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RELIGION'S INFLUENCES
ON THE WALL OF SEPARATION:
INSIGHTS FROM ROGER WILLIAMS,
JAMES BURGH, AND THOMAS JEFFERSON

Benjamin J. Hertzberg
Abstract
COilsiderillg the l'iews of three prominent adl'owtes ofa "wallo/separation" between
church anti state (Roger Williams, james Burgh, and Thomas jeffirson), this article
critiques some modern Ameriwm' lise of the lVallofseparation metaphor as an arguII1mt agaillSt religious influence

Oil

political opinion. Inasmuch as some Americam

argue the wall 0/ separation between church and state demands purely secular politiwi views, their arguments are ill unjUJtijiab/e colltrtldictiOiI with the three most
promillellt early adlJocates of church-state sepamtioll mid the wIdl metaphor itself

Introduction

W

hen Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black quoted Thomas Jefferson's
Letter to the Danbury Baptists in 1947 to argue that the first
amendment demanded a "wall of separation between church and state"
(330 U.S. 1), no one knew the radical changes his decision would affect
on church-sta'te interaction in the United States. The wall of separation
metaphor now dominates American legal and political thought about
the proper relationship between the two institutions. Daniel Dreisbach
asserts: "No phrase in American letters has more profoundly influenced
discourse and policy on church-state relations" (Dreisbach 2002, 5).
Philip Hamburger complains that even those "who attempt to wiggle free
from the clear implications of Jefferson's phrase make no effort to shake
off the phrase itself" (Hamburger 2002, 9). Today, most Americans believe the first amendment demands a wall of separation.

~rALL ()~ SFPARArION

Given this prominence, it is surprising that scholars have not more
rigorously and theoretically analyzed the wall of separation metaphor. The
legal implications and historical development of the metaphor have been
hashed and rehashed hundreds of times. Certainly the influence and ubiquity
of the metaphor demand it receive this type of treatment. Few works,
however, analyze the metaphor theoretically-asking, for example, if it
can appropriately guide American political thought about the relationship
between religion and polirics in general. Such a question is particularly
important today, as public discussion of the wall of separa;ion metaphor
grows more contentious. If America is to move toward resolution of the
internecine debate about religion's proper role in politics, the wall of
separation metaphor must be carefully analyzed, not only as a legal
doctrine mediating the relationship between the institutions of "Church"
and "State" but also as a fundamental part of the way Americans understand the relationship between religion and politics.
In order to consider the wall metaphor's proper place in American
political thought, this article will analyze the political opinions and biographical context of three early proponents of the wall of separation
metaphor: Roger Williams, James Burgh, and Thomas Jefferson. Investigation shows all three thinkers limited their respective walls of separation
to public institutions. Each believed church and state should be publicly
separated; none of their arguments led them to separate religion from
politics in their personal views. All three thinkers consciously considered
the political implications of their religious beliefs. In stark contrast, today
many cite the wall of separation metaphor to argue that Americans must
decisively remove religious influence from politics, even in individuals'
private political opinions. Such a construal of the wall of separation fundamentally changes the metaphor, making it restrain instead of protect religious freedom. Analysis of Williams's, Burgh's, and Jefferson's opinions
shows they could not have consistently understood the wall of separation
in such a way, for they advocated separation of church and state as a result
of religious influences on [heir political thought.
Modern Americans' tendency to misconstrue the wall of separation
metaphor as an argument against religious influence on political opinion
arises, in part, from the way the democratic mind treats metaphors. Alexis
de Tocqueville explains that individuals in a democracy tend to think in
broad, general terIllS; equal social conditions make citizens so similar it
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is diftlcult for them to conceive of meaningful differences between one
individual and another. As a result, their thought retreats to general
platitudes about human nature instead of rigorous, particular understanding of differences (Tocqueville 2000, 411-15). In many respects, the
entire recent history of church-state separation is a manifestation of this
democratic penchant for general ideas. The Warren Court in particular is
infamous for unyieldingly applying universal formulas like the wall of separation. However, the unyielding application of general metaphors like the
wall of separation is not the most serious implication of Tocqueville's
observations. His analysis also suggests that democratic minds push ideas
from their intended spheres into other, unintended spheres as they generalize them. Once within the democratic mind; rhe arenas to which a given
idea is applied inevitably expand-the democratic mind does not respect
incidental particularities like philosophical or political limits. As Tocqueville implied, American thought has pushed the wall of separation
metaphor beyond its intended sphere in just this way. Arguments that particular moral or religious opinions have no place in politics because there
should be a "wall of separation between church and state," or that individuals who vote in accord with their religious views infringe upon the same
separation, violate the metaphor's intended limit to the public sphere.
Such a use of the metaphor implies that individuals should gather up their
opinions into one sphere labeled "church" or "religion" and another
labeled "state" or "politics." Accordingly, individuals are actually obliged
to avoid examining the implications of one sphere upon the other-or at
least to avoid acting on those implications. Not only must church and
state be publicly separated, religion and politics must be likewise separated,
even in individuals' most private beliefs.
In his recent and acclaimed work on the separation of church and
state, Hamburger quite by accident demonstrates the way the democratic
mind pushes -the wall of separation beyond the public sphere. He accuses
those who have supported the separation of church and state of inappropriately compartmentalizing their lives:
The separation of church and state had particular appeal in
an age of specialization. Separation often attracted individuals
who-whether in fact or in their minds-divided their lives
into distinct activities and sought to maintain their freedom
within each such activity by restricting the demands of the
SIGMA

3

WALL OF SFPARArION

others. Jefferson, his allies, and many subsequent Americans
arrempted, on occa,ion, to limit religion to a private, personal,
or nonpolitical realm so that it would not intrude too much
(whether by force of law or only by tlJl'Ce of argument) on
various other aspects of their lives. To such Americans, the
moral claims of an entirely voluntary, disestablished church
could seem threatening. Accordingly, increasing numbers of
Americans attempted to escape these constraining demands
of churches by welcoming various separations between organized religion and other t~lcets of their lives, particularly
a separation between church and state. (Hamburger 2002, 16)

For Hamburger, personal compartmentalization of religion and politics is
the first step. After citizens separate religion and politics in their private
beliefs, they attempt to bring about the same separation in the public
realm. Such a formulation may perhaps be true of separationists in
more modern eras, the focus of Hamburger's analysis. Yet analyzing the
first proponents of separation of church and state-Williams, Burgh, and
Jefferson-shows, in direct contrast with Hamburger's assertions, that
each rigorously examined the political implications of his religious beliefs.
They did not rigidly compartmentalize their thought. Hamburger's failure
to notice this important aspect demonstrates how far contemporary
Americans have pushed the wall of separation beyond its original intent.
If Jefferson and those who influenced him advocated public separation
of church and state, Hamburger seems to argue, they must also have
separated religion and politics in their private beliefs. But Hamburger fails
to notice that early proponents of the wall of separation strictly limited it to
public institutions. For them, the wall of separation did not demand that
they segregate their religious ideals from their politics; indeed, it was the
natural outgrowth of those ideals. Williams, Burgh, and Jefferson, then,
could not have compartmentalized their religious opinions from their political views, for rigorous personal analysis of their religion led them
to political support for the wall of separation.

Roger Williams: Debunking Massachusetts Bay
Including Roger Williams in an analysis of the wall of separation
metaphor is surprisingly controversial. Although the obstinate New England minister was probably the first ever to use a type of wall metaphor to
advocate the separation of church and state, his work was not influential
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in early America. Williams published his works in England, and colonial
American libraries did not carry his writings (Hall 1998, 116-17; Dreisbach 2002, 78). Whatever inHuence Williams had on the development of
the wall metaphor seems to have been indirect.
Yet Williams cannot be dismissed so easily. Timothy Hall argues that
while the Supreme Court has historically favored Jefferson's rendition
of the wall metaphor, this favoring is "historically untenable" (Hall 1998,
117). He explains that early American separation of church and state owes
just as much, if not more, to Protestant dissenters, who were in rich abundance in colonial America. Whether or not Roger Williams's inHuence on
more famous early American political writers can be demonstrated or not
is less relevant, for he "is a key theoretician of [the believing, dissenting
Protestant] parentage" (Hall 1998, 117). As a dissenting Protestant in
America, Williams put forth ideas were the beginning of a tradition that
some believe was more inHuential than Jefferson's thought or that of other
Enlightenment-inspired thinkers. Any full analysis of the wall of separation
metaphor needs to examine Williams.
Williams, in turn, cannot be understood without examining the
historical context of his life and thought. He was born in England, became
a Puritan, then a Separatist, and then immigrated to Massachusetts Bay
early in the history of the colony (Morgan 1967, 24-25). Massachusetts
Bay in the early seventeenth century was an exceptional place. By lucky
oversight, the Bay Company's charter did not specifY a meeting place for
the company members. English trading companies of the day typically
met in England, allowing the Crown to oversee their dealings. The mistake
in the charter allowed the Bay Company to move their meetings to Massachusetts itself and avoid the Crown's inHuence (Morgan 1999, 40-41).
The Puritans who made up the majority of the company's membership
took advantage of this unique opportunity-without royal interference,
the Bay Colony would be free to pursue Puritanism without harassment
or corruption. The company could become a holy experiment, a "spearhead of world Protestantism" (Morgan 1999, 41).
Engaged in such important work, the Bay Company members had
a high sense of their own purpose. They believed themselves to be the
inheritors of God's covenant with ancient Israel, and as such, the Old
Testament was the model for their ideal society (Hall 1998,74). Consistent with their focus on the Old Testament, covenants were essential to
SIGMA
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Puritans' political thought; they believed both religious and political societies were and should be established by covenant. This process involved
two steps which they generally combined. First, individuals covenanted
with each other and with God to form a society; next, they chose their
rulers in the Ilame of God. Morgan explains: "Although the only visible
activity in forming the covenants was on the part of the people or their
rulers, God was thought to be a party to all the proceedings. It was his
power, not their own, that the people gave to the rulers" (Morgan 1967,
87-88, emphasis added). Because the Bay Colony was a co~enant-bound
community, its rulers felt obligated to maintain both morality and true
religion; they could not tolerate religious dissent in any form. The Bay
Colonists felt such dissent was dangerous because it broke God's covenant
and threatened to bring down His punishment on them, especially if
it was widely disseminated (Hall 1998, 79-80). As a result, though the
institutions of church and state were technically separated in the Bay
Colony, the Puritans there could not tolerate religious pluralism in any
form (Morgan 1965, xxvi). John Winthrop's handling of dissidents like
Roger Williams and Ann Hutchinson demonstrates the harsh way the Bay
Colony treated the unorthodox (Morgan 1999, 102-37).
Roger Williams's life-long project was a point-by-point refutation of
the Bay Colony's conception of politics, and he did so (as would have
made sense to him and his contemporaries) from an explicitly religious
standpoint (Morgan 1967,86). Williams's argument revolved around two
related points: First, the Catholic antichrist destroyed all authorization to
act in God's name during the Middle Ages, and second, without that authorization the Puritan covenant with God was blasphemy. Therefore, the
Bay Colonists' attempt to regulate individuals' religious beliefs and practices was also blasphemy, a truly "bloody tenet of persecution."
Williams came to believe God had revoked the authority to act in His
name, the authority Puritan's claimed in their covenant making, when he
was searching for his own divine authorization to preach to the unconverted. Puritans agreed that ministers could legitimately lead their congregations because they were selected by those congregations. Puritans voted on
their ministers and instated them in office in a manner very similar to their
political leaders (Morgan 1967,40-42, 87-88). Williams believed that this
authorization did not extend to the unconverted, for they were not members of any church and therefore did not participate in selecting ministers.

G
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The unconverted were, in effect, outside of any duly authorized Puritan
minister's "jurisdiction" (Morgan 1%7, 41). Yet Williams believed with
other Puritans that conversion to the gospel came only through hearing
God's Word. He thus had to face an unpleasant question: "If conversion
must be preceded by preaching, and if ministers must preach only to the
converted [members of the church], how is the circle to be broken?" (Morgan 1967,42, insertion added). Williams desperately wanted to be an evangelist-to preach Christianity to the unconverted, yet he could find no authorization in the Bible to do so. The early apostles received their authority
directly from Christ, and their ministry was the only biblical precedent for
the type of preaching Williams hoped to do. Without a direct commission
from Christ, Williams could not engage in the apostolic ministry he desired.
Yet Williams believed that receiving such a commission was impossible.
Churches in his day traced their authority back to Christ through the
Catholic Church-Williams's antichrist. It was this very Catholic Church
that, in Williams's mind, was responsible for ending the apostolic ministry
and corrupting Christ's Church. Williams could not believe that Christ's
authority could be traced through the antichrist itself, so he was forced
to conclude that the antichrist had permanently ended the apostolic
ministry. It could only be restored as it was established-through the
personal ministry of Jesus Christ (Morgan 1967,46-47). Williams did
not see this restoration in his day either, and without it both his efforts to
preach to the unconverted and the authority claims of all Christian
churches were suspect. Lacking apostolic authority, they were merely an
earthly gathering of like-minded individuals-God was not in their organization (Morgan 1967, 89).
The political implications of such a conclusion are clear. If Williams
held the claims to authority Puritan ministers asserted in contempt, then
the political claims Winthrop and others made were at least as illegitimate.
As with the Church, Williams sought evidence that God had covenanted
with the Bay colonists in establishing their holy society. "Where and when
and how, he wanted to know, did God transfer his powers to the people
or anyone else?" (Morgan 1967, 88). Without evidence of God's involvement with the Bay Colony's covenant, Williams could not believe that
Winthrop or anyone else had the authority they claimed to enforce true
religion. God had made his presence and involvement with ancient Israel
abundantly clear; they had legitimately claimed His authorization
SIGMA
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in government. The Bay Colony, however, was different. Arguing as they
did without proper evidence that their government was divine was
blasphemy-acting in God's name without His approval (Morgan 1967,
89). Furthermore, without evidence of God's authorization, the Puritans'
claim that they were the inheritors of God's covenant with Israel was likewise suspect (Hall 1998, 76-77). This led Williams to disdain not only
the Bay Colony's public enforcement of religion, but also their entire holy
experiment-it was an "unholy delusion" (Morgan 1967, 103). Claiming
to be God's Israel without justification was blasphemy. The Bay Colony,
like all other governments and like the various Christian churches, was
merely an organization of men, necessary, but not divine.
Williams's conclusion that governments are purely secular-created
without authorization from God-led to his final conclusion: Charging
the government to enforce true religion was also blasphemy. Believing that
government was authorized to establish true religion meant believing
that a secular organization should rule over the church-the only, albeit
limited, place where people could interact with God. It was an untenable
contradiction as blasphemous as the Bay Colony's claim to be a modern
Israel (Morgan 1967, 94-96). As a result, Williams could argue the following, the source of his own wall metaphor: "When they [members of
God's ChurchJ have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation between the garden of the Church and the wilderness of the world, God has
ever broken down the wall itself, removed the candlestick, and made his
garden a wilderness, as at this day (Williams 1963, emphasis and insertion
added). Blasphemously assuming God's authority in government and
thereby seeking to enforce religion with state power was the very reason
God had removed His authority from the Catholic Church anciently
(Morgan 1967, 96). In Williams's day, the situation was the same: Government sought to enforce religion illegitimately, and the garden of the
church remained a wilderness, bereft of God's influence.
Williams's justification for separating church and state was supremely
religious. Believing that no secular organization could assume God's
authority, Williams argued that no government, the Bay Colony's or
otherwise, could legitimately enforce religion. If there was someone,
somewhere, who could justifiably claim God's authority, the situation
would be different, as it was in ancient Israel. But such a person was
absent, and hence the church needed to be kept separate from the wilderness
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of the world, for if humans attempted to command God through their
desires to establish a state church, God would remove whatever remnants
of true religion remained. Williams's wall could not have demanded the
strict removal of religious influence from political opinions as some use
the wall of separation today. Indeed, such a construal of the wall would
undermine the very arguments Williams used to justify it. Without
considering the political implications of his religious beliefs, Williams
could not have argued for the separation of church and state.

James Burgh: Moral Regeneration and Church-State Separation
James Burgh was a late eighteenth-century Scottish reformer in London who is relatively unknown today despite his considerable influence on
the American Founders. Jefferson himself recommended Burgh's most famous work, Politicfli Disquisitions, to his son-in-law, and Daniel Dreisbach
reports that "Jefferson read and admired the Scotsman's work and almost
certainly encountered Burgh's use of the 'wall of separation' metaphor in his
extensive readings" (Dreisbach 2002, 79, 81). Indeed, Political Disquisitions was a famous, influential text in late eighteenth-century America;
its list of "encouragers" included Samuel Chase, John Hancock, Thomas
Jefferson, and Benjamin Rush (Burgh 1775). Excerpts appeared in print
from Kentucky to Holland (Hay 1979, 11 1). Although Burgh does not
reference the wall of separation in Political Disquisitioll5--the reference
comes from his Crito (Burgh 1766, 68)-it is likely that this work was as
widely read as his others. As with Williams, analysis of Burgh's thought on
the separation of church and state shows his position depends on the influence of his religion on his politics.
Burgh held remarkably firm religious convictions. Carla Hay, one
of the few scholars to publish extensively on Burgh, explains: "The mainspring of James Burgh's character and conduct was a moral code grounded
in his religious convictions. It dominated his personal and professional relationships and occasioned his literary career. Neither Burgh nor his writings can be understood apart from this reality" (Hay 1979,49). Burgh believed in public worship; he thought that "organized religion was the most
valid expression of man's religious needs and duties," and he was a confirmed, faithful Protestant even though he doubted his religious upbringing. He also defended the Bible as "the sole rule of Christianity" and
believed in prayer, revelation, miracles, and moral absolutes (Hay 1979,
SIGMA
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50-54). Burgh did not simply believe his religion, though--he had to
convince others of the truths he knew. Hay calls Burgh "an activist whose
concept of Christian commitment made him a natural evangelist, born to
strive for the hearts of men" (Hay 1979, 92). This evangelical tendency led
Burgh to his publishing career.
Hay records that Burgh was raised in an orthodox Scottish Presbyterian home as the son of a minister and then went to London in search of a
viable livelihood. In London, he was shocked at the immorality he observed
and "embarked on a lifelong crusade for the moral regeneration of his
adopted homeland" (Hay 1979, 92). The London Burgh saw was a frightful place for the moral and religious:
The men of new wealth were building homes of unprecedented
lavishness. There were clubs of quite another sort. Grocers
made rich by speculation, nabobs come back from the
colonies, gentry bored with life in their estates flocked to
the capital and threw themselves into an unabashed quest f(H
wealth and pleasure. Debauchery spread through the habits of
new and old families: to gamble, to drink oneself inw a stupor,
[() dally promiscuously with mistresses and lovers were accepted
conventions of a society in which no one knew his place
or station and in which obligations had no binding quality.
(Handlin and Handlin 1%1,43)
Burgh's outrage led him to his first publications, which were filled with
polemical cries for moral regeneration. His interest in politics began later.
Significantly influenced by Lord Bolingbroke's ideas of the Patriot-King,
Burgh hoped for an end to the corruption and immorality in English
society when young George III assumed the throne. Finally, he thought,
England had a chance to be led by a truly enlightened monarch, one untouched by the woes of factionalism and political infighting. But Burgh
was disappointed; George III became the focal point of intense political
conflict and actually increased corruption. Burgh's dismay led him to his
first political work, the unpublished "Remarks Historical and Political," in
which he lectured "the new monarch on his moral and political responsibilities as if he were an adolescent schoolboy" (Hay 1979, 92-99). In the
next few years, Burgh's disappointment deepened, and he began to fear
that Britain's mixed constitution would be replaced by a tyrannical,
aristocratic regime. Hay explains: "Believing that 'no nation ever was very
corrupt under a long continued virtuous government, nor virtuous under
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a long continued VICIOUS administration' [Burgh] was metamorphosed
into one of the earliest and most vigorous spokesmen for radical reform
during the first decades of George Ill's reign" (Hay 1979, 101). The
Handlins concur that, though originally interested only in morality, "his
environment and the temper of the times" led Burgh to politics (Handlin
and Handlin 1961, 42). His political action grew naturally from his firm,
religiously inspired, moral beliefs. He eventually realized the importance
the political realm had upon the moral state of his country and began to
agitate for radical reform in addition to moral regeneration. Burgh's political desires were an expression of his religious morality.
Among the many reforms Burgh advocated was the disestablishment
of the Anglican Church, and he uses the wall of separation metaphor to
argue tor disestablishment. Burgh writes in the Crito:
I will fairly tell you what will be the consequences of your
setting up such a mixed-mungrel-spiritual-temporal-secularecclesiastical establishment. You will make the dispensers of
religion despicable and odio1ls to all men of sense, and will
destroy the spirituality, in which consists the whole value
of religion . . . . Put into the hands of the people the clerical
emoluments; and let them give them who they will. ... We
have in our times a proof ... that such a scheme will ... prevent
infinite corruption;-ecc/esiastiCtl! corruption; the most odious
of all corruption.
Build an impenetrable wall uf sep{lrtltioll between things sacred
and ch,i!. ... To proltllze ... a religion, which you pretend to
rel'erence; is an impiety suHlcient to bring down upon your
heads, the roof of the sacred building you thus defile. (Burgh
1766, italics in original)

Burgh certainly did not have a problem with strong condemnations. Just
as his firm rel~gious beliefs led Burgh to politics, they also led him to argue
for a "wall of separation between things sacred and civil." The selection
above demonstrates Burgh's reasoning: Mixing religion with government
in the public sphere leads to ecclesiastical corruption as priests and ministers
become more concerned with their funding than with saving souls or
preaching the Word. Indeed, although those who seek to commingle religion
and government do so with the interests of the Church in mind, they
actual defile religion with worldly influences. Such commingling not only
leads to corruption, it destroys the very religion it attempts to establish.
SIGMA
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Burgh's religious commitment is evident in the Crito passage. Ecclesiastical corruption is "the most odious of all corruption"; it is dangerous because it will destroy religion, not government. This and other religious
beliefs led him to advocate separating church and state. Burgh demands
purity from the sacred, and this purity requires separation from government's worldly influence. The themes in the Crito reference are not
isolated in Burgh's work. PolitiCflI Disquisitions contains similar language,
though Burgh does not specifically make a wall of separation reference:
Governments have it not in their power co do their subjecrs the
least service as to their religious belief and mode of worship.
On the contrary, whenever rhe civil magistrate interposes his
authority in matter of religion, otherwise than in keeping the
peace amongst all religious panics, YOLI may (face every step
he has taken by the mischievous effects his interposition has

produced. (Burgh 1775, 202, italics by author)
This is more of rhe same: Religion is outside of the government's
authority, and government's attempts to influence it have terrible results. He
later writes: "By ... labouring for the establishment of what they are pleased
to call the true church ... they open to themselves a direct path to enslaving the people" (Burgh 1775,203). When the government controls religion
it leads to servitude. What's more, the government could and should use its
influence for other, better purposes. The government, he argues, "by guiding [the people] into right, moral, and political principles and manners ...
might enable them to judge soundly of the conduct of those in power, and
inspire them with a noble spirit of resistance to tyranny" (Burgh 1775,
203). Establishing religion is a terrible case of misused power. Government
could teach the people political virtue-how to avoid tyranny and the
inevitable moral corruption it brings. Yet instead, governments support
specific churches and corrupt religion instead of enlightening the people.
As a result, England is not only deprived of pure religious institutions, it is
also deprived of the moral fiber that could enable it to resist tyranny and
corruption. For Burgh, separating church and state is one step in getting
the state to properly use its power to teach the people morality and resistance to tyranny. His hopes for moral regeneration in England demanded
that he advocate the separation of church and state.
Thus, the influence of religion on Burgh's politics is obvious. Motivated by religious conviction to advocate moral regeneration in London,
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Burgh eventually realized that moral regeneration was linked to politics.
Corrupt politics leads to corrupt people, so Burgh the moralist became
Burgh the political radical. His advocacy for the separation of church and
state was intimately tied up with these desires. The government was misusing its considerable moral authority establishing religion and thereby
corrupting religion while ignoring the political education of the people.
Separating church and state was a necessary step in both preserving the
sacred nature of the church and getting the government to do its part in
bringing about England's moral regeneration. Like Williams's, Burgh's
wall of separation was inspired by his religious beliefs. Construing the wall
as separating religion from politics even in one's private beliefs would
undermine the beliefs that led Burgh to advocate church-state separation.
Religion taught Burgh the importance of a nation's morality, and to
preserve that morality Burgh advocated the wall of separation.

Thomas Jefferson: Enlightenment Politics and Religion
Analysis of the wall of separation metaphor would of course be
incomplete without including Thomas Jefferson, the most famous proponent of the phrase. Jefferson's political and religious views remain controversial nearly two hundred years after the pinnacle of his career. He also
presents the greatest possible objection to the argument of this article. Of
all the early advocates of church-state separation, Jefferson is both the
most rigorous and the most religiously heterodox. Indeed, as cited above,
Hamburger feels that Jefferson is the first of a long line of separationists
who felt that religion has no place in politics, whether in the public sphere
or in individuals' private beliefs (Hamburger 2002, 16). While Jefferson's
religious views are indeed heterodox, they still played an important part in
his advocacy of church-state separation, especially later in his life. Jefferson, like Williams and Burgh, could not have consistently argued the wall
of separation was meant to completely remove religious influence from
politics, for his religious beliefs influenced his political opinions.
Understanding Jefferson's religious tolerance begins with his belief in
"Nature's God" and Scottish moral sense philosophy. Even early in his life,
when he wrote the Declaration of Independence, for example, Jefferson
believed in "Nature's God," the Deists' God who created the universe
according to regular, natural laws and then left it and the humans he
created to occupy it alone (Jayne 1998, 139). Jefferson believed this
SIGMA
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Deists' God had given all humans moral sense to enable them to distinguish
right from wrong. Jdferson wrote: "The moral sense, or conscience, is as
much a part of man as his leg or arm" (Jefferson 1950, 14-15). Richard
Matthews explains that for Jefferson, "Morality is a matter of the senses, not
of the intellect; apptopriately, nature has given to man a moral sense that
enables him, without the aid of calculation, to differentiate right from
wrong" (Matthews 1984, 60). The implications of this belief are radical,
especially for Jefferson's time: If every individual is endowed by Nature's
God with the ability to discern right from wrong for him- or herself, then
inherited political authority and traditional state establishment of religion
lose legitimacy. No longer can the state justifiably proscribe an individual's
religious decisions; the individual should choose his or her beliefs alone.
Significantly, Jefferson argues that the moral sense works "without calculation"; at another point Jefferson explained that God "would have been a
pitiful bungler" if he had made morality an abstract, technical endeavor like
science. For every scientist, there are a thousand who cannot understand his
or her ideas, and Jefferson wonders "What would have become of them?"
(Jefferson 1950, 14-15). For Jefferson, all individuals have, to some degree
or another, the ability to choose right and wrong for themselves. This implies that those individuals also have the right to choose their religion. The
state should not abridge individuals' moral views by forcing them to believe
or to say they believe. Humans should he taught, not coerced.
Religious toleration derives directly from Jefferson's belief in individual
moral sense. Allen Jayne explains: "Having endowed each individual with
the faculty of reason, Nature's God, the God of reason, left individuals
alone to find religious truth and God with that faculty" (Jayne 1998, 139).
Regardless of whether scholars speak of moral sense or reason, however, the
implications are the same: God gave humans the ability to determine right
from wrong individually, and thus, for Jefferson, compelling individuals to
believe is morally reprehensible. Jefferson took this belief seriously. When
an amendment was proposed to change Virginia's statute of religious freedom to protect only Christians, Jefferson objected and argued that the law
was meant to protect not only Christians but also Jews, Muslims, Hindus,
even the "Infidel," a position shockingly tolerant in his day (Jayne 1998,
156). Jayne goes on to argue that the reverence Jefferson felt for the
first amendment-his desire to separate church and state-stemmed from
the moral duty Jefferson felt to tolerate all religions (Jayne 1998, 158).

14

SICMA

H f.Rrl.llFIU~

Believing, then, that Nature's God had endowed humans with the ability
to determine right from wrong (either through moral sense or reason),
Jefferson could not justifY state efforts to compel religious belief, whether
through establishing a state church or broadly protecting Christianity.
The preceding are opinions Jefferson appears to have held during the
early Declaration of Independence/Virginia Starute of Religious Freedom
stage of his life, later during his presidency, and after. Importantly, however, Jefferson became markedly more religious during his presidency.
While never joining a traditional Christian sect and still holding many
heterodox views, Jefferson began to adopt aspects of Christian morality. It
was in this phase of his life that Jefferson wrote the Letter to the Danbury
Baptists, in which he mentioned the wall of separation.
At this later stage in his life, Jefferson's personal philosophy became an
interesting mix of Epicul'Us, whom he ostensibly admired throughout his
life, and what he termed the "real" teachings of Jesus. Matthews explains
that while Jefferson felt Epicurtls an effective guide for personal decisions,
he also thought Epicurean hedonism inappropriately limited political action and political community. T() complement Epicurus, Jefferson added
Jesus' moral ideals, unadulterated by the "Platonists." As Matthews points
out, this enabled him to believe that political communities were a natural
part of human life, distinguishing him from Madison, Hamilton, and
other contemporaries dominated by various forms of Lockean liberalism
(Matthews 1984, 91-93). for them, political communities were not
natural; they had to be agreed upon or imposed. Epicurean hedonisms'
over-compartmentalization, its over-privatization of life led, Jefferson to
Jesus' moral teachings.
Jefferson also came to believe that God, while not intervening directly
in human affairs, would hold men accountable for their actions, and Jesus'
teachings were the most pure moral code to teach humans how to conduct
those actions-(JefTerson 1989, 350). In a letter to Benjamin Waterhouse,
Jefferson outlines what he believes to be the pure teachings of/esus, which
"tend toward the happiness of man." His belief and devotion to these
teachings allowed the later Jefferson to consider himself a Christian. He
explains that the sum of Christ's teachings is
that there is one Cod, and he is all perfect:
that there is a future state of rewards and punishments:
SIGMA
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that to love God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as
thyself, is the sum of religion. (Jefferson 1989, 4(5)
jefferson referred to himself as a Christian, though not in the traditional
sense. He felt he was a Christian in the sense jesus himself intended, before his teachings were corrupted by Platonic philosophy (Jdterson 1989,
331, 365). This was jefferson's rational Christianity, the nearest he ever
came to adopting a traditional religion.
Later in his life, Jefferson mixed a hope that his forlJ1 of rational
Christianity would gain prominence in America with his original moral
duty to be religiously tolerant. He believed that if only people were free
from religious oppression they would come to see the truth of his own
position. To Jared Sparks he argues: "If the freedom of religion, guaranteed by law in theory, can ever rise in practice under the overbearing
inquisition of public opinion, truth will prevail over fanaticism, and the
genuine doctrines of Jesus ... will again be restored to their original
purity" (Jefferson 1989, 402, italics in original). Later jefferson writes
similarly: "Had [Jesus'] doctrines, pure as they came from himself, been
never sophisticated for unworthy purposes, the whole civilised world
would at this day have formed a single sect" (Jefferson 1989, 404). The
late Jefferson speaks much like the adherent of a minority religion: Religious tolerance is important because it allows others to see the virtues of
his position.
jefferson's religious toleration led to separation of church and state for
other reasons as well. He was suspicious of clergy and theological debate.
Not only were the religions and theologies of his day authoritarian, jefferson's belief in Nature's God and in individual moral sense led him to
disregard theology in general. Jefferson explained to William Canby:
"} believe ... that he who steadily observes those moral precepts in which
all religions concur, will never be questioned, at the gates of heaven, as to
the dogmas in which they all differ" (Jefferson 1989,350). Instead of theological distinctions, living the teachings of religion was most important to
Jefferson. It would be utterly absurd for him to assign political privileges
based on religious differences, for doing so gave too much importance to
the very theological distinctions he felt were so irrelevant.
With the above background in mind, the consistency between the text
of Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists and the rest of his views is
clear. Jefferson wrote:
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Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his Cod, thar he owes account to none other
for his faith and worship, rhar the legislarive powers of government reach actions only, and nor opinions, I contemplate with
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people
which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereoC thus building a wall of separarion between
church and state. (Jefferson 18(2)
The Danbury Letter is a summary of Jefferson's views about religious
toleration. It is consistent with his ideas as expressed elsewhere. Religion
is a personal matter, and government should not intervene in personal
matters. In order to protect individuals from such intervention, the first
amendment builds a wall of separation between church and state.
At this time in Jefferson's life the wall of separation is a product of
several different aspects of his thought. It most certainly stems from his
belief in individual moral sense: Because Nature's God has bestowed
humans wirh at least some ability to determine right from wrong individually, the state should not endeavor to take that choice away from its
citizens. Jefferson's advocacy of the wall of separation may also reflect the
influence of his more religious ideals, his desire to give Americans the freedom to see through the sophistry of traditional Christian sects and come to
adopt a more rational, "Christian" Christianity. The question remains, however, if Jefferson's advocacy of the wall of separation resembles Williams's
and Burgh's more explicitly religious justifications of it.
Jefferson's views are radically different from both Williams and Burgh.
Jefferson was educated in philosophy and his ideas display a familiarity
with it that both Williams and Burgh lack. He is also less religious than
both of them. However, Hamburger's claim that Jefferson compartmentalized his religious beliefs from his political opinions, implying that his
religion did not influence his politics (or, for that matter, that his politics
did not affect his religion), is an unjustified exaggeration. He was less
religious than many of his contemporaries, and he was suspicious of
traditional Christianity, bur that is not to say that he was irreligious. Jefferson believed in God. He believed God had given humans their
conscience and would hold them accountable for their actions in the
afterlife. He did not believe Jesus was divine, but he did believe that Jesus'
teachings comprised the best morality he had ever found. These opinions
SIGMA
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influenced his thought, especially later in his life when he wrote the
Letter to the Danbury Baptists. Though his justification for the separation
of church and state is not as explicitly religious as Williams's or Burgh's, it
still relies upon the political implications of his religious opinions. Moral
sense, an endowment from God, is a religious view, especially in today's
context. Furthermore, both Jefferson's religious and political views were
similarly radical, and that radicalism was a consequence of his application
of moral sense philosophy and the "true" teachings of Jesus to both his
religion and his politics. Jefferson's wall, then, like Williams's a'nd Burgh's,
cannot be meant to remove religious influence from personal political
beliefs. Jefferson's unique, heterodox religious opinions influenced his advocacy of the wall of separation, just as his political egalitarianism and belief in moral sense influenced his religious opinions. Construing Jefferson's
use of the wall metaphor as an attempt to eliminate religious influence
from political opinion would contradict the roots of Jefferson's own advocacy of the wall of separation.
Conclusions

While Jefferson, Burgh, and Williams were obviously thinkers
very different from each other, their differences do not undermine the
similarities behind their advocacy of the wall of separation. Each believed
in the wall for different reasons. Jefferson's theories of human nature and
moral sense demanded releasing individuals from authoritarian political
institutions, including state establishments of religion. The individual
should be free to choose his or her path and establishing a state church
abrogated that freedom. Burgh felt state churches led to the corruption
both of religion and of national morality; the government, instead of
using state power to educate the nation's political virtues, wasted its energy
establishing religion. Separating church and state was a way to get the government to attend to its educational duties. Williams advocated separation
of chllfch and state because he felt no government could claim the authority of God Moses exercised necessary to abridge an individual's religious
choice. Punishing individuals for their religious views was blasphemously
assuming God's authority.
As disparate as their reasons for advocating chllfch-state separation
were, all three thinkers had one important point in common: their belief
in separation was, at least in part, a result of the political implications
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of their religious views. Jefferson's belief that the Deists' God hestowed
individuals with moral sense significantly influenced his politics, and
Burgh's and Williams's political views both grew directly out of their
religious convictions. Burgh's religious desire for moral regeneration led
him to advocate church-state separation, while Williams's denial that any
human on earth, in religion or politics, held God's authority pushed him
in the same direction. All three thinkers' respective "walls of separation"
owed much to the influence of religion on their politics.
It is clear, then, that modern Americans' attempt to reinterpret the
wall of separation metaphor as a description of the proper relationship
between religion and politics in general, including within individuals'
personal opinions, instead of its intended use as a metaphor to describe
the proper public relationship between the institutions of church and
state, inappropriately stretches the metaphor's application. While the
metaphor may he an appropriate description of the way Church and State
are to interact publicly, it cannot be used to guide the interaction of religion
and politics more generally, especially not within the realm of private
opinion. All three early advocates of the wall of separation-Williams,
Burgh, and Jefferson-did so in part because of the political implications
of their religious views. Indeed, all three early users of the metaphor
consciously considered the implications of their religion on their politics
and vice versa. Construing the wall metaphor as a guide for the relationship
of religion and politics in general undermines the foundation upon which the
early proponents of church-state separation huilt their wall, the foundation
of religiously informed political opinion. Today, if civil libertarians are
concerned about public violations of the wall of separation, they would
do well to consider whether the wall crumbles now because Americans no
longer seem as concerned about the political implications and demands of
their waning religious convictions.
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DIFFERENCES IN LEVELS
OF VOTER TURNOUT
AMONG THE MEXICAN STATES
David R. Hansen, Errol L. King, and Samuel H. Peterson

Abstract
[/I the 20()() electiollS, voter turnout l'aried wide0' mnong Mexican states, /1vm as high

72 to as low I1S 52 percent, This article luill answer the question: Why did voter
turnout vary among the states during Mexico's 2000 presidential elections? We
will show how levels o/weafth, educdtio/l, alld other resources, as well as indigenous
ClI!ture, are injlue/ltiaf in expldining variations in l'ott'r turnout, 1X'0 will determine
tI){' illf!uolce of'these l'ariabfes 011 IJ(Jter turnollt throllgh regressio/l allf10,sis of'the
thirf)'-two st{lfes lif'Mexico and (,dse studies of'the Fedeml District, Guerrero, Chidpas,
ilnd YUCilttlll,

ilS

Presentation of Research Question and Puzzle

I

t is important to understand voter turnout because it can indicate the
health of democracy in a country or other political unit, As Mark
Franklin write'S, "Participation is the lifeblood of democracy" (Franklin
1996, 216), Arend Lijphart reinforces this by asserting that political
participation through voting is one of several "basic democratic ideals"
(Lijphart 1997, 1), Political participation can indicate a strong political culture and high levels of citizen involvement in government, In addition, it
enables all groups of society to influence policy outcomes,
Because of its importance, many political scientists have examined
variation in voter turnollt among countries. In spite of the many efforts to
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explain voter turnout using national level variables such as compulsory
voting laws, party structure, salience of elections, proportionality of the
electoral system, and weekend voting (Franklin 1<)96,217; Jackman 1987,
407-09), few have attempted to explain variation in voter turnout within
countries outside of the United States. There is much variation among
subnational divisions in terms of voter turnout that cannot be explained
by an analysis of international variation.
We are particularly interested in the intranational varia.tion of voter
turnout in Mexico. In the most recent presidential elections, voter turnout
varied by as much as 20 percent berween Mexican states, as in Chiapas,
which had the lowest turnout levels in the country at 52.2 percent, and
neighboring Yucatan, which had the highest turnout at 72.0 percent (lFE
[2]). Other examples of neighboring states with high levels of variation
in voter turnout included Baja California and Baja California Sur, whose
levels of voter turnout differed by 10 percent. The levels of voter turnout
of rwo northern states, Durango and Jalisco, also differed by approximately
10 percent. If geography were the only factor in explaining voter turnout,
we would expect voter turnout to be more homogenous within regions, if
not nationwide. It is difficult to say that these differences are the result of
random variation because, as we will show, significant patterns are visible
in the state-by-state data. In this article we will address the puzzle: Why
does this variation of voter turnout occur within a country that has the
same electoral laws in all of its states?

Theoretical Background
We believe that a combination of resource, instrumental motivation,
and cultural theories explains discrepancies in the levels of state voter
turnout in Mexico. These theories, as we found in our data analysis, can
be mutually reinforcing, and difIerent theories may have varying levels
of applicability in difIerent states. In certain areas a history of extreme internal conflict may also affect attitudes toward voting, such as in the
case of Chiapas. We will explain the effects of conflict using instrumental
motivation theory.
To explain cross-state variations in voter turnout, we intend to use
resource theory and instrumental motivation theory, which are described
by Mark Franklin in his chapter "Electoral Participation" in the book
Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Pmpectives. Simply
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stated, resource theory is the idea that "people participate who have the
time and money to do so" (Franklin 1996, 220). In this view, the rich, the
educated, and those who have time to spare will be more likely to vote
than the poor, the uneducated, and those who have little time. Steven ).
Rosenstone argues that this is because voting, like all types of political participation, imposes an opportunity cost on scarce resources that the poor
or unemployed could otherwise use to improve their economic situation
(Rosenstone 1982,41). According to Lijphart, "the inequality of representation and inAuence [is] ... systematically biased in [1.Vor of more privileged citizens-those with higher incomes, greater wealth, and better
education-and against less advantaged citizens" (Lijphart 1997, 1).
Lijphart supports this by referring to a study by Harold F. Gosnell: "Gosnell ... found that turnout increased with economic status and that 'the
more schooling the individual has the more likely he is to register and vote
in presidential elections'" (Lijphart 1997, 2). Thus, if resource theory
is correct, we should see higher voter turnout in states with high average
levels of education, wealth, and other resources. States with chronic
poverty and low levels of education would be expected to exhibit lower
voter turnout.
Instrumental motivation theory suggests that voters will be more likely
to vote if they feel that their vote will positively inAuellce the electoral
outcome. This theory implies that an individual voter makes a cost-benefit
analysis, consciously or not, involving the likelihood that her vote will
affect public policy, the degree to which sllch an effect would benefit
her, and the costs of voting. One important factor in this costbenefit analysis is the level of contestation between parties or candidates
in the election. A citizen will be more likely to vote in a close election, becallse she will perceive that her vote is more likely to swing the outcome
toward her favored candidate. Thus, we expect that if instrumental motivation theory is accurate, we should see higher voter turnout in states
where an election is close, more is at stake, or the costs of voting are lower
(Franklin 1996, 221).
One particular aspect of the cost-benefit analysis found in instrumental motivation theory is the effect of the threat of violence on voter
turnout. Disruption caused by factors such as armed conAict and extreme
social tension can have a negative impact on the willingness and ability of
people to vote. This will occur in cases of extreme violence and societal
SIGMA
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unrest because of increased danger of violence to those who use their vote
oppose armed groups. Conflict, intimidation, political coercion, and
other disruptions may also indicate reduced perceptions of democratic
legitimacy, which would increase citizens' reluctance to vote. We have
found that this application of instrumental motivation theory is particularly useful in explaining the low levels of voter turnout in the southern
state of Chiapas, which has experienced a great deal of armed conflict in
the past decade.
In our analysis of voter turnout, we will also employ an indigenous
culture theory. We believe that high levels of indigenous culture in certain
Mexican states will tend to lower voter turnout. Much of this effect stems
from indigenous Mexicans' perceptions of themselves as alienated from
the mainstream of their society and from the benefits of representative
government. They may not feel that national representative institutions
address their particular needs, or they may be uninformed about the larger
issues in an election because of limited language skills and insufficient access to media information on elections. Indigenous people may even feel
that the national government is hostile toward them and their interests. As
Wendy K. Tam eho writes:
to

If minorities have infimnational and social networks that provide unique political information and a different source of
polirical socialization, they may not derive the same sort of satisfacrion from aHlrming allegiance to the political system or
have the same sense of responsibility for preserving the democraticprocess. (Cho 1999,1144)
In particular, we will examine the effects of large monolingual indigenous
language populations on voter turnout. We believe that large monolingual
indigenous populations in a state will lead to lower voter turnout. As Cho
claims in her study of immigrant political socialization, proficiency in the
dominant language of one's country greatly improves the possibilities
for political participation. Her analysis implies that at least a minimum
proficiency is important in overcoming bureaucratic processes in registering to vote and obtaining information about political issues.
Cho also argues that "minority populations have a tendency ... to establish ethnic communities or neighborhood clusters" (Cho 1999, 1144).
An indigenous village with many citizens that do not speak Spanish will
be less likely to feel itself a part of Mexican society than a village where
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bilingual or monolingual Spanish speakers predominate. Monolingual
speakers of an indigenous language will likely be less informed about election issues and may hold a more parochial perspective than Spanish speakers who have access to a national media perspective. Maria Paris, writing
for the Instituto Federal Electoral, shows that Mexican speakers of indigenous languages are likely to be less tolerant of other races, religions, and
political backgrounds than non-indigenous Mexicans (n.d.). This easily
leads to alienation from the non-indigenous majority and the mestizodominated political system.
Furthermore, the cultural divide in Mexico appears to be widening, as
the populations of speakers of almost all of Mexico's indigenous languages
continue to grow, passing on their language and culture to future generations.
For example, from 1970 to 2000, the population of people speaking an indigenous language nearly doubled and now comprises over 6 percent of
the national population of Mexico (INEGI [4]). In all eleven states where
10 percent or more of the speakers of indigenous languages were monolingual, voter turnout was below the national average. The monolingual
population is a reflection of the level of integration of the indigenous population of a state. If indigenous culture is a fundamental determinant of
voter turnout, we expect to see lower levels of voter turnout in states with
deeply entrenched indigenous communities, as measured by a large proportion of indigenous people in a state, a low percentage of Spanish speakers, and large groups of monolingual speakers of an indigenous language.
In addition to instrumental motivation theory and resource theory,
Franklin also uses mobilization theory to explain voter turnout. This
theory holds that "citizens ... are more likely to participate if encouraged
to do so" (Franklin 1996, 220). Mobilization theory also stresses the importance of the "activities of groups and organizations (especially political
parties)" in increasing voter turnout (Franklin 1996, 220). This theory, although applicable, was not used in our analysis due to a lack of sufficiently
detailed information about the mobilization efforts of political and other
civic organizations in each Mexican state. To collect the necessary data to
examine mobilization theory, we would most likely need to conduct field
studies and other more in-depth research into efforts at mobilizing the
various groups of Mexican society.
We must keep in mind the reinforcing effect of these theories on one
another in predicting voter turnout. One theory may be more generally
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applicable and thus capable of establishing a rough baseline prediction for
voter turnout, which is then modified by more state-specific variables. Resource theory, for example, is applicable to all states because of its focus on
variables that are seen in all states of a country, such as levels of wealth and
education. As Franklin points our, instrumental motivation theory and resource theory are often highly interrelated, as citizens whose opportunity
cost of voting, in time and effort expended, is higher are probably less
likely to vote. Our indigenous culture theory, in contras~, may have
high predictive and explanatory power in particular cases, such as that of
Chiapas and other states with large indigenous groups, while being unable
to explain anything about voter turnout in an area where indigenous
culture has no significant presence.
We must also note that causative variables from different theories
may be correlated with one another. For example, indigenous culture may
affect the amount of education that a person may receive, while an advanced education may cause an individual to reject many aspects of her indigenous heritage. The presence of high correlations between some of our
independent variables indicated the possibility of multicollinearity, which
can produce unreliable regression results. For example, there was a large
correlation (R=0.77) between average years of school and per capita GOP.
To overcome the problem of multicollinearity, since the variables used to
examine a particular theory will most likely be closely related, such as different variables measuring education or wealth, we eliminated some of
these redundant variables from the regression.

Regression Analysis
To support our thesis, we ran several regressions on the variables we
thought would be most useful in supporting or undermining the theories
we used to explain voter turnout. Though we discovered some possible
problems with our data, we were able to mitigate them by using statistical
techniques. Among the group of variables we examined, we found that indigenolls culture had the most significant influence on voter turnout.
To examine the contestation element of instrumental motivation
theory, we used the difference in vote share between the top two votegetting parties in each state in the 2000 legislative elections to indicate the
level of competition in state elections. To assess the theory that states with
high percentages of indigenous population have lower voter tumour, we
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Table 1: Influences on Voter Turnout
Independent
Variable
Percentage lllonolingual

ClleHicients (t-ratios) Coefficients (t-ratios) Coefllcients (t-ratios)

-0.24')' (141)

-Il.l R I (-1.702)

--

0.11.)(1.\15)

0.09')7 (J.()H7)

0.111 (1.220)

\'ote ~harc of top two
parties

O.O')Wi (I.OW;)

0.094') (1.0.,6)

00752 (O.R03)

Per capita COP

0.05')') (1.1')6)

O.O.l(,8 (1.221)

0.05') I" (1.888)

--

-j. ')47 (-O.HS4)

-0.4,')" (-2677)

')2.6')7' (6,,1')2)

53.R4Y (6.427)

')0582" (').995)

Adjusted R'

n.,91

0.386

0,,143

F-r~ltio

,).')S4"

4.9(),)'

5.052'

indigenous

Percentage Catholic
Difference between

Chiapas and Oaxaca
Dummy

Constant

Dependent variable: Percentage voter turnout
* indicates p :0. OJ)')
H
indicates p:O. 0.1 ()

measured the level of indigenous cultural influence as the percentage of a
state's indigenous population that speaks only an indigenous language. We
found this to be a more accurate depiction of the depth of indigenous
culture in an area than the percentage of the population that spoke an indigenous language without regard for other languages spoken because it
takes into account the level of indigenous integration into or alienation
from mainstream Mexican society. We collected data on gross domestic
product (GDr) per capita in each state (INEGI [7]) in order to test resource theory's implication that people with more wealth tend to vote
more. We also found data on the percentage of people who identified
themselves as Catholic in a given state, which enabled us to control for religious affiliation, which varies widely among the states (INEGI [10]).
Regression 1 in Table 1 analyzes the relationship between the dependent variable of voter turnout (IFE [3]) and four independent variables:
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difference in vote share (IFE [3]), the percent of indigenous people who
are monolingual (INEGI [9)), per capita GOP (INEGI [7]), and percentage of Catholics (INFGI [10]). We chose the first three independent
variables to test the relative importance on a national level of each of our
principal theories (instrumental motivation, indigenous culture, and resource theories, respectively). We also included the level of Catholicism
(INEGI 10) in a state to check for possible religious effects on voter
turnout. Because our analysis did not find levels of Catholicism to have a
significant influence on voter turnout, we did not include' it in our case
studies.
The most statistically significant correlation was with the indigenous
monolingual variable, which showed a p-value of 0.004. Its regression
coefficient value of -0.245 showed that, for a 1 percent increase in the percentage of monolingual speakers of indigenous languages, voter turnout
decreased by 0.245 percent. In contrast, on a state-by-state level, the level
of Catholicism, the average number of years in schoo!, and the difference
between the top two vote shares proved inefl-ective at predicting voter
turnout. The correlations of these variables with voter turnout were not statistically significant (p>0.2), and their associated regression coefficients were
too small for the variables to have much substantive effect on voter turnout.
Taken together, the regression using these four variables had an R2
value of 0.391, meaning that the regression equation using these four
variables can explain 39.1 percent of the variation in voter turnout across
states. The regression's F-ratio of 5.984 indicates that the variables in the
regression, taken together, have a statistically significant effect on voter
turnout with a p-value of less than 0.01.
Our model's R2 value of approximately 0.4 shows less predictive
significance than several studies of cross-national variation in voter
turnout. For example, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., claims several R2 values of
0.9 or greater in his study of the effects of various electoral laws and sets of
political institutions on voter turnout (Powell 1986, 25). Robert W. Jackman obtains R2 values as high as 0.97 in his comparison of voter turnout
among industrial democracies (Jackman 1987,412-16). Though we cannot claim such high values of statistical significance, the relative difficulty
of obtaining such predictive power is exacerbated by the small sample size
and limited scope of our study to one election year. Idiosyncratic factors
not easily captured in such a limited stlldy, such as regional weather
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conditions and the details of local electoral races, may playa role in explaining voter turnout. Theories that we were unable to examine, such as
Franklin's mobilization theory, might also explain some of this variation.
Statistical Concerns

It appears that Chiapas and Oaxaca may be outliers for some of our
independent variables, especially Catholicism and monolingual indigenous
percentages. To determine how significant the effect of these outliers was
(regression 2 in Table 1), we created a dummy variable for Chiapas and
Oaxaca (1 =Chiapas or Oaxaca; O=all other states) and tested it with the
variables that we used in our previolls regression. When we performed
the regression with the dummy variable, the R' value decreased slightly
to 0.386, but the overall regression retained a high level of statistical
significance (p=0.003), with the F statistic decreasing to 4.905. The monolingual indigenous percentage variable, however, became only marginally
statistically significant and lost some of its predictive power, with its
p-value increasing to 0.101 and its regression coefficient declining to
-0.181. Including the dummy variable in the regression had little effect on
any of the other variables.
'It) determine whether the level of monolingual indigenous population
has an influence on voter turnout apart from the influence of outliers,
we performed the regression again without the monolingual indigenous
variable, but including the dummy variable (regression 3 in Table 1).
We found the presence of the monolingual indigenous variable in regression
2 greatly reduced the statistical significance of the dummy variable and increased the R' value, indicating that the dummy variable is not as effective
as the monolingual indigenous variable in explaining voter turnout.
Since Chiapas may be an outlier, we will study its situation more
in depth in this article to determine some of the factors that affect its
low voter turnout and that will help us to determine whether it is an exceptional case or merely an extreme example of the effects of these statelevel variables. This analysis also prompts us to study more carefully the
role of indigenous culture in affecting voter turnout.
In addition, our quantitative analysis is limited by the fact that we are
using state-level variables to attempt to explain variation in voter turnout,
a variable that is inherently based on individual decisions and characteristics.
For example, while measures of indigenous culture are positively correlated
SICMA
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with voter turnout on a state-by-state basi~ with a significam degree of
predictive ability, we will take care to strengthen this correlation and show
causation by providing data to show the same inHuences in the behavior
of individual voters. For this reason, we will perform several case studies
to show the workings of our theories on an individual level.

Case Study of Mexico D.E
Though technically not a state, the election laws in tht: Federal District of Mexico (Mexico D.E) are very similar to those of other Mexican
states with regard to federal elections. Since the Federal District has its
own electoral districts and follows the same electoral law, we will include
it in our study, treating it like a state. In the 2000 elections, Mexico D.E
recorded the second highest voter turnout in the country behind Yucatan
with a voter turnout of 70.59 percent (lFE [3]).
Resource theory best describes voter turnout in Mexico D.E According to resource theory, an individual's proximity to a polling site could encourage or deter her from voting. On a national level, seven out of eleven
states that have more than 0.10 polling sites per square kilometer have
above-average voter turnout, while only four out of the twenty-one states
with less than 0.10 polling sites per square kilometer have above-average
voter turnout (CNIRT; IFE [3]). In the 2000 elections, Mexico D.E had
11,130 polling places, which means that there were almost seven and a
half polling sites per square kilometer. Most citizens of Mexico D.E could
walk to their polling site within a few minutes. The citizens in rural areas
of the rest of the states, however, would normally have to drive or ride
longer distances to reach their polling sites. A typical state such as Chihuahua, for example, had only 0.02 polling places per square kilometer.
The level of voter turnout in Chihuahua, at 58.2 percent, is significantly
lower than Mexico D.E's 70.6 percent (lFE [3]). Even if the citizens of
Mexico D.E were not better off economically, they would still have more
time to vote than residents of rural areas since most polling sites in the
capital are just a stone's throwaway.
The high per capita GOP and levels of education of the Federal District of Mexico also support resource theory's contention that the rich
and educated are more likely to vote. Mexico D.E's per capita GOP of
131,790 pesos is considerably higher than the average national per capita
GOP of 52,090 pesos and is almost double Chihuahua's 74,820 pesos
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(INEGI [7]). In addition, one study showed the average person older than
fifteen years of age in the Federal District has completed 9.4 grades compared
to the national average of 7.3. In contrast, states like Chiapas, Guerrero,
and Oaxaca all average six or less grades of schooling completed (INEGI
[8]). Mexico D.E also has the highest literacy rate: 97 percent compared to
the national average of 90.5 percent (lNEGI [3]). Thus, the combination
of proximity, income, and education in Mexico D.E all help to explain its
unusually high voter turnout.
Cultural rheory also helps explain Mexico D.E's high voter turnout.
The indigenous population is almost nonexistent in the Federal District,
accounting for only 1.8 percent of the total population. To make this
even less significant, only one person in every 10,000 is a monolingual
indigenous-language speaker. Since rhere is little deeply rooted indigenous
culture in Mexico D.E, this factor does not lower voter turnout.
The level of contestation in Mexico, D.E's 2000 elections was
probably not a significant factor in Mexico D.F.'s high level of voter
turnout. The vote shares of the top two parties were separated by 7 percentage points compared with a slightly higher national average of
10 percentage points.
Case Study of Guerrero

In order to further understand the effects of these variables on voter
turnout we will look at the state of Guerrero. This state is nearly an exact
opposite of Mexico D.E While the Federal District has the second
highest voter turnout, Guerrero had the second lowest voter turnout in
Mexico. Resource and culrural theory both playa role in explaining Guerrero's low turnout.
Guerrero is one of seventeen states with less than 0.10 polling sites per
square kilometer with below-average voter turnout. With 0.06 polli ng
sites per square kilometer, the average citizen of Guerrero has to travel a
considerable distance to reach the nearest polling site (CNIRT; IFE [3]).
In addition to Guerrero's largely rural population, the state's per capita GOP
is among the lowest in all of Mexico. At 27,800 pesos, the per capita
GOP in Guerrero is about half of the national average and only one-fIfth
of that of Mexico D.F.'s (lNEGI [7]). With such a low income in a rural
state, a trip to the polls could be out of the question for many voters.
Guerrero's economic adversity helps describe its low voter turnout.
SIGMA

33

VOTER TURNOUT AMONC MFXICAN STATES

Education in Guerrero is also anemic compared to national levels.
The average person over the age of fifteen in Guerrero has only completed
six years of school and only three out of four people in the state are literate
compared to Mexico D.E's 97 percent literacy (lfE [8]; IFE [3]). It is
difficult for populations with low levels of education and low literacy
rates to become educated on political issues. Since Guerrero has such low
education and literacy levels, its citizens have few incentives to get out
and vote.
In addition, the percentage of monolingual speakers 'of indigenous
languages in Guerrero is the second highest in the country. Since Guerrero
has the second highest level of monolingual speakers of indigenous
languages, the state may be failing to integrate its population into the national political culture and society as a whole (IFE [4]). This is yet another
factor that discourages citizens of Guerrero from voting.
Instrumental motivation theory, in contrast with these explanations,
would predict a somewhat higher level of voter turnout ill Guerrero, since
the vote shares of the top two parties in Guerrero were separated by only
seven and a half percentage points. This is comparable to the Federal
District's level of contestation but not far off the national average, so its
impact on voter turnout would be minimal at best.

Case Study of Chiapas
In the 2000 presidential elections, Chiapas had the lowest level of
voter turnout in Mexico. The state's level of turnout, 52.19 percent, is remarkably low compared to the national average of 63. 97 percent (IFE [2]).
Chiapas is far behind the rest of Mexico in its level of voter turnout for
two reasons. First, the state is the poorest and least educated in Mexico.
According to resource theory, this poverty of resources causes people
to focus more on mere survival than issues such as politics and voting.
Second, violent conflict has existed in Chiapas f()f years. Instrumental motivation theory affirms that this violence increases the perceived costs of
voting, thus decreasing voter turnout.
According to resource theory, poverty has an effect on voter turnout.
As one author writes, "when a person experiences economic adversity, his
scarce resources are spent on holding body and soul together-survivingnot on remote concerns like politics" (Rosenstone 1982, 26). This is
apparently the case in Chiapas.
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Due to Chiapas's undesirable status as the poorest and least developed
state of Mexico, the people of Chiapas are the least likely to have the time
and money to vote. According to INEGI, the average citizen of Chiapas
makes 10.7 Mexican pesos per hour (slightly more than a U.S. Dollar).
This average wage is the lowest in the country and is a little more than half
of the national hourly average wage of 18,7 pesos (about 2 USD) (INEGI
[2)). Another indicator of Chiapas's poverty is the state's GDP, which is
also the worst in the country. The state GDP of 20,700 Mexican pesos
is less than half ofthe average state GDP of 51 ,090 pesos (lNEGI [6)).
Another factor affecting the low rate of voter tlLrnuut in Chiapas is the
level of social instability and political violence. Social instability, violence,
and their consequences have been particularly apparent in Chiapas, where
a state of upheaval has existed since 1994. Conflict in this state has
substantially decreased its level of voter turnout. Firsthand accounts and
other reports confirm the idea that instability and violence have created an
environment that is hostile to certain segments of the population due to
their political affiliations (Humanitari:tn Law Project).
To understand the inst:tbility and violence that exist in Chiapas and
their effect on voter participation, one must first understand something
about the source of such violence. On J:tnuary 1, 1994, a guerrilla group
known as the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) started an
armed uprising. Although the revolt quickly lapsed into an unofficial
ceasefire, the region is said to be in a continuing state of low-intensity
war. Violent extralegal groups, such as the EZLN and their paramilitary
opposition, known as "Peace and Justice," continue to operate in the region. These groups, as well :ts the police and the Mexican army, have been
accused of human rights violations "involving everything from harassment
to murder" (Dent 2002, 303-04).
The effects of this "low intensity war" are particularly visible in the
voter turnout Elf the 1997 election. I n this election the state had a turnout
of only 35.81 percent, strikingly low compared to the 1991 turnout of
65,82 percent (IFE [5]). Although one IfE document attributes this to
the "low reliability of electoral data," other sources provide ample evidence that suggests that low voter turnout is attributable to disruption
from the regional conflict (IFE [4]).
One report from the International Service for Peace (SIPAZ) cited
several elector:tl irregularities that occurred as a result of the conflict in the
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region. For example, "polling booths were being set up adjacent to military camps, or in zones controlled by the PRIor by the paramilitary
group, 'Peace and Justice'; Zapatista-conrrolled towns acted to prohibit
polling booths in their communities; and military patrols stepped up activities in Zapatista strongholds" (SIPAZ). The report also states that on
the day of the election,
voters were reporredly drafted or coerced inro particIpating;
there were attacks and ambushes on voters by armed groups;
some voting booths did not allow tiJr privacy; voting instructions
and voter lists were incorrect or incomplete; political propaganda was distrihuted by parti~ans at polling places; election
ofllcials were absent at some polling places, etc. Abuses
inciud[cd] reports of stolen and burned ballots, highway
blockades, and other actions that otherwise impeded or made
voting difficult. (SIPAZ)

Under these conditions many could not "go to the polls because of the
insecurity and violence that reigns in that region" (SIPAZ).
Another source of evidence of the poor electoral conditions arising
from violence in the region is a report by the Humanitarian Law Project
(HLP). This report, titled "Chiapas: Burned Ballots and Absent Voters,"
details the experiences of a team of five sent to observe the election
process. This group cited various instances of intimidation. One example
occurred in the town of Tumbala, Chiapas, where "six heavily armed
policemen stood just to the right of the voting region. Given recent arrests
in this town which are being contested as politically motivated, their very
presence contributed to the air of intimidation." Another example was
cited from an unidentified town of Chiapas. According to the observers,
as one man was explaining to them the recent state of threats and violence,
the approach of another man caused the first to change his criticism to
praise of the progress of the elections. The group of observers concluded
"the conditions in this region were not conducive to fair elections,"
and "the people in this region did not feel conditions were either safe
enough or fair enough to warrant participation" (HLP).
Despite IFE's affirmation that "preparations to carry out fair elections
were in place," other organizations cited a "lack of guarantees" (IFE [4]).
Organizations like "citizen's councils, the PRO, the Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas, Civic Alliance, and indigenous and peasant organizations"
protested the lack of better conditions (SIPAZ).
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Although not as severe, the violence and social tension that affected
voter turnout in 1997 was still present during the 2000 elections. According to one report, men associated with security forces loitered around
polling places and "occasionally snapp[ed] pictures of the people lined up
to receive their ballots." The report also mentioned the existence of fear of
attacks by "paramilitary groups along the road out of sight of the election
observers stationed at the polling booths" (Nelson). This continuing intimidation was almost certainly one cause of Chiapas's low levels of voter
turnout in the 2000 elections.

Case Study of Yucatan
Yucatan is another particularly interesting case, especially when
contrasted with Chiapas. This state, in spite of its poverty and underdevelopment, has had very high levels of voter turnout. Yucatan's voter
turnout for the 2000 presidential elections, 71.96 percent, is the highest
state level in the country (IFE [3D. This elevated voter turnout is surprising,
given the state's poverty. High levels of contestation in the state might lead
us to expect instrumental motivation theory to explain this phenomenon.
Yucatan's high voter turnout is not explained by resource theory. Like
Chiapas, Yucatan is one of Mexico's poorer states. The average wage
in Yucatan is only 13.7 pesos per hour. This is about three pesos more
than the average wage in Chiapas but still significantly less than the
national average of 18.6 pesos (lNEGI [2D. The state economy as a
whole, indicated by the state CDP of 41,660 pesos, is higher than that of
Chiapas bur still not up to par with the national average of 51 ,090 pesos
(INEGI [6]).
Although resource theory fails to describe the high voter turnout
in this economically poor state, instmmental motivation theory succeeds. In
Yucatan there has been a high level of contestation between two parties,
specifically beTween the Partido Accion National (PAN) and the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PR!). This contestation is manifested in the
results of the 2000 presidential elections when PAN received 47.10
percent of the vote and PRI received 46.08 percent of the vote. The next
closest party received only 3.90 percent of the vote (lFE [3D. A high level
of contestation existed because neither party dominated the election. This
contestation indicates that instrumental motiVJtion theory may be helpful
in explaining the high level of turnout that exists in Yucatan.
SIGtv1A
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Conclusion
In summary, education, wealth, and other elements of resource theory
predict much of the variation in voter turnout. In addition to this, indigenous cultural theory enables us to understand how alienation and marginalization of indigenous populations can lead to lower levels of voter
turnout in states with large indigenous components. We discussed in our
article how monolingual speakers of indigenous languages, in particular,
can feel separated from the center of Mexican sociery. Though it has less
effect in most cases, instrumental motivation theory explains the case
of Yucatan, where the other theories' predictions fail. Chiapas's social
breakdown and violence exemplifY the devastation that violence and its
aftermath can wreak on democratic participation. Thus, the most accurate
predictions of voter turnout in individual cases include the interaction of
several variables.
The complexities of this analysis show the importance of understanding
the interactions between different causative variables explaining voter
turnout. We have been limited by the small sample of states available
to us, which has forced us to examine ollly a few of the variables that can
have the most influence on voter turnout. An interesting topic for future
study might involve taking a larger group of countries, controlling
for national-level variables, and examining the factors that influence
intranational variation in voter turnout in this larger sample. We were not
able to fully analyze such influences as the level of urbanization in an area,
the effect of religion, and differences in civic culture across regions. We
would also like to explore Franklin's theory of mobilization by examining
organizations and methods that might differ across states in their ability
to mobilize citizens to vote.
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THEORIES OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECISION MAKING:
WILSON, ROOSEVELT, AND THE SOVIET UNION

Jeremy Lloyd

Abstract
This article presents a case study ofPresidellts Wilson and RoosClJelt in regards to diplomatic recognitioll th{lt demonstrates personality does haul' an e/fict
decisiOiI making.

bl

Itsing

{I

Oil

foreign-policy

compamtille study of two decisiollS regarding dzjJlomatic

recognitioll, this article demollStmtes how two focets of presidelltial personalityl/iorldlliew ilIld politiml style-muse the presidellt to see things a certain way alld act
accordillgly. As sitch, the findings sal'e as an altematilJe to theories that utilize rational {lefor models alld discollnt the importance (1'the presidellt himself ill making
foreigll policy.

A President's Dilemma

A

pressing matter had come to the attention of the President, and on
April 12, he wrote his Secretary of State and requested a special
meeting to consider the diplomatic recognition of a new regime. The
next week the cabinet and President assembled and discussed the current
political situation of the country in question. The current leaders of that
country were guilty of gross atrocities: executions of the common people
occurred daily, prisoners were massacred on a regular basis, basic rights
and privileges had been revoked, and church property had been confiscated.
The power of the legislature had been severely diminished, the courts
ceased to operate, and the only real vestiges of government were dominated
by the revolutionary party, with a tyrannical nine-member committee
presiding (Walch 1954, 1).
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The cabinet debated the situation and reached a unanimous decision:
the new regime should be recognized. The Secretary of State defended the
decision by explaining: "We certainly cannot deny to other nations that
principle whereon our government is founded, that every nation has a
right to govern itself internally under what forms it pleases, and to change
these forms at its own will; and externally to transact business with other
nations through whatever organ it chooses, whether that be a King, Convention, Assembly, Committee, President, or whatever it be. The only
thing essential is, the will of the nation" (Walch 1954, 2). This meeting might have been in 1933. The evidence above certainly
holds true for the Soviet Union, whom Roosevelt recognized later that
year. This description might also apply to China and any number of Presidents, ranging from Truman and Eisenhower to Nixon and Carter. One
might also think of Eisenhower and Cuba in 1959 or other recent examples. Who was the President in question?
The meeting described above occurred on April 19, 1793, and included
George Washington, his Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and other
cabinet members. The country was Revolutionary France, which was embroiled in the Reign of Terror. The United States issued a proclamation of
neutrality on April 22 and agreed to receive the hench ambassador
(Genet), ensuring that the new government would be recognized.
The example illustrated above highlights the dilemma of extending
diplomatic recognition to certain nations. In many cases the presidenr
recognizes truly despicable regimes, those headed by tyrants who oppress
their people and whose practices are contrary to U.S. ideals. And while
recognition usually reflects merely rubber-stamping a de facto regime, the
United States is one of the few nations that uses morality as a criterion for
recognition. The example of Washington's recognizing Revolutionary
France calls into question the actual reasoning behind the decision. Did
Washington believe recognition necessary because of the nature of the international system, that is, that France would prove a desirable balancing
mechanism against a possible British threat? Or was the decision the result
of compromises between the President and members of his cabinet, such as
the former French ambassador and current Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson? Or perhaps the decision resulted from Washington's own predispositions, as a former head of a revolutionary army himself and his memories of
vital French aid during the perilous Revolutionary War just a decade earlier.
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This article will make the case for the latter: the greatest factor in the
case of diplomatic recognition is the president himself. Diplomatic recognition is a constitutional power granted solely to the president and as such
the will and mind of the president become important factors in explaining
why certain nations are recognized by the United States while others are not.

Brief Recognition History: The Soviet Union
In 1917, Vladimir I. Lenin led a successful coup that overthrew
the monarchy of Czar Nicolas II and established a new regime led by the
Bolsheviks. Embroiled in "the war to end all wars" and SllSpect of the new
communist government, Woodrow Wilson chose to deny recognition to
the new Soviet Union. Sixteen years later, in 19.'33, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
a newly elected president dealing with the effects of the Great Depression,
decided to reverse the decision of his Democratic predecessor, Wilson, and
extend recognition.

Which Level of Analysis?
Three basic levels exist with which to analyze foreign-policy decisions:
individual (first level), state or bureaucratic (second), and systemic (third).
These levels can be further distilled to a simple dichotomy of approaches:
analytic and deductive. Second- and third-level approaches claim that by
examining the structure of an international system or the bureaucracy/state
we can deduce how the decision-maker will behave. A first-level approach
instead attempts to "get inside the head" of the decision-maker and analyze
what prompted his/her actions and behavior. Thus a basic difference exists
between the first level and second or third levels of analysis: whether or not
the cognition of the decision-maker affects the outcome of foreign-policy
decisions. Simply said, will all decision-makers behave the same way under
similar circumstances or do variations occur as a result of different manners
of thinking, perceiving, and acting on foreign-policy decisions?
Advocates of systemic and state/bureaucratic levels of analysis argue
that decision-makers "are cognitively competent to match means to ends
and to rank options accordingly" (Stein and Welch 1997, 52). This theory
of rational choice thus contends that by examining the systemic and/or
bureaucratic factors that influence the decision-maker we can reliably
explain and predict the behavior in a variety of contexts (Stein and Welch
1997, 52). This concept is often illustrated with phraseology such as
SIGMA
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"states are a black box/billiard ball," meaning that states are unitary rational
actors that merely fend for their own interests by logically weighing options and deciding which foreign-policy choices are in their best interests.
The rational choice approach thus eliminates the need to examine the life
histories, biases, or motivations of decision-makers by replacing them with
the abstract idea of the state personified as a single actor. Statements such
as "the Soviet Union is becoming too aggressive" or "the United States
must protect its allies" reflect this type of thinking.
.
While rational choice theory is parsimonious (i.e., simple and compact
yet wielding great explanatory power) and useful in predicting behavior in
certain situations, it has many shortcomings. It fails to explain how two
persons faced with similar circumstances arrive at different conclusions
(Jervis 1976, 36). Rational choice theory is also inadequate in explaining
why decision-makers make irrational decisions. Robert Jervis clarifies this
definition of irrationality: '''Irrationality' here describes acting under pressures that the actor would not admit as legitimate ifhe were aware of them"
(Jervis 1968, 456). A first-level approach becomes necessary to account for
the influence of these pressures (individual beliefs, biases, misperceptions,
etc.) in decision-making that result in irrational decisions.

Why Examine Decision Making
in Cases of Diplomatic Recognition?
The case of recognizing the Soviet Union demonstrates clearly the importance of selecting the appropriate level of analysis in order to determine
why recognition was extended or denied in each case. Second- and thirdlevel approaches do not fully explain the behavior of the two presidents
involved in the case (Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt). Wilson
refused to recognize the Soviet Union when nearly all of our allies had already done so (Subcommittee on Asian and PacifiC Affairs 1979, 2). Yet
Roosevelt reversed the decision of a previous president who belonged to his
same political party while risking Congressional and public support in
order to take what he felt was the correct action. Both of these examples
call attemion to the fact that systemic and bureaucratic models do not
fully detail the rationale behind such occurrences. A first-level approach is
needed to lend more explanatory power and take into account the president himself as an important factor. James David Barber, in The Presidential Character, gives a compelling argument as to why it is important to
focus on individual presidents:
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Who the President is ar a given rime can make a profound
difference in rhe thrusr and direcrion of narional politics ....
Even the mosr superficial specularion confirms rhe commonsense view rhar the man [president] himself weighs heavily
among other historical facrors. A Wilson re-e1ected in 1920, a
Hoovcr in 1932, a John F. Kennedy in 19(,4 would, it seems
vcry likely, have guided rhe body poliric along rather different
paths from those rheir actual successors chose. (Barber 1992, 3)
This is the basic argument for utilizing a first-level approach: who the
president is does mlltter. Just as Johnson acted in a singular manner and
made decisions that Kennedy would probably have avoided (as many
argue of the Americanization of the Vietnam War), so did the behavior of
Wilson and Roosevelt deviate from the path other presidents would have
taken. Not all presidents behave in the same way under the international
and bureaucratic pressures they face, as rational choice theory assumes;
therefore, it is impossible to deduce a rational pattern that they will
follow. The failure of rational choice requires us to analyze individual
psychological and cognitive factors in order to determine why certain behaviors occurred.
The arguments up to this point have explained why second- and
third-level strategies are inadequate in analyzing expected presidential behavior. These inadequacies lead us to turn to a first-level approach for adequate explanatory power. In the cases of presidential behavior regarding
diplomatic recognition, certain decision-making theories prove helpful in
breaking down patterns of action and response. It is useful to examine the
development of this decision-making approach in order to assess which
tenets of this theory will be most useful in explaining how recognition
may be explained. With respect to presidential decision making, especially
with regards to the issue of diplomatic recognition, the theories of three
political scientists prove particularly useful: James David Barber, and
Alexander and Juliette George.
Barber argues in his seminal work, Presidential ClJilracter: Predicting

Perfornulllce in the White House, that decision-makers must be viewed as
actual persons, not as nondescript embodiments of state interests. Each
president brings "an individual character, a worldview, and a political
style" to the office, (lctors that definitely affect how foreign-policy decisions
are made. Presidential character, which Barber defines as "the way the
president orients himself towards life," is posited as the most important
SIGMA
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of the three personality aspects. Character types are classified into four
categories-active-positive, active-negative, passive-positive, and passivenegative-and Barber explains what tendencies each type causes and
predicts what kinds of behaviors logically follow each type. The worldview
of the president "consists of his primaty, politically relevant beliefs, particularly his conceptions of social causality, human nature, and the central
moral conflicts of his time." Style, on the other hand, refers to how the
president fulfills his political roles of speaking to the public, interacting
with government officials, and managing the nutters that present themselves
to him (Barber 1992, I-II).
The validity of evaluating the decision-maker's personality to explain
foreign policy is echoed by Alexander and Juliette George in Presidential
Personality {md Performance, which devotes an entire chapter to defending
the basic premises of Barber's argument. George and George readily admit
the shortcomings of Barber's work, mainly its lack of theory and methodology, but defend its intentions, and also its successes (George and George
1992, 151). They recognize the need for Barber to define more specifically
and operationalize the aspects of presidential character, world view, and
political style. They therefore attempt to clarify and correct aspects of
character and worldview in chapter five of their work. The final chapter
of the book applies the notion of presidential style to several administrations, beginning with Franklin Roosevelt and ending with Bill Clinton.
My work seeks to complement that of James David Barber, and
Alexander and Juliette George by focusing on the worldview and style of
the president with regards to diplomatic recognition. While character may
play an important role in determining patterns of behavior, I believe it
just as important to examine how the president views the world around
him and how he receives and evaluates information in order to analyze and
explain foreign-policy decisions. As Yaacov Vertzberger explains, "the critical input in the decision-making process is thus the perception of
the environment rather than the real environment" (Vertzberger 1990,35).

My Approach
My study will utilize the qualitative comparative case study approach
in order to analyze the influence of presidential personality on diplomatic
recognition. My comparative analysis examines the cases of recognition
(or nonrecognition) of the Soviet Union by Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt. My dependent variable is the de jure recognition of a nation by the
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United States, while my independent variable is the decision making of
the two presidents in question. I examine each president in terms of two
independent variables: world view and political style. My basic hypothesis
is that two factors, the way in which the president sees the world and how
he receives information from advisors, affect foreign-policy decision making.
The cases I have selected are indeed comparable in the fact that they
contain many important similarities. Both presidents were members of the
same political party (Democratic) and were described as religious in
nature. Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt dealt with the same nation (one
which had been formed by a violent revolution that replaced a government the United States had previously supported). Finally, both presidents
dealt with widespread distrust among the American public and Congress
towards communism. Because the cases share these similarities I can focus
on the two aspects of presidential personality-worldview and political
style-that do actually vary between the two presidents and evaluate
whether these variables affected their decisions to extend or deny recognition to the Soviet Union.
I realize that other factors, such as domestic politics or the balance of
power ill the world, could also possibly account for the outcome which
I seek to explain in my case study. I will control for these variables by focusing primarily on first-level factors. Although I realize other factors also affect the decision-maker, I will assume that presidential personality is the
strongest influence in determining foreign policy and that other factors are
not as significant.

Operational Definitions: Worldview and Political Style
According to George and George, Barber's overemphasis on character
as the most important aspect of personality slights the scope and definitions
of the president's worldview and political style. I rims employ modified
defInitions in-my thesis because I feel they better express what each should
reflect in my treatment of the cases. Categorizing both worldview and
political style into set types permits the analysis and explanation of the
effects of personality on foreign-policy decision. The main points of my
findings are organized into Table 1 and are subsequently detailed in the
case study that follows and the conclusion.
I define the worldview of the president in the same manner as James
E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff: factors including education,
religion, ideology, belief systems, critical life and historical experiences,
SIGMA
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Variables/Outcome

Wilson

Roosevelt

World view

I. Idealism
J. Pragmatic politics
2. World politics = Local
(independent variable) 2. Individualism
3. Democracy best i'Jrln of politics writ large
governmt"nt
3. Politics of inclusion
4. Moral mission of the

U.S.

Political style
(independent variable)

Formalistic

Recognition extended? No
(dependent variable)

Competitive

Yes

Table 1: Summary of findings. Findings demonstrate causality in both cases
bl:twel:n managerial style and recognition, and causality Ixtween worldvicw and
recognition.

professional training, foreign travel, mental and physical health, and previous political activities that influence how the president views the world
(Dougherty and Pfalrzgraff 1990, 473). Because of the limited scope of
this article, my research will focus on (1.ctors that ultimately affect foreignpolicy decisions and will not examine domestic factors. I operationalize
the worldview of the president by creating three or four main characteristics of how the president perceived his environment. Examples include
realist or idealist perceptions of the world, how politics operate in the
world and how a politician should act, and the role of the United States
in world politics.
For presidential political style I utilize the definition of Alexander
George (along with Eric Stern): the way in which the president organizes
and manages his cabinet and bureaucracy, the way in which information
is received by the president, and how he generally utilizes said information
(George and George 1998, 152-54). I classifY each advisory system in
terms of organization and then describe whether the president's utilization
of that system created diverse opinions and sources of information, and thus
significantly influenced his thinking or just acted as a tandem of "yes
men," helping shape new policy and implementation of legislation, etc.
The way in which the president organizes his cabinet and bureaucracy
falls into one of two categories:
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1. Formalistic: Staff and advisors organized so as to provide structure,
a rigid hierarchy, and order. This approach stif1es dissenting opinions and
promotes unity and harmony within the executive branch.
2. Competitive: President encourages diversity of opinions and advice
by pitting departments and agencies against each other. This results in
overlapping jurisdiction, redundancy, ambiguity, etc.

Case Study: The Soviet Union
President Woodrow Wilson
Worldlliew. Of all of the forty-three presidents the United States has

had, none entered the White House with better academic experience than
Woodrow Wilson. Prior to his ascension to the presidency, he spent over
three decades studying, analyzing, theorizing, and writing about the
dynamics of politics. Religion, education, and political and professional
experiences created a truly unique view of how one of the United States'
most complicated heads of state perceived the world in which he lived.
Born into a poor family in the heart of the South, Wilson knew much
about overcoming hardship and adversity. Most scholars agree that the
young Wilson suffered from dyslexia, a condition that would cause him
not to be able to read until the age of eleven. Wilson conquered his condition, however, and became an apt pupil, devouring dozens of books and
writing prolifically on a variety of subjects. Wilson studied history and
politics and received his doctorate from Johns Hopkins University in 1886
for his treatment of cabinet government in the United States. After teaching at various universities, Wilson landed a job at Princeton University in
1890, and twelve years later he was appointed its president in part because
of the fame he garnered for promoting progressive ideals. In 1910 Wilson
accepted the invitation to run for governor of New Jersey, and after
winning he enacted several reforms, such as laws limiting monopolies and
labor abuses: These reforms propelled him into the national spotlight
and provided the foundation for his successful presidential candidacy in
1912 (Braeman 1972, 1-15). Wilson's religious upbringing furnished him
with a clear sense of right and wrong within the world and what role he
should play in order to correct the evils that existed. His education allowed
him to explore and articulate these views, while professional and political
experience gave him a chance to propose ideas and work for the good of
humanity. Wilson's outlook can be categorized into four elements: idealism,
SIGMA
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individualism, the superiority of democracy, and the role of the United
States as righteous leader.
Idealism, the first general theme of Wilson's worldview, stemmed
from his Presbyterian roots and hecame the unifYing force in his political
life. Wilson believed that the only way to secure peace in the world was
through a policy of liheral internationalism, that is, one in which selfgoverning democratic nations would peacefully negotiate conflicts instead
of resorting to war. This idealism was later explicitly manifes~ed in the formation of the League of Nations. Wilson believed that foreign policy
should not be defined in terms of materialism but should instead be "more
concerned about human rights than about property rights" (Trani 1958,
443). This differed greatly from past administrations' hardheaded realism
that sought to ensure the security and economic well-being of the United
States first and foremost.
Individualism stands as another pervasive feature of Wilson's perception
of the world. As a wholehearted believer in the Presbyterian faith, Wilson
adopted a Calvinistic view towards the individual: that one could achieve
both the approval of God and earthly success through hard work and
concentration on goals. Wilson embodied this principle himself, overcoming
poverty and dyslexia to receive a Ph.D. and also attain positions of influence
and importance. Subsequently, Wilson felt that because God had blessed
him and permitted him to become president of the United States, his ideas
about politics and government were also supported by God and were
morally right (Latham 1958, 91). Wilson felt he should work tirelessly to
ensure that such ideas were implemented, and not compromise in the face
of conflict or adversity.
The third aspect of Wilson's worldview is the belief that democracy is
"the most humane and Christian form of government" (Latham 1958,
153). Wilson's entire adult life was spent studying, theorizing, and practicing
the essential aspects of democracy, the only form of government built
upon principles of equality and freedom, and the only one that can guide
men to achieve peace. Placing democracy on a philosophic pedestal was
coupled with similar positive beliefs in the inherent goodness of man
(Christian optimism) and the progressive nature of organic life (social
Darwinism). These three beliefs led him to the conclusion that democracy
must some day achieve its potential as the universal rule of political life.
As a corollary of this belief, Wilson deduced that the only hope for a
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peaceful world community would be one in which democracy had
triumphed and public opinion reigned as the means of guiding the people.
It was therefore his responsibiliry "to make the world safe for democracy."
The final aspect of Wilson's worldview was perhaps a culmination of
the other three in that he defined the role of the United States through the
lens of idealism, individualism, and democracy. Wilson believed that
the U.S. should form relationships with the world that reflected our
unique contributions to humanity. The United States and its political
system embodied the principles of equaliry, freedom, and moraliry while
societies in Europe and Asia were still mired in the results of class divisions
and ethnic quibbles. Wilson saw America's ultimate goal not as the
attainment of wealth and power, bur rather as the fulfillment of its noble
obligation to advance peace and world brotherhood. Scholar Harry
Notter summarized Wilson's worldview:
[America's) mission was to realize an ideal of liberty, provide a
model of democracy, vindicate moral principles, give examples
of action and ideals of government and righteousness to an
interdependent world, uphold the rights of man, work for humanity and the happiness of men everywhere, lead the thinking of the world, promote peace-in-sum, to serve mankind and
progress. (Notter 1937,653)

Wilsoll felt that as leader of the only moral and free nation on the face
of the earth he must promote this idealistic vision in order to advance
the causes of God and promote the well-being of all humanity. Wilson's
interpretation of this divine role of the presidency led him to judge nations as either moral or immoral. Moral regimes were legitimate because
they promoted the interests of their citizens and helped other nations to
accomplish the same.
Political style. Woodrow Wilson callie to office with extensive experience
as an admin~strator, having already presided over Princeton Universiry for
over a decade and having spent two years as governor of New Jersey. Wilson had definite policy aims in mind and structured his advisory
system to give him a free hand in developing foreign policy and personal
projects. His system also permitted progressive cabinet members to
shepherd programs such as tariff reform, child labor laws, and the creation
of the Federal Reserve and a graduated federal income tax through Congress. Cabinet members, however, were chosen either for their political value
SIGMA
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in helping support Wilson's ideas or for their progressive accomplishments. This fact became most evident in Wilson's selection of a Secretary
of State: William Jennings Bryan. A reformer and perennial presidential
candidate, Bryan received Wilson's nomination because of his reputation
as the Democratic Party's leading reformer and because Wilson was afraid
he might oppose potential legislation if left out of the administration
(Clements 1987, 90).

Preferred Advisors
and Cabinet I1eads

Non -Preferr ed
i\,h isors and Cabind

Formalistic (Wilson)

Figure 1: The formalistic model under Wilson. This system fi!rers information
and opinion through clear hierarchy of advisors, especially preferred ones.

Wilson created an extremely formalistic advisory system, one in
which all valuable foreign-policy advice, and to a certain extent domestic
advice as well, was funneled through a few advisors (see Figure 1). Wilson's
exclusive relationship with one such advisor, Colonel Edward House from
Texas, has been well documented by political scientists and biographers
alike and cannot be overstated (George and George 1998,67-89). House
and Wilson became acquainted during the summer of 1909 as Wilson was
gearing up for his guhernarorial campaign. The two men developed a
mutual friendship and respect that would culminate in House's unofficial
placement as Wilson's personal confidant in the White House. During the
transitional phase as president-elect, Wilson consulted exclusively with
House in determining potential candidates for all of the cabinet and advisory positions and even offered House his pick of any of these positions.
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House refused to have his influence narrowed to a single area of policy,
preferring rather to be a "free-lance" and "to advise with him regarding
matters in general, and to have a roving commission to serve wherever and
whenever possible" (Clements 1987, 91). House became the President's
key advisor on many issues. Wilson, he observed, "never seems to want
to discuss things with anyone, as far as I know, excepting me. Even the
Cabinet bore him with their importunities, and he often complains of
them" (cited in Latham 1958, 18). Even William McAdoo-the trusted
Secretary of Treasury who would later become Wilson's son-in-lawcomplained of the faithlessness of the executive in the judgment of any of
his official advisors (Latham 1958, 18).
The clear hierarchy that developed within the administration, coupled
with Wilson's quirky behavior, served to limit the amount of information
the President received. Wilson generally detested meeting with cabinet
members, congressmen, and lobbyists and thus created a rigid meeting
system. All interested parties were required to solicit an appointment with
his main White House aide, Joseph Tumulry, who effectively screened unwanted visitors. All appointments were kept to ten or fifteen minutes, so
that the President could play golf in the afternoon, as he was accustomed
to doing. When support was needed for bills, Wilson would either strongarm the necessary congressmen or appeal to the public or party faithful in
order to garner the necessary votes.
Wilson's system did have an interesting side effect, however: it gave an
unprecedented amount of power to his cabinet members because he largely
ignored them. Secretaries with progressive ideals were provided a free hand
to promote their reforms. McAdoo, for example, was able to provide the
blueprint of the Federal Reserve System to Wilson, who later aggressively
promoted its passage, because he was afforded freedom by an aloof
executive. Secretaries provided many key ideas and initiatives to the President but were largely excluded from the decision-making process. Wilson
did have many poliq programs and ideas for reform, bur these were usually
very narrow in scope. In general, Wilson concentrated on large domestic
reforms, such as child labor laws and tariff reductions, and more particularly
on matters of foreign policy. Wilson consulted with his Secretary of State
occasionally, in order to keep up appearances, bur, as one can imagine,
Wilson's formalistic system put matters of foreign policy largely into the
hands of the executive and his most trusted advisor, Colonel House.
SIGMA
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Explanation. Wilson held particularly strong worldviews with regards
to issues of sovereignty and involvement in world politics. His idealism led

him to desire a world in which nations fairly represented the interests of
those they ruled, one where all mankind could benefit from superior types
of political and economic systems like the ones the United States had implemented. Wilson felr that he played an important role in forming rhis
new world order: he led the most moral nation on earth and held divinely
approved ideas about politics and government. As such, he ~ad rhe ability
to make important judgments and declare narions moral or immoral. Nor
only did Wilson affix this stamp of illegitimacy to various regimes, he also
fought against rhese nations in order ro secure thei.r downfall.
As previously mentioned, Wilson's advisory system allowed him a free
hand in conducting foreign policy. His formalistic system gave him very
few inputs; again, evidence supports the notion that Colonel House and
nearly no one else was consulted in the question of recognizing the Soviet
Union. Wilson had his mind made up on the Soviet Union long before
the revolution of 1917. Wilson was a rabid anti-tsarist who hated the
repressive actions of Tsar Nicolas II. When rhe Bolshevik Revolution
occurred Wilson was originally hopeful that the new regime mighr be an
improvement over the previous rulers. Wilson was sorely disappointed when
he realized that gross atrocities were being committed by Lenin and his cohorts in order to stay in power (Trani 1976, 443-44). He subsequently
wrote the regime off as immoral and refused to extend recognition. Wilson
would even go as far as sending in troops to attempt to overthrow Lenin's
government and establish a legitimate one in its place (Latham 1958, 25).
This was nor an isolated incident. In 1914 Wilson was faced wirh
a similar situation when Victoriano Huerta violently overthrew the
established government in Mexico. Wilson was indignant rhar a moral
regime had been overthrown by an immoral one and declared, "I will not
recognize a government of butchers." Wilson's comments to the American
people on the subject of recognition are especially pertinent because they
represent his views towards all peoples of the world, and nor jusr one
nation (e.g., Mexico) in particular:
The peace, prosperity, and contentment of Mexico mean
more, much more, to us than merely an enlarged tield for
our commerce and enterprise. They mean an enlargement of
the tield of self-government and the re.llizariol1 of the hopes
and rights of a nation with whose best aspiralions, so long
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suppn:ssed and disappointed, we largely sympathize. (Dallek
1982,352)

Robert Dallek states poignantly the implication of Wilson's remarks, that
"in a word, [hel had enunciated the proposition that, for all practical purposes, Mexico's internal affairs were subject to the same standards applied
in the United States" (Dallek 1982, 352). Wilson, as the leader of the nation that was a "light on a hill" for all of the world, thus set a standard for
extending recognition and did not hesitate to pass judgment on regimes
that he felt failed to represent the interests of their citizens.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt

Worldview. The presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt offers a marked
contrast to the ideological approach taken by Wilson and the laissez-faire
style of Roosevelt's Republican predecessors. Roosevelt felt entirely at
ease in his position of great authority and believed that his skills and
competence were a perfect fit for the office of president. His time in office
would be characterized hy optimism, involvement, courage, and progress,
all of which reflected the personality of the President, especially his
perception of the world around him.
Biographers classifY President Franklin Roosevelt as the most cosmopolitan president the world had ever seen, perhaps with the exception only
of his cousin, former president Theodore Roosevelt. Like his older collsin,
Franklin came from the upper class, graduated from Harvard, practiced
law, and served in the Navy. Roosevelt became involved in politics soon
after a short career as a lawyer, winning a seat in the New York State Senate. His progressive ideals garnered the attention of President Woodrow
Wilson, who appointed him assistant secretary of the Navy. After successfully fulfilling this duty during the turbulent years of the First World War,
Roosevelt ran for vice-president on the ticket ofJames Cox. After losing
in the landslide victory of Herbert Hoover in 1920, Roosevelt struggled to
stay in the center of the political scene of the Democratic Party. In 1921,
Roosevelt was taken ill with poliomyelitis, which robbed him of his ability to walk. Always the warrior, Roosevelt fought against the illness and
continued to practice politics from his wheelchair, a remarkable feat considering the stigma present during the time period that handicapped
persons were unfit for political leadership. FOR's historic battle with polio
left him a different person, someone with greater understanding for the
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underdog: in essence the type of people the Democratic Party claimed to
represent. He successfully reentered politics in 1928 by launching a successful gubernatorial campaign in New York. Four years later he par/eyed
his popularity and success in the Empire State into the new hope of the
nation as president.
FranlJin Roosevelt had a truly unique perspective of the world, the
presidency, and his role in both. Roosevelt's worldview may be classified
into three broad categories: pragmatic politics, world politics as local
politics writ large, and politics of inclusion. Roosevelt st~lt~d clearly what
the president of the United States would have to do to meet the crises of
1932 and all other future crises as leader of the nation: press forward with
"bold, persistent experimentation" (Barber 1990, 287). Critics are quick
to point out that Roosevelt had no "grand design" or overarching political
philosophy, but he instead based his presidency on the simple fact that
"our nation is in trouble and it is the responsibility of the government to
do something about it" (Dallek 1995, 35). Roosevelt was a man of action,
one who inspired hope and optimism because he was willing to take risks
in order to help others.
Secondly, Roosevelt believed that politics should be practiced the
same at the world level as at the local level. Alliances, power, and personality
should play into the equation for the interaction of the president as well
as every mayor, councilmember, etc. Just as the leader of a town or city
could take extraordinary measures in order to deal with crises, FDR took
matters into his own hands upon ascending to the presidency. He shut
down the banks the day after he stepped into office, passed an amount of
legislation previously thought unimaginable to curb the effects of the Depression, and asked Congress for all power possible to fight poverty, the
same as if a foreign invader had threatened the liberty and freedom of
the United States (Dallek 1995,25). Roosevelt viewed crises as his time to
shine, and he employed the same tactics that got him into the White
House to fight against the problems that plagued society.
Finally, Roosevelt also viewed politics as a process in which everyone
should be included. Support for his programs and initiatives were always
gathered through coalitions, in order to include as many people as possible.
I n the international sphere, Roosevelt felt the same way about other
peoples and cultures. During his presidency four essential human freedoms became the clarion call for aiding persons of all nations: freedom of
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speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.
Roosevelt once stated that "our liberty is linked to the destiny of the world,"
and as such "democracy must be supported in all corners of the earth"
(Dallek 1995, 79). Roosevelt's vision included the idea of collective
security and international cooperation. The United Nations was Roosevelt's brainchild, his manner of creating peace for all members of the earth
by including them in the decision making, the security, and the
economic stability of the entire world.
Political style. Experts classifY Franklin D. Roosevelt as the first
president to utilize a modern system of bureaucracy. My analysis of Roosevelt's managerial style concentrates primarily on his first year in office,
1933, because the Soviet Union received official diplomatic recognition
later that year. Though his later modifIcations to the advisory system
(e.g., creation of the Executive Office of the President) would most clearly
reveal his political style, his managerial trends were evident even from the
very beginning.
Roosevelt's organization of White HOllse aides and cabinet secretaries
is basically the prototype for competitive models (see Figure 2). As George
and George eloquently state, Roosevelt "deliberately exacerbated the
competitive and conflicting aspects of cabinet politics and bureaucratic

J\(h isors and C :.lhinet

Heads

Agencies \Vithlll
De partmcJl ts

The Competitive Model (FDR)

Figure 2: Competitive model employed by Roosevelt. It encourages variety and
multiple sources of information and permits the pre,idcnt to consult anyone.
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politics" (George and George 1998, 204). In a conversation with Frances
Perkins, his Secretary of Labor, Roosevelt revealed how he thought cabinet members should relate to each other: "A little rivalry is stimulating you
know. It keeps everybody going to prove he is a better fellow than the next
man. It keeps them honest, too" (George and George 1998,2(5). Roosevelt denied the collective importance of the cabinet, preferring instead to
consult with individuals on various policy issues. Cabinet meetings, though
held weekly, discussed little of substance and were basically OI~ly a ven ue for
individuals to find the President afterwards and discuss issues face-to-face.
Roosevelt successfully created an atmosphere of chaos in the administration, one that only he could sort through. He purposefully made ambiguous and duplicitous assignments to secretaries in order to promote
competition and blur the lines of jurisdiction between departments.
Under secretaries received their nomination not from the secretaries of
their departments, bur from the President himself thereby forcing cabinet
heads to accept Roosevelt's nominees instead of their own men. Presidential aides from the White House were forced into cabinet positions as well
and often drew themselves into conflict with their superiors, whom they
were supposed to support. Roosevelt operated without a chief of staff and
preferred selecting White House aides and cabinet secretaries who held
general rather than specific knowledge of issues (with a few notable exceptions of course, such as Secretary of State Cordell Hull). Anonymity became the preferred attribute of those who advised him (Hess 1988, 32).
Roosevelt drew on a large network of friends and acquaintances inside
and outside of the bureaucracy. Drawing on contacts made in his years as
a state senator and governor of New York, and as assistant secretary of the
navy under Woodrow Wilson, he consulted whomever he pleased on
a given issue. Samuel Rosenman, for example, served as an integral part of
Roosevelt's gubernatorial administration and was solicited often for advice
on policy issues. Rosenman eventually began writing all of Roosevelt's
speeches and had to quit his job as a New York Supreme Court Justice in
order to keep up with the workload. Friends and acquaintances, such as
William Bullitt and Frances Perkins, quickly found themselves with influential positions within the new administration (Ambassador to the Soviet
Union and Secretary of l.abor, respectively) and as such were consulted
more frequently than their peers. Even Franklin Roosevelt's wife, Eleanor,
was a prominent figure in advising the President (Barber 1990, 279).
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Roosevelt had little respect for institutional boundaries or ideological
differences between subordinates. Several instances have been recorded in
which Roosevelt took ditferent cabinet secretaries or aides who were at
loggerheads and made them come to a unified decision. Instances also
arose in which Roosevelt would force strict, overbearing timetables upon
those around him in order to whip up competition alld conflict and
resolve tough matters quickly.
All of these items served to create an atmosphere of controlled chaos
in the administration-controlled at least until the pressures of war
strained the system almost to the point of breaking. Roosevelt was able to
employ his office effectively as a "bully pulpit," just like his rough-riding
cousin, in part because of this atmosphere he created. It served to give him
multiple sources of information and create unity around only one person,
himself. While this created enormous problems in implementing policies
and procedures, it did prove effective in permitting Roosevelt to push
his own projects with minimal interference, whether it was New Deal
legislation or the recognition of the Soviet Union.
Explanation. Roosevelt viewed the issue of recognizing the Soviet
Union as something that could only help, and not hurt, the United States.
He thought it absurd that our nation should reject a country just because
of its ideologies: "purely doctrinaire ideas, as, that communism automatically outlaws inreracting with a nation, should be discarded" (Bennett
1985, 6). He believed that he should end the "abnormal relations" between the two nations and that "frank, friendly conversations" could have
that effect by eliminating misconceptions and promoting a new chapter in
U.S.-Soviet relations (Greer 1958, 162-63). Roosevelt believed in including all nations of the world in politics, and he hoped interacting with the
Soviet Union would promote a peaceful world order and create benefits
for both nations. Roosevelt mentioned often the huge potential for trade
between the two nations and thought that such a benefit was worth overlooking the conflicting ideals of communism with capitalism (Maddux
1980, 13).

Roosevelt's advisory system served to reinforce the idea that he should
extend recognition to the Soviet Union. As was his nature, Roosevelt
consulted with many persons inside and out of the administration to
understand fully the situation and its implications. One advisor pointed
out " ... he could not go forward until he had tested the ground, studied
SIGMA
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all the reactions, and weighed all the risks" (Maddux 1980, 11). Having
consulted many sources of information, most of whom expressed support
for the idea, Roosevelt moved ahead with plans and contacted Stalin's
representatives. The negotiators that represented the United States in these
discussions on recognition briefed the President personally and even
brought Soviet representatives to the White House so that Roosevelt could
further persuade the Soviets to come to terms with the demands of the
United States. In the end, Roosevelt's personal lobbying proved a decisive
factor in ultimately convincing the Soviet Union to est~blish formal
relations with the United States (Maddux 1980, 14).
Advisors of the President pointed to the growing threat of Germany
and Japan as the primary motives in Roosevelt's ultimate decision to
recognize the Soviet Union (Bennett 1985, 5~G). While these were
certainly factors in the Roosevelt's thinking, it appears that other factors
weighed just as heavily on his mind. Roosevelt genuinely desired a new
world order where all nations would be included and violent confrontations
could be avoided. These plans would later come to fruition in the creation
of one of Roosevelt's ideas: the United Nations. Increased trade would
benefit citizens of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. alike and would hopefully lead
to even better relations in the future. Roosevelt, as a popular leader who
knew he could garner the necessary support at home and abroad for the
idea, used his bully pulpit of the presidency and made the necessary
arrangements to extend recognition.
Roosevelt best expressed these sentiments himself in his first Inaugural address in 1933:
1n the field of world policy I would dedicate this nation to the
policy of the good neighbor-the neighbor who resoilitely
respects himself and, because he docs so, respects the rights of
others-the neighbor who respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors. (Greer 1958, 158)

Roosevelt hoped that mutual trust and aid could become the core of
international relations, instead of mere power politics and conflict. As
the leader of an influential nation, Roosevelt tried to pursue policies
that would promote this type of cooperation. The recognition of the
Soviet Union in 1933 serves as a quintessential example of how Roosevelt's views of the world thus influenced his foreign-policy decision
making.
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Conclusion
My research supports the notion that studying the role of the
decision-maker in foreign policy has merit. By examining two facets of
a president's personality, his worldview and his managerial style, in relationship to diplomatic recognition, I was able to establish a degree of
causality. Table 1 summarizes my basic findings, showing first that both
presidents had certain aspects of their worldview in common, namely a
belief in American exceptionalism and a desire to become more involved
in the politics of the world. In other words, each president believed that
America enjoyed the benefits of the very best economic, political, moral,
and military systems and should help other nations of the world progress
towards that point as well.
This similarity in ideology between these two democratic presidents
begs one to question why Wilson refused to extend recognition if he, like
Roosevelt, wanted to include other nations in the political process and
help them to attain the same prosperity the United States enjoyed. The answer lies in one particular aspect of worldview: labeling. Wilson set clear
distinctions (i.e., "labeled") between nations he viewed as legitimate or
not. for Wilson this litmus test was one of morality. Legitimate nations
were moral if they permitted their citizens basic freedoms and worked towards their development and livelihood. On the other hand, regimes that
deprived their own citizens of these basic rights could not be trusted and
must be shunned by the international community as a whole, and especially the United States as the moral leader of the world. This would force
such regimes to correct their erroneous behavior and adapt to the superior
ways of the Un ited States and its allies. Wilson's view that God had implicitly placed him in the presidency because of his hard work and moral
lifestyle reinforced the view that he alone had the responsibility to deny
recognition to immoral foreign regimes. Wilson's divisive worldview was
complemented with an advisory system that severely limited the amount
of dissenting information he received in matters of foreign policy. These factors boil down to a simple fact: that Wilson's labeling of the Bolshevik
regime, one he felt had usurped power and was depriving citizens of their
rights, placed them in the realm of illegitimacy. He thus felt it his duty to
refuse recogn ition.
Roosevelt, however, saw potential benefits in extending the official
recognition that their predecessors had denied. He felt that iflasting peace
SIC1\IA
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was to be created in the world, then all nations, regardless of regime type,
must necessarily be included. Roosevelt used an extraordinary amount of
political capital-even lobbying personally with representatives of the
U.S.S.R.-working out a deal behind closed doors to extend recognition.
Although Roosevelt might have agreed with the categorizations that
Wilson had made, he refused to let his own personal beliefs and ideologies
stand in the way of recognition.
My findings show that worldview affected the decision to extend or
refuse recognition to the Soviet Union. World view, especialiy the labeling
mechanism previously described, is the primary factor in how presidents
come to make decisions on recognition. Presidential style, while not the
primary factor in the question of recognition, cannot be ignored. How
the president sets lip his advisory system and how he receives information
concerning foreign policy act as a reinforcing mechanism and should thus
be categorized as an intervening variable.
Table 1 illustrates this point: Wilson created a formalistic system
to simpli~' the process of receiving information. The few advisors he trusted
were given inordinate amounts of power in influencing the president,
yet these advisors largely reported information that would reinforce the
previously held views of the president. Thus when Wilson labeled
the U.S.S.R. as immoral there were no advisors to dissent from this opinion.
Had \X'ilson set up a competitive model of advisement the outcome
might have been altered. Forceful aides and secretaries might have aided
Wilson in removing the labels they had placed on the U.S.S.R. and might
have helped him realize that the political inclusion they desired required
the recognition of all types of regimes as a starting point from which
to work.
Roosevelt, on the other hand, had such a system in place. His advisory
systems were largely competitive, and as such provided a wide array
of opinions and information on any given topic. Rather than merely
reinforcing ideas of the president, these systems forced the president to decide from among many given options. This also served as a reinforcing
mechanism, in that Roosevelt initially considered the idea of recognizing
the Soviet Union and then found support from within his own cabinet.
Roosevelt found many within his administration who supported his ideas,
which reinforced his views enough to ignore the protests of the State
Department and inHuentialmembers of Congress.
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My case study of Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt in regards to diplomatic recognition demonstrates that personality does have an effect on
foreign-policy decision making. My research supports the idea that "who
the president is matters" in cases of diplomatic recognition. The United
States is one of the few nations on earth that makes recognizing another
country a matter of moral approbation (rather than mere reflection of
which regime is in power). This tends to make the issue of recognition
a matter of the conscience of the president rather than a vital national security interest. I believe that utilizing personality or other first-level approaches in such cases is highly beneficial. My work complements that of
James David Barber, and Alexander and Juliette George by focusing on the
worklview and style of the president. In using a comparative study of two
decisions regarding diplomatic recognition, I have proven the claim that
presidential personality affects foreign-policy decision making. I demonstrate how two facets of presidenrial personality-worldview and political
style-cause the presidenr to see things a certain way and act accordingly.
My findings serve as an alternative to theories that utilize rational actor
models and discounr the importance of the president himself in making
foreign policy.
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THE RISE OF THE SPANISH SILVER REAL
Rachel Piccolo Moises
Abstract

The Spallish silver real, or eight reales, dominated illtenliltional jinanci,d
markets from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. This article explores
the history ofthe real illid defines the izctors contributillg to the coin's rise as the
premier internatiollizl currency. V(7hile Spain's monetary policies and wealth of
sill'er bullion lUere illstrumental in the real s rise to ubiquity, the demand for
dependable silver ClIrrency ill Asian trade markets assured international demmld for the real long after the Spanish Empire entered its decline.

Introduction

L

ooking back on history, one can easily identifY particular currencies
that rose to prominence and became the preferred global currency.
What is it about a currency that motivates both allies and enemies alike
to seek after it and prefer it over their own currency? In this article, I will
investigate the case of the Spanish silver real or eight reales, which some
have called "the world's most famous silver coin" (Pond 1941, 12). From
the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the real dominated the international financial market and was the most sought after and trusted coin
in the world. I seek to explain this phenomenon.
Generally j currency prospers simultaneously with the nation that
controls it, but that was not the case with the real. According to Dennis
Flynn, the pinnacle of the Spanish empire was in 1')80 (Flynn 1982, 139)
and from then on the empire steadily weakened until it lost its position as
a great power in the mid-seventeenth cen tury (Elliot 1961, 52). During its
decline Spain suffered from an abundance of ultimately overwhelming difficulties. These included the burden of administrating an empire
larger in area than the Roman empire at its peak, the massive strain and
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expense of numerous wars, the depopulation of the mother country as a
result of emigration to Spanish colonies and the expulsion of the Moors,
the invasion of foreign goods into the domestic economy, poor government financial administration, and Spain's over reliance on precious metals
for wealth (Chapman 1948, 335-36).
The rell! persevered as the primary international currency for another
two hundred years despite the Spanish empire's collapse and continued
weak domestic economy. How is it that a country with coun:less domestic
economic flaws could support such a currency? I propose that a weak
domestic economy and a strong international currency need not be mumally
exclusive; in fact, some of the policy choices that most hurt Spain's home
economy simultaneously helped the mIl gain international distinction.
Once the mzlhad been propelled into international circulation, it became
virtually independent of Spain due to strong international demand for it.
To further examine the position of the retlLI will establish the historical
background of the Habsburg Spanish Empire to illustrate the conditions
of the empire and continent in which the rea! originated. Next I will offer
a historical overview of the origin of the red. how widely it was used, and
when it ceased to circulate as an accepted currency. I will then address how
and why the mzl became the preferred international currency. I will also
discuss the critical role China played in the mzl's rise in South East Asia,
Europe, and the Americas. Finally I will return to the questions posed
earlier and expound on the reasons for the real's long life of success.

Historical Background on the Habsburg Spanish Empire
The struggle of numetous kingdoms to rise to continent-wide power
and attain both political and religious dominance characterized sixteenthcentury Europe. Paul Kennedy explains that this struggle for European
predominance signaled a change in the nature of warfare in Europe from
regional conflicts to large-scale international contentions. He attributes
this change to two main factors: first, the Reformation, which divided Europe berween the North and the South and between middle-class city
dwellers and the lower feudal orders; second, the rise of the Habsburgs,
whose possessions formed a "nerwork of territories which stretched from
Gibraltar to Hungary and from Sicily to Amsterdam" (Kennedy 1989, 32).
The Habsburgs secured the position of Holy Roman emperor and
thus gained considerable influence in European affairs. Nevertheless, their
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most effective means of increasing in territory and power was through
strategic marriages. Through the arrangement of such marriages Maximilian I of Austria brought the Habsburgs the inheritances of Burgundy, the
Netherlands, Hungary, Bohemia, and, of greatest consequence, Spain. By
1526 Maximilian's grandson, Charles V, was Holy Roman emperor and
inherited the rule of these newly acquired kingdoms (Kennedy 1989,
32~33).

Despite the heterogeneous composition of the Habsburg Empire and
the resultant difficulties in maintaining their unified domain, the empire's
neighbors took the threat of Habsburg power seriously. Habsburg lands
encircled the French state, which dedicated itself to checking Habsburg
power. Habsburg expansion also distressed the German princes who had
fought diligently to restrain the Habsburgs from exercising power within
German territories. The popes were aim critical of the increasing Habsburg power (Kennedy 1989, 33~34). With such a wide range of enemies,
no amount of territory or political clout could assure the Habsburgs would
become victors in the battle for European predominance.
According to Kennedy, the Reformation instigated religious clashes
which turned political animosity into bloody hostility. Due to Habsburg
monarchs' staunch defense of Catholicism, political power and religious
matters were inseparably connected, and thus the divisions of the Reformation spilled into the political arena (Kennedy 1989, 33).
In the mid-1500s, the Spanish Habsburgs were forced to defend their
Italian territory against a series of attacks by the French. Between 1520
and 1550, Francis I of France waged war against Spain despite repeated
defeats and treaties. Charles V had sufficient resources to defend his territory against the French, but due to his position as Holy Roman emperor
he had additional enemies with whom to contend. Among those foes the
most formidable were the Turks from the Ottoman Empire, who threatened Charles V on many fronts. The empire's inland territories were in
danger of attack by forces advancing from the Hungarian plains, and
Spain and Italy were vulnerable to attacks by sea. Charles V also met much
difficulty in Germany, where the Protestant Reformation had destroyed all
political stability. Finally, Spain had revolts in the Netherlands to deal with
in what is now known as the Eighty Years War (Kennedy 1989, 34~38).
In addition to outside threats, the Habsburgs strained themselves by
engaging in offensive actions to expand their territory. In 1580, Philip II
Slt;MA
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annexed Portugal along with its colonies. In response, England determined to check Spain's power by supporting the Dutch rebels in the
Netherlands. Thus what had begun as a local rebellion became an international struggle for power; in time, Dutch and English privateers extended the fighting to fronts as far away as West Africa and the Caribbean.
In addition to the Portugal offensive, in [he 1590s Spanish armies invaded
France in a campaign that lasted nearly a decade.
In 1598 the constant warring between Spain and its enemies began to
subside with the Peace ofVervins; Spain agreed to refrain f~om interfering
with France. In 1604 Spain and England agreed to cease fighting. Five years
later Madrid negotiated a truce with Dutch rebels heralding a short-lived
peace (Kennedy 1989, 34-38).
In 1618 another wave of wars swept the continent. Within Germany
the rivalry between the Ptotestant Evangelical Union and the Catholic
League had been intensifying for a decade, and because of many outside
interests "It appeared as if most of the States of Europe were lining up for
a final settlement of their political-religious antagonisms" (Kennedy 1989,
39). The Protestant Bohemian states revolted against Ferdinand II, the
new Holy Roman emperor, and thus began the Thirty Years War of
1618-1648. Germany, the Netherlands, France, and England all joined in
the conflict. Even after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, Spain and France
continued to fight for more than a decade. Finally, in 1659, Spain conceded to peace and signed the Treaty of the Pyrenees, which signaled the
end of Habsburg power in Europe (Kennedy 198<), 39-40).
The aforementioned political conditions of Europe during the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries greatly affected the political and economic
stability of Spain both domestically and internationally. Now I will examine
how Spain's stability affected the rise of the real.

Historical Overview of the Spanish Real
The retdwas first minted in the fourteenth century under the direction
of the King of Castile and Leon, who was known as Pedro the Cruel (Pond
1941, 12). However it was not until 1497 when Ferdinand and Isabella
initiated monetary reforms, called the Pmgrnatica de Medilla del Campo,
that the real was established as a unit of account in Castile and Aragon.
Under the new system the maravcdi was the basic unit of account. The
silver retd was equivalent to 34 rrulrtwcdis, and 375 nlllrtwcdis equaled
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the gold excelente (Sumner 1898, 608). The real was further divided into
eight fractions, hence its alternative title, the eight reales. Although other
coins such as four reales and two reales were minted, they were merely fractional coins of the eight reales (Carothers 1930, 27).
John Porteous boldly claims, "The Pragmatic of Medina del Campo
was one of the best timed monetary reforms ever made." Spain could not
have foreseen the impending inflow of bullion from the Americas, yet the
kings reformed their minting system in a manner that prepared it to handle
a massive influx of bullion. As Porteous goes on to note, "By providing from
the start for the issue of indefinite multiples of ... the real, they met the demand for larger coins which a big influx of precious metals was bound to
create" (Porteous 1969, 153). The previously incompetent Spanish monetary system was replaced with one adequate to meet the needs of the forthcoming Spanish Empire. When Spain began receiving massive flows of
Spanish-American bullion, it was fully equipped and prepared to increase
production of the silver real.
The Pragmatim established the organizational framework to begin
regular minting of the real, but other factors initiated the increased minting:
Portuguese voyages to Asia revealed Asia's great demand for silver, and
Spain's discovery of America provided a seemingly unlimited supply of the
precious metal. In what would turn out to be a pivotal intersection of
events, the demand for Spanish silver increased almost simultaneously
with an increase in its supply (Busschers 1999, 10-11). The reform of
1497 established the real as a unit of account and prepared Spanish mints
to cope with the dawning invasion of Spanish-American silver.
How far did the real spread as an accepted currency? J. Busschers
quotes a scholar as saying, "In worlds [sie} history, no coin whatever, has got
so wide spreading over both the hemispheres. From the Gobi desert to the
banks of the Amazon and the Hudson, and from the Great Chinese wall to
the Australian continent, this piece is prevalent" (cited ill Busschers 1999,
50). One cannot dispute that the eight reales earned its title as an international currency. Throughout its life it took on various appearances as successive Spanish kings altered its design and occasionally its weight and
value, but its popularity in all corners of the earth endured regardless.
In the Western Hemisphere the I(',ll dominated as the primary currency
in all of Spanish America, which included most of South America, all of
Central America, and much of the Caribbean. The real, or peso, as it was
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known in much of Spanish America, prospered in these areas until each
country gained its independence during the nineteenth century and began
minting national coins. Even so, the present currency standards of all Central and North American countries are derived from the real (Carothers
1930,22). For instance, after independence Mexico modeled its "Mexican
dollars" or "pesos" after the Spanish reales it was accustomed to minting.
The new peso quickly dispersed within the rears area of circulation, and
the international community either did not distinguish it from the Spanish real or accepted it as an appropriate substitute (Andre~ 1904, 321).
The Mexican dollar went virtually unchallenged until the late nineteenth century when Mexico's silver output dramatically plunged. The
United States, Great Britain, and France each attempted to replace
the peso's use in their respective overseas colonies. Each nation independently
attem pted to "displace the Mexican coins, first by attem pting to force its
own money into circulation, then by issuing an imitation of the Mexican
dollar, and now at last by the proposed adoption of a gold "exchange
standard" (Andrew 1904, 342). It took many failed attempts for the
nineteenth-century great powers to displace the Mexican dollar in their
own domestic economies and throughout their colonial possessions. Although the Spanish government did not mint the Mexican dollar, its SllCcess is attributable to the prestige and stability of the rea!.
In the English Colonies, despite the official currency of English
pounds, most coin payments were made in reales. After American independence, Congress "declared the dollar [the American term for peso or
real] to be the ideal monetary unit for the United States," and it
continued as legal tender in the United States until 1857 (Andrew 1904,
326). The real also prospered in Europe, particularly in countries interested
in trade with South East Asia and China, "the most important area of
circulation" for the real (Busschers 1999, 93). The Chinese came to trust
the eight mIles to the extent that they would not accept substitutes even
if those coins' weight and value exactly equaled that of the md. With
the advantage of such confidence, the real maintained a stable position
in the Chinese economy until 1914 when it was replaced by a Chinese
silver dollar called the 'Yuan Shi Kai Dollar' or simply ),Utl1l (Kann
1928,159).
The rcal freely circulated throughout most parts of the globe and was
the predominant currency in nearly the entire civilized world from the late
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fifteenth century into the nineteenth century. Having established that,
I will now turn to an explanation of the rise of the Spanish rea! as the
international standard.

Rise of the Spanish Real as an International Currency
Worldwide demand for silver dramatically increased III the midsixteenth century as Europe experienced a liquidity crisis and China
entered its "silver century" (Von Glahn 1996, 113). Fortunately for Spain,
the discovery of huge amounts of silver in its American colonies coincided
with this worldwide surge in demand for silver. This simultaneous increase
in demand and supply of silver was a necessary precondition for the real
to emerge as an international currency. Were it not for the Chinese demand in particular, the rea! would not have attained nor maintained its
international status. As the global demand for silver began to change,
Spain instigated domestic economic policies that concurrently crippled its
economy at home and thrust the rea! into international usage. The rea!
began circulation in the European community and eventually made its
way to North and Somh America, South East Asia, and China. In time
international demand led by China became so great that Spain's only task
in maintaining the rCtlI was to offer the world a steady supply of the
coveted money.
The rt'tli's rise was predicated upon a worldwide increase in demand
for silver. Busschers explains that around the time Spain began minting
the real, gold coins "were the most important coins in international trade"
(Busschers 1999, 11). At the time, Europe heavily traded with the Arabs
who brought oriental products from the East. However, when Portuguese
explorers made their way to India in 1498 they soon found that local
merchants eagerly accepted silver and rejected gold. This change in
monetary priority was due to the fact that "Gold was plentiful in the
Indies, whereat; silver was in demand there" (Porteous 1969, 142).
Portuguese trade thus created two new markets for silver, an Asian
market that demanded silver currency for transactions, and a European market eager for funds with which to trade in Asia. Although this
early Asian demand for silver catalyzed a greater demand for silver in the
West, it did not have nearly the far-reaching effects that the Chinese demand would have over fifty years later. However, for the sake of chronological clarity I will postpone discussion of Chinese demand until after
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having established how the real became the coin to meet the early increase
in demand for silver.
How did the real earn its initial popularity? As mentioned previously,
the sudden wealth of silver flowing from the Americas into Spain's coffers
was a necessary precondition for the eventual popularity of the real: Spain
never could have supported an international currency of such magnitude
with solely its domestic silver supply. Before the discovery of SpanishAmerican silver, there was insufficient silver to supply the world with large
volumes of silver coins. Piatt A. Andrew's observation that ~ore than fourfifths of all the silver produced for use in the civilized world between 1493
and 1850 came from Spanish-American mines illustrates the central role
American silver had in increasing the world supply and making the reill's
international growth possible (Andrew 1904, 322).
Nevertheless, merely having the capability to supply massive volumes
of silver coins does not guarantee the international community will accept
and seek after one's currency. Another necessary condition is that the coin
has a stable, high value that can compete with other coins in the market.
The retzl exhibited these qualities.
The Spanish government maintained the high value of the real.
Andrew reports that "[Spanish] standard of weight and fineness has suffered comparatively few alterations since their institution." The real
underwent no serious debasement until the eighteenth century when it
was only slightly devalued on two occasions. Miraculously, between 1497
and the early twentieth century the value of the coin decreased by only
5.9 percent. For a long period while Spain's contemporaries were debasing
their coinage, the real maintained a stable value and "their exceptional
goodness caused them to be the more eagerly sought abroad" (Andrew
1904, 323-24).
The reason for the Spanish monarchy's dedication to a stable real was
largely one of self-interest. Spain well understood the potential for
competition from other European states, and were the real's demand to be
compromised by that competition, long-run seigniorage, or taxes received
by Spain from New World mints, would decrease. Although revenues
from seigniorage were not the largest source of Spanish income, they
provided a significant and steady flow of earnings to the Crown. Akira
Motomura notes that these revenues were particularly vital during times
of war as they were generally unimpeded by military conflicts. Thanks to
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Spain's notable emphasis on preserving a strong currency for use in foreign
transactions, the Spanish real was the most stable and highly valued silver
coin of the period.
Although the real's intrinsic value was superior to that of its contemporaries, it still required augmented exposure to foreign markets to
increase its circulation and popularity. In 1552, Spain took drastic and
domestically unwise measures to battle high inflation caused by massive
silver imports. The new policy encouraged cheaper imports while discouraging exports. In fact, it went so hr as to ban the export of many
goods including "wool and silk textiles, tanned leather and other goods"
(Busschers 1999, 22). As a result, wool exports peaked in 1550, and over
a short period of time dropped over 175,000 arrobas per year, the equivalent
4.3 million pounds (Phillips 1982, 779). Naturally such a policy contributed to domestic economic disaster as local producers were Cllt off
from the international market and faced a flood of new foreign competition.
Thus Spain instigated the devastation of its own economy by spending its
silver abroad in an attempt to control inflation.
The battle against inflation was not the only cause of silver outflows
from Spain: the extravagance of the royalty and overspending on war ensured a steady flow of money out of the country. Porteous suggests, "Both
Charles V and Philip II were encouraged to overspend wildly on war and
grandiose diplomatic projects" (Porteous 1%9, 171-72). Earl j. Hamilton
further notes that "Extravagance of the royal family and courtiers, intrigues of Philip I I, and disturbances in the Spanish possessions in Italy,
Holland, Portugal, Flanders, Germany, Austria, and Africa helped to multiply the financial burdens awaiting Philip III (1598-1621)" (Hamilton
1965, 74). The result of Stich extensive overspending was massive exportation of silver, and despite the steady flow of wealth from the Americas,
Spain plunged into extensive debt.
By 1600 the only domestic concern over inflation was directed towards the locally used vellon. When Philip III took the crown in 1599 he
faced a national debt that could longer be ignored. His predecessors,
Charles V and Philip II, had been committed to maintaining "sound
money" and had managed to withstand pressure to use debasement as a
means to increase government revenues. Philip III, however, lacked the
strength to resist political pressure to do something about the unbalanced
budget. Although he dared not touch the real because of potential
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international competition, Philip quickly authorized debasement of the
vellon. The vellon is a petty currency originally composed of both silver
and copper that was used within Spain among the common people for
virtually all transactions (Hamilton 1965, 75). In fact, the Spanish economy
was comprised of two nearly distinct markets: one for large-denomination
gold ducats and silver mdes, and another for small-denomination veLlones
(Motomura 1994, 106). Beginning in 1599 and continuing throughout
the economic decline of Spain, the velloll suffered repeate(! devaluations
at the expense of the public (Hamilton 1965, 75).
The first of many alterations to the velloll was to re-mint it as a purely
copper coin. Less than three years later his Majesty reduced the vellon's
weight by half. Later that same year, he increased the fees for coinage and
fixed the maximum price for copper. The purpose of these policies was to
increase government revenue, and that is exactly what they did. The first
and second debasements each increased net revenue by 100 percent, and
the fixed copper prices increased Crown revenue by approximately 254
percent (Davies 1961, 94). In the following years the vellon was devalued
and re-minted on several difTerent occasions, each time accruing profits to
the Crown and putting more vellOllCs into circulation. Hamilton notes,
"These inflationary measures drove vellon, which had circulated at or
above parity for more than a century, to a discount and evoked bitter
criticism from the kingdom" (Hamilton 1965, 75-76).
The purpose of this article does not permit an in-depth analysis of the
series of vellon devaluations, but the effects on Spain's domestic economy,
and indirectly on the real, are of interest. Velloll inHation increased the cost
of all goods and services in Spain, which prompted merchants to sell to
the Spanish domestic market while shunning Spanish export goods
(Davies 1961, 95). Once again Spanish producers and merchants faced a
situation in which they could not compete with foreign products Hooding
the market, nor could they sell their products abroad. When Philip IV
(1621-1665) took the throne Spain faced the problems of inflation and
massive public debt left by Philip III. These strains upon the country were
only exacerbated by a worsening of general economic conditions due to
increased emigration of young men, heightened international competition
from northern Europe, decreased Crown revenues due to the alienation of
most taxable income sources, and large commitments of both revenue and
manpower to the recently begun Thirty Years War (Hamilton 1965, 79).
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Under the reign of Philip III most inflationary problems had been
sufficiently controlled that the vel/oil continued to circulate practically
side-by-side with silver at only a small discount. However, the problems
under Philip IV, including continued wilon devaluation, soon generated a
steep rise in the price of vefloll and a premium on silver coins. In 1626 the
premium on silver rose to approximately 50 percent, and Philip IV's
attempts to counter the increase were so unsuccessful that by 1642 the
premium had risen to 200 percent. Under these circumstances Gresham's
Law, which posits that bad money drives our good money (Britannica n.d),
took effect, and silver reales disappeared from circulation in Spain (Davies
1961, 96-98). Spain's economic struggles boosted the real's international
circulation as many reales previously reserved for domestic use were
shifted to foreign exchange.
Even as Spain entered a period of economic disaster, the real began its
era of greatest popularity. Early Spanish policies of the mid-sixteenth
century designed to stifle exports helped the real embark on its first major
campaign abroad. The rest of Europe-particularly the Netherlands,
France, and England-benefited from Spanish imports by exploiting
the hungry Spanish market. In return, those countries reaped silver, in the
form of rmles, which compensated for their own domestic lack of silver.
Spain's neighbors welcomed this source of silver, and because of the real's
stable value they generally refrained from melting them down or using
them for other non-monetary purposes.
After the real's initial exposure to foreign markets, Spain's massive
spending on war and extravagance continued to pump silver out of the
country, evidenced by the enormous debt accrued during the reigns of
Charles V, Philip II, and Philip III. ''The flood of precious metals from the
Indies, it was said, was to Spain as water on a roof-it poured on and then
was drained away" (Kennedy 1989, 55). The Crown's attempts to remedy
the public debt by devaluing the vellon eventually led the price of velloll to
skyrocket, which in tllrn accelerated the drive of silver reaies out of the
country into foreign markets.

In today's world it seems collnterintuitive that a COllntry could
promote its currency abroad by initiating policies that were ultimately detrimental to its domestic economy. We associate a strong international currency with a strong domestic economy, but that was not the case for Spain.
On the contrary, were it not for the stifling of exports and encouragement
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of imports, the real's international success might have been delayed. That is
not to say that the retzl would never have risen to become an international
currency, bur there would had to have been some other mechanism for putting the coin into foreign pockets. As it is, Spain's large volume of imports
and expenditures on war and royal extravagance served as the means to
introduce the retJI to the world.
Once significant amounts of reales were circulating internationally
and Europeans continued to ofTer a willing market for them, the real was
on its way towards becoming a universal coin. However, t1~e real did not
reach its full potential until it expanded beyond the boundaries of Europe.
Its first destination on foreign land was Spanish America. When Spanish
settlers began establishing the empire in the New World they encountered
several problems concerning the use of currency. American indigenous
peoples did not use coins as a medium of exchange but rather used other
goods such as cacao beans, seashells, and mother-of-pearl, as well as forms
of commodity money (Seeger 1978, 168). In the New World the reid and
other Spanish coins were established as the official currency, but the
money supply was limited to the small amounts that settlers brought with
them from Spain. Due to the severely deficient money supply, Spanish
settlers had no choice but to use gold and silver as commodity monies and
trade with the natives according to the weight of the precious metals. As
the Spanish population in the New World grew, a lack of currency continued
to plague the settlers (Aiton 1931, 199).
After years of petitioning the royal crown in Spain, the Queen finally
approved a royal cMuLa on 11 May 1535 which authorized the viceroy of
New Spain to organize a royal mint (Aiton 1931, 201). Coins were to be
minted in accordance with the regulations established by the Catholic
kings in Spain and were to strictly adhere to the weight, size, and design
of the existing Spanish coins. Furthermore, the minting of gold coins was
expressly forbidden (Seeger 1978, 177-78). Since the natives would not
accept copper coins, the New World mint exclusively produced silver
coins (Porteous 1969, 170).
The exclusive and abundant minting of silver coinage in Central and
South America, along with the decree that the coins be accepted as legal
tender throughout the Spanish Empire, contributed to the international
success of the reaL. Without competition, the real dominated the SpanishAmerican market as the most sought-after coin. The most signitlcant
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reason for the real's spread across Spanish America is that all peoples of the
Spanish empire, indigenous and ladino, were required to accept Spanish
coins as legal tender. In other words, Spain forced the reid on its colonies
and the new mints on the continent made the coins readily available to
the population. As local economies began to expand, the demand for
currency increased and use of the real grew (Porteous 1969, 225).
Spanish domination of Central and South America, along with the
demand created by Spanish settlers, facilitated the spread of the real
throughout those lands. In North America the driving factor behind the
mIl's spread to the British colonies was the shortage of coins. For most
countries, the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century was a time of
irregularity in type and quantity of coins. Because of constant Huctuations
in bullion supply and the lack of uniformity in the type of coins available,
"every country encouraged circulation of whatever foreign coins it could
entice into its territory" (Carothers 1930, IS). The American colonies
suffered from a severe shortage of coins and the people eagerly procured
coins of any country through trade. Although coins from most Western
European countries circulated in the colonies, the predominant coin was
the Spanish real, which the colonists referred to as the "Spanish dollar"
(Martin 1977, 1009). The colonies received the largest quantity of mzles
from their prosperous trade with the West Indies. Additional Spanish
coins migrated to the colonies from European settlements along the Gulf
of Mexico and pirates frequenting the Atlantic ports further supplemented
the supply (Carothers 1930, 22).
Throughout the eighteenth century the colonists continued to depend on Spanish dollars to provide an adequate supply of coins. As
previously mentioned, the colonies had become so accustomed to reckoning
in terms of [he Spanish dollar that when the Continental Congress
determined to establish an official currency standard throughout the
country, the Inost viable option was to base the system on the Spanish
dollar (Carothers 1930, 3S). The new system maintained American dependence on the Spanish dollar. During the next century, Congress made
several attempts to eliminate foreign coins from circulation, but the large
quantity of Spanish reales in circulation and people's historic use of
the coin led to its continued use untillS57 (Martin 1977, 1010-20). The
American account demonstrates one situation in which the real reached
a country through trade in response to demand for silver coinage. Once

RISE Of THE REA!.

the real began circulating, the common people became highly trusting of
and dependent upon the coin. A similar phenomenon occurred in China.
How did the real make its way to China? Busschers explains the possibility that some reales arrived in China via Portuguese trade routes to
India. The Portuguese empire, which relied on the real, regularly traded
with India and China (Boxer 1970,459). Busschers estimates that in the
second half of the sixteenth century, Portugal exported some 750,000
reales annually to Asia (Busschers 1999, 26). Until the late sixteenth century few reales made it to China through that route because the Portuguese
took advantage of an embargo prohibiting Chinese sailors to trade with
Japan and used Japanese silver to make a large profit on their trade
with China. Since the Portuguese primarily used Japanese silver to trade with
China, most of the reales went to India, where they were melted down and
converted to local currency (Boxer 1970,4(0). Nevertheless, estimates indicate that during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries between 6,000 and 30,000 kilograms of Spanish silver were shipped
annually to Macao, China.
Despite Portuguese trade, the reid did not substantially penetrate
South East Asia and China until Spain began trading there. Beginning in
1565 Spain regularly traded with Manila through a small fleet called the
Manila Galleones that traveled between Mexico and the Philippines. The
Galleons traded in an interesting cycle: the trip back to Mexico brought
Chinese silks and other oriental goods, which were purchased in the
Americas with reales. After exchanging its goods for silver, the ship returned to Manila with reales destined to purchase more oriental products that
could be sold for silver in America. After a decade of continuing transfer
of Spanish-American silver to South East Asia, the Viceroy of New Spain
with charge of the Philippines added to the flow of reales by sending
100,000 pesos of eight reales to Manila annually (Madriaga 1968, 59).
The substantial amount of silver Howing from Spanish America to
Manila had not yet reached its final destination. Upon arrival in Manila,
Spanish merchants used the silver primarily to purchase Chinese goods.
Chinese merchants wanted silver and the Spanish wanted exotic oriental
products; the result was that Chinese vessels dominated the Philippine
market as they searched for and profited from Spanish trade. Between
1611 and 1612, 91. 5 percent of Manila's customs revenues came from
Chinese vessels (Von Glahn 1996, 123). Chinese dominance of the market
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and the fact that Spanish vessels returned home laden with Chinese goods
clearly indicates that masses of Spanish silver in Manila were being traded to
China. One estimate suggests voyages ftom New Spain shipped five million
mIfes annually to Manila and thence to China. In 1597 alone, an estimated
twelve million mIfes reached China via Manila (Boxer 1970, 464).
A third and final route for Spanish-American silver to end up in
China came from bullion originally shipped to Seville and thence either
legally or illegally sent to Amsterdam and London. Beginning in the
1600s, both the Dutch and East India Companies began transporting
some of this silver to South East Asia to purchase oriental goods. Although
smaller amollnts of reales reached China through this route, in comparison
to the Spanish-China trade out of the Philippines, it provided a consistent flow of silver to help meet Chinese demand (Atwell 1982,75).
Now we return to the question of why Chinese merchants so eagerly
accepted Spanish reates. What created the Chinese demand for the real?
The Chinese monetary system was based on bronze coins minted by the
Ming government, but due to a shortage of bronze, coins became scarce.
Consequentially private bronze coins and various forms of silver began to
compete with the Ming coin in an attempt to feed the Chinese market's
demand for money. After 1600, the Ming state debased its coin, and
notwithstanding increased imports of foreign silver, the silver coin exchange rate rose progressively (Von Glahn 1996b, 430-31).
Just as the Chinese state decreased the quantity and value of the
official money supply, the demand for money drastically increased due to
a "commercial revolution" in China. Von Glahn lists several factors which
contributed to the augmented demand for money: the "monetization of
public finance as well as private exchange, dissolution of servile social
relations and the emergence of free labor markets, regional specialization
in agricultural and handicraft production, rural market integration, and
the stimulus of foreign trade" (Von Glahn 1996b, 432). These factors increased demand for money throughout Chinese society as more and more
people and institutions began engaging in monetary transactions.
As the gap between the money supply and demand for money expanded, silver mining in China experienced a compensation-driven
boom. However, in a matter of decades Chinese domestic silver supply
waned, forcing the Chinese to look elsewhere to supplement their inadequate money supply. Ironically, it was at this time, the 1530s, that Japan
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discovered "abundant silver deposits" which welcomed in what is known
today as East Asia's "silver century." Despite a ban on overseas trade, Chinese merchants quickly began trading with Japan in pursuit of silver. As
time went by, China found other sources of foreign silver, prominent
among them the already mentioned Portuguese traders in Macao and
Spanish-American silver in Manila (Von Glahn 1996b, 432).
China's need for money motivated the search for foreign resources,
but that does not explain why the Chinese people chose silver instead of
other forms of bullion such as gold or bronze. Richard Von Glahn explains, "The source of profit from silver ... was the high value silver commanded in China compared to other forms of specie" (Von Glahn 1996b,
433). Silver had twice the value in China as it did in Europe: the goldsilver ratio in China was 1:6, while in Europe it was 1: 11-12 (Busschers
1999, 24). C. R. Boxer intrepidly states, "This was the basic reason why
China remained for so long the suction-pump which absorbed silver from
all over the world" (Boxer 1970, 461).
Savvy merchants quickly discovered the profit of trading with countries
that placed a relatively low value on silver and then returning to China to
reap a hefty arbitrage profit. This practice was so profitable that many
merchants went abroad for the sole purpose of procuring silver to sell in
China (Von Glahn 1996, 126). Given the premium price silver commanded in Asia, European traders "could buy cheap and sell dear" so long
as they had an ample supply of realeJ (Boxer 1970,463). Considering this set
of circumstances, the flow of silver into China seemed destined to happen.
Though China was interested in silver in general, why did the real in
particular become so popular in China compared to other contemporary
silver coins? At this time China had an established system of bronze
coinage for its official currency, but it used silver as commodity money
(Von Glahn 1996, 142). As a commodity, silver was valued according to
its weight, and because the real had both high and constant silver content
the Chinese quickly accepted it (Busschers 1999, 24). Not only did the
real have a high value as a commodity, but it was also readily available due
to the high volume of trade between Spanish America and Europe with
South East Asia. A further advantage for the real was the fact that it was
the first foreign coin to enter China in significant quantities (Kann 1928,
128). These factors combined to produce both wide usage and acceptance
of the Spanish real in China.
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The demand for the real in China was essential to the real's consistent
prosperity for three centuries. Were it not for the massive Chinese demand, the rerzl would have been significantly more vulnerable and likely to
fall with the Spanish empire. Since China and most of South East Asia
accepted only the real, any nation desiring to participate in the lucrative
Asian trade had to acquire a sufficient supply (Busschers 1999, 33).
Until the 1590s, Portugal and Spain dominated trade with Asia.
Other European nations eventually began to realize the profitability of
trading directly with Asia, and in 1597 the Dutch challenged Portugal's
monopoly of the Indian trading route. lwo years later England ventured
to trade directly with the East. The two nations soon established regular
trade relations with Asia, but neither England nor the Netherlands was
pleased with their dependence on Spain to supply them with trading
coins because the real was scarce and because it was a tactical weakness
to be dependent on one's enemy. In 1600 the English attempted to
substitute the real with its own silver trading coin, which exactly equaled
the weight and alloy of the Spanish real. The Dutch, who suffered
most from the I"erzl's scarcity, also coined their own rerzl. Unfortunately for
both countries, the Chinese rejected both mock-reales (Busschers 1999,
33-34).
Bllsschers attributes the rejection to two things. first, "because the
Spanish coins had been counterfeited by other nations ... the Asians
mistrusted any new coinage" (Busschers 1999, 33). The Chinese had
come to so trust the reid that even coins of the same weight and alloy were
quickly dismissed as suspect counterfeits. Second, millions of eight reales
were already circulating in South East Asia, and the amount of new coins
supplied by other European nations was insufficient to overthrow the
firmly established real (Busschers 1999, 34).
After the Chinese snubbed real substitutes, the international prestige
of the retd surged. It was then undeniable that if a country wanted to trade
with China, it would have to obtain Spanish reales for the transactions.
High demand for reales in South East Asia and China boosted demand for
the coin in the West to a degree that even the British East India Company
made its transactions in China primarily with Spanish dollars. Eduard
Kann estimates that between 1710 and 1759 the East India Company
alone traded £26,833,614 of silver in the form of Spanish retzles with
China (Kann 1928, 126-27).
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Once again we encounter a trend that conflicts with modern-day
conceptions of what increases a currency's international demand. Generally one expects that if a nation engages heavily in exporting, its currency
will be highly demanded internationally. In this case, however, it was
Spain's imports that initially diffused the real throughout Europe, not its
exports. By the time worldwide demand for the real began to peak, the
Spanish empire was already entering its decline and was not engaging in
extensive foreign trade. Although Spanish-American trade i?itially spread
the real to South East Asia, it only indirectly influenced the rnt/'s success.
Indeed, it was China's tremendous demand for the real and the world's desire to trade with China that made the rnd the ubiquitous world
currency that it was.

Conclusion
The Spanish Empire first introduced the rettl to the world at a time
when its power was unquestioned. However, as time went by and the
Spanish Empire's grip on power began to slide, the retzl continued to prosper.
At first glance it is puzzling that the real managed to prosper in spite of
Spain's concurrent decline, but upon closer examination one sees that after
having achieved a measure of international success, the real's popularity
became independent of the empire that produced it.
Spain's economic policies marred its domestic economy but promoted
the real's use by the international community. After this initial promotion
of the retd, it became the universal trading coin and was in high demand
throughout the world, irrespective of Spain's position in the world powersystem. Chinese demand supported the rettl's position as any nation wishing
to trade with China had to have sufficient reales. China's thirst for silver
and its wealth of coveted goods maintained the international ubiquity of
the real in spite of Spain's supposed inability to support an international
currency in the face of a national downturn.
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TAX REFORM IN RUSSIA:
ENCOURAGING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE
THROUGH PERSUASION

Camille Jackson

Abstract
Despite tremendous diffimlties ill the past, the Cltrrmt Russian ttlX system is pelj(JI'millg surprisingly well. Hl!lllellCl', while Russian gOlJermnent officials have effictively
ttlckled many olthe ecollomic and logistiCflI problems embedded ill the laws themselves,
area still calls/lJr re/lIJ'In: uoll/ntary compliance. This /llctor alone sets the Russian
tClX systl'm apart jiwil most systems in the
and Europe, £IS Rwsians haul' tmded

0111'

u.s.

Clway fi'Olll tClX compliance jiN centuries. fuse Cln explanatioll

{ifpersuClsion to show

how the RussiClI/ gOllermnmt cillZ-mld is-garnering /lolulllary compliance from its
citizms, using fl persuasioll chain in which per51lasion trtllisf/:rsfrom illterntltionalofficials to Russian gouermnmt officials to Russian citizens. This chaill combines with
existing theoretical ideas that Russians are readJl, but not willillg, to tlccept democratic
stalldards and that better performallce will illcrease trust (and tax payment) in
democmtic regimes. 1 use dma from the New Russia Barometer alld interuiews with
Russiall citizell5 to test this explallation, concluding that it is too early to tell if
persuasion methods haz l(' been e{fictiue, but that there is clejillite potential/lJl' the
dellelopment ofl'plulltillJi tax complimzce ill Russia.

T

he final days of 1991 brought unprecedented changes for Russia. The
fall of Soviet rule and the struggle toward Western-style democracyor at least away from communism-had been a long, hard, and trying
process for Russia and her citizens. National output shrank considerably,
inequaliry increased, and poverry became a realiry for many. These calamities
stem from the difficult yet necessary restructuring process-a process
marked by difficulties and sometimes failure. An area in which the country
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has met with extreme difficulty is taxation. Russia has been notorious for
widespread tax evasion and corruption, problems caused by ill-conceived
tax laws and a cultural tendency away from tax compliance (Aslund
2001). Contrary to popular belief, however, the past few years have also
seen surprising success in tax reform initiatives (Aslund 2001; Institute of
Economics, Moscow 2002).
Indeed, amidst all the suffering and calamity, Russia has been making
progress in its transition, and the new tax code adopted in stages between
1999 and 2003 is remarkable evidence of this progress. In· the course of
change, Russian officials have lowered both income and corporate tax
rates, tightened compliance by using personal identification numbers on
tax returns, and worked incessantly to improve federal-regional tax relationships. As a result, tax receipts have increased from 69% of expected tax
revenue in 1996 to around 120% of expected revenue in 2000, and the
growth rate of tax revenues almost tripled between 2001 and 2002 (Aaron
1996; Pravda 2002).
Some of this success is attributable to new tax laws that have increased
clarity and transparency while decreasing an almost intolerable tax burden.
Other success is attributable to higher oil prices and their subsequent
boost of the Russian economy. Even in the [lce of these successes, however,
Russian tax law will not become fully effective until the new laws meet
with voluntary compliance. Indeed, this aspect alone is the most significant
difference between the Russian tax systems and those operating in the
United States and Europe: in Russia, there is no cultural norm that one
must pay one's taxes; on the contrary, there is a norm that one should
evade paying taxes to the greatest extent possible.
How, then, does the Russian government overcome this obstacle? I
use an explanation of persuasion, or using dialogue to win a party over to
your beliefs, to demonstrate how the Russian government can facilitateand in some cases is already facilitating-voluntary tax compliance from
its citizens. This idea begins with international tax assistants who first
convince the Russian government that facilitating voluntary compliance
should be a priority. Russian governmcnr officials then take this idea down
to the level of citizellS, where they set up programs and launch campaigns to
garner voluntary compliance.
To provide a context to discuss this process, I will begin by laying out
some of the problems associated with Russian tax compliance, problems
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I identifY as "unwritten rules" of the tax system and "social!historical
rules" that have evolved over time. It is these rules the Russian government
is struggling against-a struggle made more difficult by the fact that these
rules have been cultivated flH' over a century, becoming embedded in
Russian culture over time.

The Russian Tax System: A Tiger Tamed?
For most of the 1990s, the Russian tax system gained a reputation for
ineffectiveness, complexity, and corruption-and for good reason. Tax
revenues were low (1997 tax collections were only 65.9% of those anticipated), tax laws were complicated and nearly incomprehensible without
the aid of an accountant, and deals both with and within government
helped facilitate low tax compliance (Institute of Economics 1997,5). The
tax system became a tiger imprisoning the government, rendering Russia
incapable of providing social benefits, offering economic incentives
through taxation, or attracting foreign investment through transparency.
With unemployment averaging 10.3% between 1990 and 1999, wage arrears equaling around $40,000 in 1997, and age-adjusted mortality
rising by 33% between 1990 and 1994, social benefits were sorely needed
yet crippled by low tax receipts (Eggars, Gaddy, and Graham 2004; International Labor Organization 1997).
Necessarily, the system needed reform: the tiger had to be tamed.
What lay in the heart of the tiger were tax institutions-the rules that
govern how people and organizations act within the state and society.
These ineffective institutions can be broken into three primary categories: faulty and uncoordinated "written rules" created by the government, "unwritten rules" that have arisen in both government and society,
and "social/historical rules" that have been centuries in the making. Of
these three, the Russian government has transformed written rules the
most, and this-reform has proven surprisingly successful. Voluntary compliance, however-the focus of this article-is primarily affected by
changes in unwritten and historical! social rules, which cannot be so
easily changed by a parliamentary vote. Unlike written rules, these two
categories have yet to be fully tamed. Before understanding how such
taming can occur, however, one must understand where all three types of
rules came from, what they are, and how they have crippled the Russian
tax system.
SIGMA
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Three Sources of the Complex System
Badly written rules. The Russian government is responsible for creating
the offIcial, wrirren rules of the Russian tax code. Since the fall of communism
in 1991, these rules have been amended, changed, and added to, subsequently becoming more complex if not mutated and greatly deformed.
Beneath all this adding and amending a number of forces were at work,
shaping the rule-making process until it became blind to the realities of
the system and produced rules that only added to the comp!exity.
One of these forces was government tolerance of an inadequate system.
According to Vitaly Artyokov, head of the Russian State l~lx Service umil
1997, the Russian government "passed a law whereby taxes are considered
to have been paid when a payment authorization is issued by the client,
not when the funds are received by the budget" (cited in Varnavskaya
1997, 8-9). In addition, firms apparently had a legal right not to pay, and
the government considered tax offenses only an economic crime, not a
crime against the state (Varnavskaya 1997, 8). One example of such
leniency was the corporate institution of "middlemen" used to avoid taxation. These middlemen buy products from a mother company, sell those
products, then use the resulting profits to obtain inputs and supplies for the
mother company. Thus, while the "middlemen" are actually working for
the company, they are legally tax exempt and not recorded on the books as
corporate agents (Filippov 1997,2). With a parliament overly sympathetic
to corporations making such lenient laws-which are ultimately contrary to
the goal of increasing tax revenue-there was bound to be confusion and
low compliance.
Another problem contributing to the undue complexity of the tax
system was lack of coordination between the legislature and executive
branch. Especially in the mid-1990s, the Russian legislature focused on
creating tax laws that were lenient while the executive branch focused
on compliance and rule of law. Explanations for the lack of political coordination include clashes between parties within the Duma and government officials who were put into office by-and therefore loyal tocertain companies. Between 1992 and 1995 especially, politics within the
Duma prevented the body from passing effective laws that might have
aided tax administration by the executive branch and greatly simplified
the system. Within parliament, the left and right prevented each other's
agendas from being passed, creating a blockade to effective tax reform
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(Silenikov-Murylev and Trotlmov 1997, 1). In addition, early, lenient tax
laws enabled some companies to become wealthy and acquire power,
power that they then used to put certain candidates into office (Norberg
2004). Coming into office partly through the assistance of non-taxpayment, these politicians had a certain loyalty to the lax taxation laws
and little incentive to improve the system (Vishnevskaya 1997, 1).
In the face of lenient tax laws, the executive branch attempted to
ameliorate the problematic situation though strict enforcement of existing
tax law. The most extreme and notorious example of this is the Russian Tax
Police, which was given such wide discretion in collecting taxes that
Russian tax collection practices bore a striking resemblance to intimidation
by the mafia (Gregory and Brooke 2000). In addition, Russian tax administration became bloated over time, with a 5,000-position (17%)
increase in personnel between 1992 and 1995 (Aslund 1995, 194).
Behind this inconsistency berween creation and execution of the tax
laws lay problematic ideological divides regarding reform. A World Bank
report on assisting Russia's transition notes that "the period through late
1999 was characterized by ideological and political splits over market reforms, perceived risk of backsliding, frequent shakes and major decisions
within the government itself-including ... parliamentary opposition to
the reform effons" (Zanini 2003, 40). When the writers of rules lean
toward clemency and the executors toward severity, the rules tend to become muddled and interpreted disparately by the different groups.
Lack of government foresight is another factor that led to bad rules.
During perestroik{{, when Russia first began the transition to private enterprise and was only imagining what a new tax system ought to look like,
the government required little accountability from new enterprises, thus
failing to condition fIrms to the reality and necessity of taxation (Zanini
2003, 40). The Russian government also applied shortsighted crisis management to deal with financial emergencies, often introducing "short-term
and frequently improvised policy reaction ... rather than ... the implementation of a longer-term and comprehensive stabilization and reform
blueprint" (Zanini 2003, 40). This lack of foresight produced institutions
that were neither sustainable nor realistic for a market economy.
Unwritten rules. In addition to the obvious written tax rules of
the Russian government, there are also unwritten rules created by both
government and society that have hindered the Russian tax system. Some
SIGMA
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of these were meant to be compatible with government regulations while
others were meant to help firms and individuals get around regulations.
One of these unwritten rules, non payments, has become extremely prevalent
in-and detrimental to-the Russian tax system. 'fhe system of nonpayments provides for noncash payment or payment through goods
instead of money, a practice engineered by businessmen and government
officials in an effort to decrease inflation but that has led only to currency
devaluation and defaults on loans (Aitken 200 I).
The Russian government's heavy involvement in the system of nonpayments has led to especially detrimental effects: the government is often
tardy with its payments for goods and services, which in turn makes
government-serving firms tardy with their tax payments (Pinto,
Drebentsov, and Morozov 2000). Local governments have played a part in
the promulgation of this system by allowing and even inventing nonmonetary tax payment systems-such as barter-to exact even marginal
tax compliance (Woodruff 2002). This creates a cycle that might work
theoretically (nobody pays nobody and all debts are forgiven), but that
in practice creates economic inefficiencies because many of the companies
to whom debts are forgiven are obsolete and unneeded (Aitken 2004).
In the end, the nonpayments system compounds fiscal difficulties
(Woodruff 2002).
In addition, the nonpayment system creates two business systems: one
monetary and the other barter-based (Randall 2001, 152). Barter systems
have become surprisingly prevalent in Russia, especially since the financial
crisis of 1998, and government tax provisions have only further encouraged
such practices. Barter systems are economically inefficient as they require
a double coincidence of wants; transaction costs increase greatly as both
buyers and sellers must find what they want from someone who wants
what they have to sell.
Keeping multiple, misleading business records is an unwritten rule
that has additionally plagued the Russian tax system. According to Linda
M. Randall, "several managers described their strategy of keeping three
sets of books: one for government tax collectors, one for organized crime,
and one for the manager" (Randall 2001, 151). These separate, misleading records are not considered dishonest, but simply an appropriate way of
doing business. This practice reflects the Russian approach to dealing with
taxes, an approach that can be traced back further than a century.
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Social and historical rules. Many of the problems and inefficiencies
that existed in the Russian tax system were present in the late 1800s during
Russia's last attempt at creating a comprehensive tax system. Then, like
today, increasing corporate taxes, collusion between taxpayers and tax
collectors, and a blurred line between tax avoidance (considered legal)
and tax evasion (illegal) plagued the system (IMF 1997; Bowman 1995,
272). Evidence of the same problems constantly reoccurring suggests
that many of the inefflciencies in the tax system are the result of Russian
culture and the Russian way of looking at taxation, which differs greatly
from social conceptions of taxation in other countries. An anecdote illustrates this point:
During a business semll1ar in Novgorod, Russia, managers
openly discussed the mechanism that they use to avoid paying taxes. A tlrst question directed to American seminar
leaders sought explanation of the ways U.S. managers avoid
paying taxes. The instructors admitted that there arc a number of loopholes that with a good accountant and tax planning allow Americans to reduce their tax burden and still hold
to the letter of the law. Still puzzled, the Russians asked how
Americans who cannot take advantage of loopholes avoid
taxes. In response, faculty members pointed out that Americans run the risk of getting into trouble with the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service if they attempt to avoid paying taxes. This exchange of information convinced the Russian managers that
Americans arc not aggressive and not good managers. (Randall
200 I, I ') 1)

While this attitude is prevalent among Russian business managers,
what is more disconcerting is its prevalence among Russian lawmakers.
The current attitude regarding tax avoidance among Russian citizens is exacerbated by lawmakers who appear more interested in accommodation
of tax evasion. than they are in combating it. Highly publicized leniency
for tax violators has produced a public that does not fear prosecution for
tax violations. Indeed, as noted by Erik Berglof and Romesh Vaitilingam,
"non-compliant taxpayers have interpreted each amnesty as a promise of further forgiveness, and acted accordingly" (BerglM and Vaitilingam 1999,
11). In closing, while Russian culture may have a historic trend toward tax
evasion, badly written rules and tax-evasion prone unwritten rules have
only worsened the situation.
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Persuasion: The Key to Voluntary Compliance?
I take part in this debate by contending that legal reform alone cannot
change imbedded social norms or historical rules-Russian's historical
tendency to evade taxes. Social norms-and the unwritten laws contingent
upon them-are reconciled largely by administrative reform, not policy
(tax-code-changing) reform. I argue that persuasion is the guiding factor
in both motivating administrative reform and garnering voluntary compliance. This process, in effect, creates a persuasion chain, as represented in
the following diagram:
IIHernarional
Moncrary

Russian
Fedcral

Fund

Covernmenr

World Bank

Russian

USAID

Regional
Govcrnmenrs

Figure 1. Persuasion Chain
Persuasion chain. Here, persuasion "begins" with international
technical assistance-officials with the IMF, World Bank, USAID,
and OEeD, who transfer an understanding of economic principles.
International officials interact with Russian government officials, offering advice that is considered, analyzed, experimented upon, and
then absorbed into both Russian tax laws and administrative practices.
After incorporating these suggestions and ideas, built on an understanding of economic principles, Russian officials then transfer these
ideas, ways of thinking, and understanding about how new laws and
practices should function on to Russian taxpayers, persuading them to
comply with these new laws based on economic principles. Here, the
transferred idea is that the new tax system must act like a principled tax
system as opposed to simply looking like one. This persuasion is
directed both toward Russian companies, from which most tax receipts are received, and Russian individuals who pay taxes. Persuasion
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of both companies and the Russian population in general is achieved
through two primary methods: (a) literature, propaganda, and advertisement of the new changes in the tax law; and (b) assistance for taxpayers.
The first embodies an education initiative-programs to educate taxpayers as to what their responsibilities are, as well as how the changes are
in their favor. The second is also educational in nature, but focuses on the
nuances of compliance and is an attempt to show government support for
those who comply.
Existing explanations and extension. Explanations of voluntary tax
compliance within Russia have not been widely formulated or researched,
but scholars have done extensive work regarding Russian culture. Since I
intend to use a largely cultural argument for voluntary tax compliance,
I will huild upon this area of research to create a theoretical foundation.
Numerous articles in Russian culture literature address Russia's
prospects for effective democracy. One prominent study incorporating
numerous interviews with Russians from all walks of life found that Russians support democratic values but are unsure whether their current institutions will effectively uphold democracy (Carnaghan 2001). In other
words, Russian culture is prepared for democracy and the incorporation of
Western attitudes and behavior, but Russians themselves feel that their institutions are not capable of such behavior. The study further finds that
Russians see a strong need for institutional reform but have little interest
in changing these institutions. If, however, institutions were changed with
the assistance of international organizations and analysts, these reformed
institlltions might then foster democratic ideals. Ellen Carnaghan does
not consider this, but I would like to present it as a possibility.
Some theoretical support for this possibility is embedded in William
Mishler and Richard Rose's work on regime approval (Mishler and Rose
2002). These authors contend that the performance of institutionsparticularly eGOnomic performance-is the driving factor behind regime support. If democratic institutions perform well, then citizens will
support democratic regimes, while ill-performing democratic institutions
will have the opposite effect. Although this research focuses on regime
support as opposed to tax compliance, I contend that tax compliance
reflects regime support. After all, it only makes sense that support of
a democratic regime would be reflected by democratic behavior within
democratic institutions.
SIGMA

99

TAX RHOR~l IN RUSSIA

An earlier study by Mishler and Rose investigated the role and status
of trust in post-Soviet countries, a concept central to the functioning of an
effective democracy (Mishler and Rose 1998; Bianco 1994). This study
found that post-Soviet citizens are not necessarily distrustful of their
government, but that they were not entirely trustful either. Instead, postSoviet citizens reflected skepticism, an in-between characteristic that
allows one to draw only limited predictions for the future of democracy in
post-Soviet countries. Although the study did not yield stro.ng predictive
results, it did effectively paint a picture of post-Soviet levels of trust. This
finding was reconfirmed, albeit not directly, in Carnaghan's study.
By combining these findings, one can form a picture of how politics
and democracy should work in Russia. Russian citizens are skeptical of
their government and believe current institutions will not effectively
support democracY" At the same time, Russians do harbor democratic
attitudes, and if democratic regimes performed well and brought economic
success, Russians would, in theory, fully support those regimes and institutions. Recently Russian institutions have performed well. Tax revenues
are high, compliance has greatly improved, the federal budget is under
control, and the Russian government can now payoff its loans instead of
defaulting on them. Will this shift create enough support for democratic
tax institutions to create voluntary compliance, or has voluntary compliance
actually preceded this shift? I contend that persuasion initially prompted
reform and now this reform may prompt a two-way process that will
eventually lead to greater compliance. More specifically, once persuasion
has convinced Russian taxpayers to comply (which some evidence already
supports), the improved tax performance created by persuasion will earn
added support and, by extension, promote even greater compliance. It is
important to note, however, that for this process to work persuasion at the
outset is a necessary requirement.
Method. To evalute the accuracy of my ideas I have examined data
on regime support, trust, and attitudes toward tax evasion from the New
Russia Btlrometer for the years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, and 2003. In addition, I have interviewed Russian citizens in Moscow, investigating their
knowledge of and opinions on the recent tax reforms and whether they
have perceived increased compliance over time.
Data from the New Russia Btlrometer yields mixed evidence. Over
time, support for the democratic regime, and especially for the president,
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has increased (Figures 1 and 2). Presidential support, however, can be attributed to a change in the president as opposed to a change in the
population's perspective on the presidency in general. Regime support is
similarly ambiguous and may, as Mishler and Rose hypothesize, reflect increased performance
of the democratic system.
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It is difficult to draw conclusions concerning trust in the government
from the available data for a number of reasons. One problem is that the
New Russia Barometer asks about trust in specific groups or organizations
within government (Figure 3), as opposed to trust in government as a
whole. While this is an effective and precise manner of gauging trust, the
way it was carried out by the New Russia Barometer produces two potential issues of incommensurability. The New Russia Barometer is not consistent in the entities it asks respondents to evaluate. For example, between
1996 and 2000 the Barometer asked about the Duma or parliament in
general, while in 2001 and 2003 it asked about members of Parliament.
In addition, the Barometer asked about trust in international officials in
2000, but in no other years. A second problem with the New Russia
Barometer is that none of the questions it asks concern trust in tax collection officials, or any group whose approval level could give a very precise
idea of how much Russians trust the government to collect and use
taxes fairly. The best estimates of this kind of trust are likely derived from
public perceptions of the police, a part of which oversees tax collection
and administration, and of the Duma, which ultimately oversees changes
in tax law. Fortunately, the New Russia Barometer measured both groups
every year. Unfortunately, measurements indicate that trust in both
groups fell between 1996 and 2003. lrust in the Duma has plunged the
most, taking a large hit in 2001 when the New Russia Barometer began
asking about Duma members specifically as opposed to the Duma in
general. Trust in the President has increased substantially since 2000,
reaching a trust level of 60% in 2003 (Figure 3). Also included is a measure of trust in entrepreneurs, a trust that has increased over time and may
be related to higher corporate compliance with tax laws. Most of these
numbers, however, leave us with more puzzles than before. The data from
the New Russia Barometer cannot clearly answer why trust in tax law
administrators (police) and tax lawmakers (the Duma) has decreased while
support for a democratic regime in general has increased.
Only one question from the New Russia Barometer directly addresses tax
evasion, and, unfortunately, the Barometer asked this question only in 1998
and 2001. According to this data (Figure 5), general attitudes have changed
slightly during that time. Respondents felt that tax laws were more strictly
enforced in 2001 than in 1998 and that it has become more difficult to
evade taxes by paying a bribe. However, only 2% more respondents felt
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there was no need to pay. In other words, the Russian population has seen
tax administration increase, but this increased administration has not
brought about a shift towards voluntary compliance or a sentiment that
taxes should be paid. This is an interesting finding, suggesting that although
there is greater perceived enforcement this has not been accompanied by
cultural change or the emergence of a belief that taxes should be paid.

A deeper look into the situation through interviews
Interviews with Russian citizens and officials shed further light on this
relationship between the perception of increased enforcement and a concurrent lack of change in cultural attitudes. While speaking of corporate
(as opposed to private) taxes, one Russian respondent expressed the view
that the new, lower tax laws made it easier to own a business and pay taxes;
it was the laws alone, and not attitudes, that have increased the number of
businesses and amount of business tax compliance. Along those same
lines, Derek Norberg, executive secretary of the Russian American Pacific
Partnership, expressed that businesses now see it as profitable to pay taxes:
doing so is less costly, increases transparency, and increases the company's
legitimacy in the eyes of the community and international investors
(Norberg 2004). The attitudes of businessmen have not changed, but the
new laws and lower tax rates have made compliance a mllch more feasible
and profitable option. This same idea has been expressed by other oHicials
and citizens; the new tax rates make it more profitable for companies to
pay taxes (Dobrolyubova 2004).
In addition to lower rates making compliance easier, new administrative measures have made compliance imperative. For example, previolls
income tax laws left a gaping hole for Russian citizens with more than one
job: They could report only one form of employment on tax forms and
Russian officials would never know that they had two or three other jobs.
Recently, however, Russia has instituted a tracking system that identifIes
each individual with a number. This system has made it more difficult to
hide multiple jobs and income sources. Thus, both statistical and qualitative evidence seem to suggest that Russian attitudes toward paying taxes
have changed very little and that any increased compliance must be attributed to a change in laws.
The evidence of increased perception of enforcement and increased
compliance in general rdlects an overall trend in Russian domestic
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government. Known as rutin's "rule of law," this is an ideal strongly
enforced by rutin in many facets of Russian society, including the media,
elections, crime, and, of course, tax payment. Strong administrative
measures such as the arrest of Yukos Oil Company owner Mikhail
Khodorkovsky have shown rutin's desire to come down hard on tax
offenders, and the public largely supports the government in this endeavor. Currently, 36% of Russians support the government against
Yukos, 8% support Yukos against the government, and 17% are unsure
(Public Opinion Foundation 2004). This trend, however, may simply be
a starting point for garnering compliance. In the United States, most of us
would say we comply because there is widespread knowledge of the IRS
and how it punishes noncompliance. If a similar knowledge is cultivated
in Russia, voluntary compliance may form over time. This change, however, must be facilitated through persuasion, persuasion the government
has already initiated through a series of programs.
Studies conducted by the World Bank point out the importance of
programs geared toward creating voluntary compliance and indicate that
Russia has launched educational initiatives and set up taxpayer services
within some regions-with international pressure (Gill 2003). Before
2000, compliance initiatives were not a high priority for the Russian
government. The government saw tax payment as simply an obligation of
all Russian citizens to keep the government running; it would be ludicrous
to fund programs geared toward getting citizens to pay taxes with the very
funds these programs were meant to raise. Over time, however, the Russian government saw the importance of voluntary compliance-a change
that came about primarily through international diJ!ogue as officials with
the World Bank convinced Russian government officials that voluntary
compliance is an area of the tax system that must be addressed, even if
doing so requires the paradoxical use of taxpayers' rubles (Dobrolyubova
2004). Since then the government has lunched advertisement campaigns
to educate Russians about the new tax laws. These campaigns have included slogans such as "pay your taxes Jnd sleep calmly" and analogies
such as an apple slice that illustrates the decrease in income tax
(Dobrolyubova 2004). Other programs have included taxpayer services,
where tax inspectorates can answer questions for taxpayers, and even a tax
book for school children-an educational initiative meant to teach children at an early age the importance of paying taxes.
S[CMA
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Perhaps it is too early to observe the efTects of these voluntary compliance initiatives. Indeed, for a country with a historical trend away from tax
compliance, such initiatives will take time and may have a limited effect
at first. I contend that this premature state is largely responsible for the
mixed statistical resul ts presented in Figures 2-5 and the tremendous eviderlCe that new laws alone account for compliance. Over time, new laws
coupled with new administration-and especially administration initiatives geared toward voluntary compliance-have a potential for success.
This is pardy supported by Mishler and Rose's theory: the 'positive economic performance of a regime (in this case, the present tax system) will
elicit support for that system or regime. This support, coupled with compliance programs, could in turn create more support-support that can
change the thinking of taxpayers over time. Aside from this theoretical
development, tax scholars note that even the United States went through
a period of heavy corruption and Mafia infiltration dming the 1920s, yet
has since developed an honest tax system (Swift 2004). Thus, there may
be hope for Russia as well.

Evidence of a Persuasion Chain.
While only future research can fully examine the persuasion relationship between Russian government and citizens, some evidence already
supports the persuasion chain laid out earlier in the chapter, especially
as it pertains to voluntary compliance. As noted previously, before 2000
the Russian government did not see voluntary compliance as a priority;
it required international dialogue and persuasion, primarily by the World
Bank, to convince the government to fully address the issue (Dobrolyubovna 2004). Since then, the Russian government has launched numerous
advertisement campaigns and initiated taxpayer services to foster voluntary compliance. While many of these initiatives have been geared toward
the population in general, some are meant to persuade businesses specifically, especially the taxpayer service programs. Besides income taxes,
which are usually paid through companies, Russian citizens pay few direct
taxes. This may seem to make tax advertisements geared toward the general population pointless, but many business owners and enrrepreneurs are
included in the general population. Thus, this completes the persuasion
chain as it applies to voluntary compliance.
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This article has briefly explored the area of voluntary tax compliance
in Russia, concluding that conflicting statistical evidence suggests a need
for further research in this area to determine the relationship between
administrative reform, tax policy reform, and the growth of voluntary
compliance. At the same time, qualitative evidt>nce lends support to the
idea of a persuasion chain linking international organizations, the Russian
government, and Russian citizens. Although tax compliance has increased
in Russia, the nation has a potential for even greater tax compliance, a
potential that, if realized, may be an important step towards consolidating
democracy in Russia.

TAX REFORM IN RUSSIA
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THE SINO-TAIWANESE CRISIS:
A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS

Nelson Chung

Abstract
Jllternational relations specialists ha1!e produced abllndallt litelllture on the CiJinaTaiwan crisis, which is among the most /io/atile issues .fu·ing the United States. But
thusfar, .tew halle predicted the olltcome o/t/Je crisis, which / intend to do. / use game
theOl:y to model the expected behal'ior o/the three countries while considering each

0/

the other;- actiOlzs. JOI',,"!/lllize the outcomes based Oil the four major regime-type re/atiollShip optiolls fwailable to China alld Taiwan: reTI 11 ijiCtltio II, cOlzteriellltioll, commOllwefllth, alld illrlepmdmce. By bllildillg

Oil

preuiolls research, / define the illcefl-

tiue structures the three co II II tries .flce. \,(/ithin thatjTaml'work / examine I'llery possible
coune

0/ actiOiI accessible to each col/lltry and how each course ofactio II afficts their

payoffs. Then lfind the Nash-EquilibriulIl

COllrse

o/fletion. / predict that China and

Taiu1an luill peacefitl(y ,liJrlll a commOllll'ealth, because neither side call find a more
profitable lmilateml deviation.

Introduction .

I

n his reelection bid President George W. Bush said the following

In

defense of invading Iraq:
We're pursuing a strategy of freedom around the world, because I understand free nations will reject terror. Free nations
will answer the hopes and aspirations of their people. Free nations will help us achieve the peace we all want. (New York
Times, 1 October 2()04)

President Bush's remarks reflect his neoconservative belief in promoting peace through spreading democracy, a conviction which stems

SINO-TAIWANESE CONfLICT

from the theory that democratic nations will avoid gomg to war with
each other.
Bush exhibited this ideology early in his tenure when he vowed to
commit whatever resources necessary to defend democratic Taiwan in the
case that China decided to attack. His promise is perhaps the strongest
commitment by a
president to Taiwan since the
de-recognized
Taiwan's status as a sovereign state. The commitment constitutes a radical
break from previous administrations' intentional ambiguity toward the
China-Taiwan problem. Critics condemned Bush's act ;s excessively
provocative, contending that China's staunch determination to regain the
island could produce a major conflict if the U.S. intervened. Supporters
lauded the President's commitment to defending democracy.
The China-Taiwan problem originated when China ceded Taiwan

u.s.

u.s.

to the Japanese in 1895. After World War II, the Japanese were forced to

relinquish Taiwan to the United States, who transferred the island to the
Chinese Nationalists as a place of refuge against the Communists in
the Chinese Civil War. The Nationalists lost the war and retreated to
Taiwan. Ever since, Taiwan has functioned as a de facto independent
country. The Civil War has been declared over, but China is insistent on
regaining Taiwan and has threatened the use of force in doing so.
Any military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would cost the U.S., China,
and Taiwan in lives and treasure. Each country is considering the relevant
costs, which thus far have prevented them from taking any action. Using a
game-theoretic model of Taiwan, China, and the United States, I predict
that China and Taiwan will peacefully form a Chinese commonwealth, the
U.S. will not have to intervene, and China will nor impose economic sanctions. This outcome follows from several conclusions. If Taiwan attempts
to gain more sovereignty than that granted by a commonwealth by declaring independence, it would incur a costly Chinese invasion without American help. For China, if Taiwan offers to form a commonwealth, invading
would be too costly; Beijing is better off simply accepting that political relationship. If Beijing threatens to isolate Taiwan economically, it would see
damage to its own economy; therefore such threats are not credible.
Past Work on the Sino-Taiwanese Conflict

Many international relations scholars have written about the probability and impact of a Taiwanese declaration of independence and a
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Chinese invasion. Steven Tsang has examined the incentive structures the
two states face in their actions (Tsang 2004b). I will use these structures
to gauge the payoffs of different strategy options.
Scholars differ on whether China would follow through on any threat
to attack Taiwan. Michael O'Hanlon advances notions that China would
not invade because (1) it has too much to lose economically and (2) it lacks
the military capacity (O'Hanlon 2000). Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzell
challenge those notions, arguing that China would retake Taiwan even at
high economic costs. And though China lacks the navy to launch an amphibious attack, it possesses missiles and weapons of mass destruction sufficient to obliterate the island (Scobell and Wortzell 2001). This aids in
determining the payotfs of the game; China would lose more from not
invading than from invading if Taiwan chooses to declare independence.
Concerning the Taiwanese side, John Tkacik argues that Taiwan has
too much invested in China to declare independence (Tkacik 2001). Even
if China does not attack, it can threaten to sever economic relations with
Taiwan at high costs to the latter.
Regarding the outcome of a possible armed conflict, Ellis Joffe shows
that three major options of attacking Taiwan are available to China:
a blockade, missile strikes, and an amphibious invasion (Joffe 2OCH,
126-27). Assuming U.S. support of Taiwan, only missile strikes have a
reasonable probability of succeeding Sustaining a blockade against Taiwan is difficult against the Taiwanese military, let alone the U.S. military.
An amphibious invasion is beyond the capacity of the Chinese military in
the near future. From this premise it is clear that U.S. intervention would
probably determine whether China can take back Taiwan.
Scholars recognize that cross-strait dynamics also hear significance to
the United States. Ralph Clough has noted a trend of Taiwanese information technology (IT) production facilities being relocated to the Chinese
mainland. Many of these final products are sold in the U.S. (Clough
2001, .)3). Any military conflict would potentially atfect the supply of
these technologies to U.S. markets. This technology factor increases the
costs of non-intervention for the United States.
On the theoretical level, Enze Han, Emerson Niou, and Brett Benson
have each used game theory to model the Sino-Taiwanese crisis. Han
provides a very basic model as a starting point (Han 2004). The model
includes two games with two players each, China and Taiwan: one game
SIGMA
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without American intervention, one with American intervention. The second game has a higher probability of conflict. Han proposes increasing the
incentives for cooperation in order to avoid that conflict. In these games,
players are given two options: cooperate, which means maintaining the
status quo, and deviate, which to Taiwan means independence and to
China attacking. Han's model shows that a U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan would actually heighten the probability of war (Han 2004,
8-9). He recommends increasing incentives for cooperation ~s the way to
maintain peace.
Niou's more sophisticated model of the crisis includes the U.S. as a
third player and uses sequential moves, dividing China's military action
into two steps: missile exercises and actual attacks. It also includes the uncertainty of who is in charge of each country. His conclusions include,
among others, that Taiwan is more likely to declare independence if the
probability of U.S. help is high and that China is more likely to use military coercion if the American government is weak (Niou 1998, 12, 18).
Benson and Niou construct another game-theoretic model that accounts for the different types and levels of commitments the U.S. can
make to Taiwan (Benson and Niou 2001; 2004). In their game, the U.S.
chooses among ambiguous, weak, and strong commitments. Niou and
Benson conclude that the U.S. can maximize its payoff by maintaining
ambiguity in its commitment to defend Taiwan.
The aforementioned models allow us to see the significance of U.S. involvement, the importance of each country's leadership strength, and the
implications of diHerent degrees of clarity in U.S. commitments. But each
model has dichotomous strategies: Taiwan can choose either between reunification, on one hand, and independence or the status quo, on the
other. These models ignore the possibility of different regime types that
can serve as compromises between the two outcomes. They also disregard
the impossibility of Taiwan's maintaining the status quo. Joffe notes that
China has sternly warned Taiwan that it does not have the option of maintaining the status quo forever (2001, 111). Scholars have proposed diHerent regime types that do allow for compromises in the political relationship
between China and Taiwan. A confederacy and a commonwealth are two
of the most common of these models. Tai-chun Kuo and Ramon H. Myers
have defined a commonwealth (Kuo and Myers 2004, 192-94); Tsang, a
confederacy (Tsang 2004a, 202-06).
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Under a commonwealth, two equal and sovereign countries join in a
political union. They control standing territories and pledge not to intervene in each other's domestic affairs. Neither is considered a province. A
commonwealth between China and Taiwan would allow Taiwan to become a neutral country in security terms and require the two countries to
gradually demilitarize. Additionally, a commonwealth allows each country
to

engage in its own diplomatic relations and join international organiza-

tions. According to Kuo and Myers, this arrangement, a commonwealth,
would help China "expunge the past humiliations suffered by the PRC
from foreign 'imperialism' and allow the people of Taiwan recognition as
a sovereign, independent nation" (Kuo and Myers 2004, 192).
A confederacy constitutes a slightly closer integration. Tsang describes
a confederacy (what he dubs as a "Chinese Union") as
two governmenrs across the Taiwan Strait upholding the principle that there is but one China though both can have diplomatic representations overseas and conduct rclations with the
rest of the world without violating this principle. In looking at
the sovereignry issue this can be seen in comparison to that in
a marriage. While a married couple (or the Chinese Union) together will share 'sovereignty' as a unit. the husband and the
wife (or the two constituent Chinese state, of the PRC and
Taiwan) can by mlltual agreement and understanding still
function as 'sovereign' individuals to the outside world without
infringing on the 'sovereignty' of the marriage (or the Chinese
Union) even though one partner in the marriage (or the PRC)
may. because of its size. playa more dominant role. (Tsang
2004a, 20.1)

In comparison to a commonwealth, which grants Taiwan full sovereignty,
a confederacy allows Taiwan shared sovereignty with China while ftmctioning as a sovereign only in diplomatic relations. In a confederacy, unlike in a commonwealth, Taiwan must conduct its diplomatic relations
under a tide that designates itself as part of the Chinese confederacy, such
as "Taiwan of the Chinese Union" or "Chinese Taiwan" (Tsang 2004a,
204). In addition, Taiwan can never vote against or undermine China in
international bodies. As in a commonwealth, a confederacy prohibits interference in each other's domestic affairs, but adds that the two entities
cannot criticize each other's policies. Also like a commonwealth, a confederacy allows both sides to maintain their own armed forces with separate
SICMA
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command structures and the right to purchases arms from any source in
the world. But the two militaries would organize under the designation
"Defence Forces of the Chinese Union," with a coordinating body (Tsang
2004a, 205). As is apparent, a confederacy implies a tighter union in name
and in function vis-a.-vis a commonwealth.
I use those definitions to construct a sequential-move, game-theoretic
model that assumes Taiwan has reached the point where it must choose
from reunification, confederacy, commonwealth, and independence. Past
game-theoretic models have included the status quo as an oi)tion because
the aims of those models were normative: to determine what the U.S.
should do to avoid armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. These models did
not predict the final outcome of the crisis. In constrast, this study does.
The status quo cannot be the final outcome because China has said it
will not allow Taiwan to drag its feet indefinitely. This model assumes
that Taiwan has reached a point where it must choose, that China reacts
to Taiwan's decision, and that the U.S. decides whether to intervene.
This study adds further light to the crisis by allowing us to see what
regime type will define the Sino-Taiwanese political relationship.
Unit of Analysis
I will treat Taiwan, China, and the United States as unitary actors for
simplification.' Rational choice theory allows the aggregation of each
policymaker's decision calculus into a whole, assuming that each politician
within a country faces roughly the same incentive structure. 2
The Taiwanese Interest
With the players defined, I now identify the interests of each player
that constitute the payoffs in the game. The government of Taiwan seeks
to perpetuate its power, and to do so the government must answer to its
electorate. Su identified democratization as the greatest force behind
Taiwan's mainland policy (Su 2004, 50-51). Blit the realities of the international system restrain Taiwan from acting Ollt of pure political motives
at the expense of the country's security. In face of these limitations, Taiwan can respond to the demands of its people by pursuing three major
goals: raising Taiwan's international standing, maintaining the democratic
way oflife, and promoting economic prosperity.
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Raising uzizUtms Illternatiowzl Standing. The Taiwanese generally desire raising Taiwan's international profile. Disagreement over the island's
identity and future polarizes its inhabitants. But a majority rejects the "one
China" principle and recognizes Taiwan's sovereignty (Zhao 2001, 103).
Taiwan actively seeks to promote its sovereignty through dispensing foreign aid in exchange for diplomatic relations, campaigning to join international organizations, and demanding equality in talks with the PRe.
Attain ing de jure independence would consummate Taiwan's quest for a
heightened international standing.
Maintaining the Democratic Way of Lift. Democratization has raised
Taiwan's international profile, but the Taiwanese also hold liberal democracy to be an end unto itself, not just a means to attain stronger international status. Tsang has noted that the Taiwanese see themselves as
sharing more in terms of political values with Western Europe and North
America than with communist China (Tsang 2004b, G). Taiwan has experienced the freedoms of liberal democracy and would not revert to
authoritarianism. De jure independence would ensure that the Taiwanese
continue to enjoy their freedoms. Reunification would not necessarily
mean that those freedoms would be revoked; China has promised not to
interfere with local affairs after reunification (Lasater 2000a, 48). But the
Taiwanese are suspicious of those promises. They scrutinize China's treatment of Hong Kong in order to predict the treatment China would give
them under unification.
Promoting Economic Prosperity. Even more so than democratization,
rapid economic growth in Taiwan has enhanced Taiwan's prestige and improved the quality of life for the Taiwanese. To take advantage of China's
economic ascent will require Taiwan to have closer economic integration
with China.
In pursuing increased international standing, perpetuation of democracy, and fmt-her economic growth, Taiwan is subject to constraints imposed by the PRe. Taiwan's increasing economic dependence on the
mainland make it vulnerable to blackmail. Pursuing international recognition angers the PRC and has often elicited threats of attack.
China has the world's fastest-growing economy, and Taiwan must
concede to closer integration if she is to cash in on that growth. China
supplies a huge export market and low-cost labor. Consequently,
Taiwanese companies have relocated much of their manufacturing to the
SIGMA
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mainland. In order to capture further gains from this growth, Taiwanese
businesses have lobbied the Chen adminisrration to proceed with simtollg,
or "three links" of direct air, shipping, and mail across the strait. Industrialists like Wang Yung-Ching of Formosa Plastics and Kao Chin-yen of
Uni-Enterprises (owner of the 7-Eleven franchise in Taiwan) have joined
in lobbying, suggesting that Taiwan's government set aside politics for fifty
years and focus on economic issues (Trliwllll Economic News, 22 May
2002). Jiang Zemin expresses similar wishes. His eight-point proposal
asserts that "political disagreement should not impede econa'mic cooperation" between China and Taiwan; Jiang aims to protect the "rights and
interests of industrialists and business people from Taiwan" (Jiang 1995).
Detaching politics from economics is impossible (Rourke 1995, 472).
Wang, Kao, and Jiang are naive in thinking that it is.
While the growing trade and investmenr relationship between China
and Taiwan is mutually beneficial, Taiwan, as the smaller economy, stands
to lose more if the relationship is ended. China can threaten to sever economic ties if Taiwan refuses to reunite. Chalmers Johnson has noted that
the Taiwanese government is aware of this, and in response it has tried to
divert outward foreign investmenr flows from China towards Southeast
Asia to lessen dependence on China's market, so that an attack on Taiwan
equates to an attack on the entire region (Johnson 2000, 160). Nonetheless, if links are not established, Taiwan may lose out to Japanese, Korean,
and Western corporations in cashing in on China's boom. Thus the
"China factor" imposes a major constraint on Taiwan in promoting economic prosperity.
Taiwanese pursuit of international recognition provokes China. Chinese economic and military threats constrain Taiwan's ambitions to improve its international profile. Examples of responses to Taiwan's eHorts at
acquiring international recognition include the firing of missiles into the
Strait after Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell University
in 1996 and the Chinese furor over arms purchases from the United States.

The Chinese Interest
Just as Taiwan must answer to its electorate in order to perpetuate its
power, China is beholden to the nationalism that legitimizes the regime.
With Communism's collapse the CCP resorted to nationalism as the
ideology bolstering the party. The CCp's legitimacy is a function of its
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performance in boosting the state's international stature and meeting the
basic needs of its people. China can do so in three major ways: maintaining territorial integrity to meet the irredentist demands of its people,
improving its strategic position to increase its power and thereby enhance
international stature and prestige, and developing China's economy to improve the lives of its people. All three are answers to nationalism; the last
can also be seen as meeting the basic needs of its people. The following is
a detailed explanation of the three.
1. Closing the chapter o/national humiliation. The CCP is determined
to retake Taiwan in order to close the chapter of national humiliation
caused by Western and Japanese imperialists, as that would end what
China sees as foreign meddling in China's domestic affairs. Allowing
Taiwan to break away would dissatisfy its people's nationalistic sentiments
because Taiwan has not been fully returned to China since China surrendered the island to Japan in 1895. If Taiwan were allowed to become independent, the CCP would be seen as incapable of answering to the
nationalism that legitimizes it in the first place. Social disorder might
result from CCP indifference to Taiwanese moves toward independence.
Such is the main incentive for the PRC to block independence movements. Thus, having Taiwan under its reins would positively impact
China's legitimacy, as did the return of Hong Kong.
2. Enhallcing national power. In addition to closing the chapter of
humiliation, China can answer to the nationalism of its people by attaining
superpower status. Retaking Taiwan would boost the PRe's strategic position and hard power. Martin L. Lasater has noted that control of Taiwan
would give China the following: its only strategic gateway into the ocean;
adjacency to critical sea lines of communication; the ability to block Japan's
economic lifeline; a communications hub in the Western PacifIC; disruption
of the U.S. strategic chain spanning Japan, Korea, and the Philippines; and
the coastal defense currently unavailable (Lasater 2000a, 7-8).
But the costs of war would cripple China's military, especially if the
U.S. chose to intervene. As will be discussed later, war could mean economic instability leading to social unrest that would force the PLA to
protect the CCP and render the PLA incapable of attending to its security
functions. The geopolitical enhancement from having Taiwan would be of
little use if the PLA has to quell domestic discontent. Thus I expect war
to have a negative impact on China's national power.
SIGMA
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3. Developing economy. China's rapid post-liberalization growth has
contributed immensely in legitimizing the CCP. Integrating newly industrialized Taiwan into China's economic sphere would further the work by
enabling a synergistic relationship between China's low-cost labor and Taiwan's advanced high-tech sector. However, as was seen with the European
Union in its earlier stages, complete economic integration does not require
political integration. Tariff-free borders, free flow of investment, and labor
mobility can occur between two independent political entities. On the
other hand, attacking Taiwan comes at a high economic costs-; Scobel! and
Wortzel! have shown that an invasion of Taiwan would lead to a sharp
drop in foreign direct investment inflows from Taiwan to the mainland
and thereby would cause massive unemployment and ultimately social unrest (Scobell and Wortzell 200 I, 1). Retaking Taiwan by force would hurt
China's economy and the CCP's legitimacy, so it constitutes a major disincentive for forced reunification.
International constraints on Chi1lfl. In pursuing legitimacy through
those three means, China faces the constraints of the international system.
China has entered the international community and consequently is subject to global norms and institutions. Two major events constrain China
in its attempts to maximize legitimacy: the probability of international
intervention and the disapproval of the international community.
Expected international intervention. The international community is
likely to frown upon an invasion and may take action to deter China.
China saw NATO intervene in Kosovo without a UN mandate and in
spite of NATO's recognition of Serbia's sovereignty. This action has major
implications for the Taiwan issue because China's UN Security Council
veto and Taiwan's lack of sovereignty may not be enough to safeguard
China from international intervention.
International norms. In addition, forcibly reintegrating Taiwan would
adversely affect China's "soft power." As Joseph Nye has demonstrated, the
ability to get others to do things through enticement rivals hard power
as the "currency" of international relations today (Nye 2004). Much talk
of the recent diminution of the U.S.'s soft power resulted from Bush's
allowing the neoconservatives to run amok in foreign policy decisionmaking (Buchanan 2004; Prestowitz 2003). Neoconservatives in the
upper reaches of the Bush administration have been blamed for violating
international norms when attacking Iraq unprovoked and for considering
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doing the same to Iran. The same wOllld hold true for China. Attacking
a prosperous, democratic entity would similarly give China a black eye in
the international community. Furthermore, such a choice could even
lead to a Cold War with the United States (Scobell and Wortzell 2001,
20-21). Thus, invading Taiwan clearly harms China's international status.
U.S. Interest
U.S. interests 1Il the cross-strait crisis are mainly strategic and economic. Lasater identified nine reasons why Taiwan is of importance to the
United States and five why China is (Lasater 2000b, 51-56). I summarize
the major issues below.
strategic interests in 7fiiwlln. Taiwan is of strategic importance to
the United States for three major reasons. First, if the U.S. bils to defend
Taiwan it will hurt U.S. credibility regarding its other commitments.' Second, a de facto divided China may be vital ill containing China's growing
power. Third, Taiwan is part of an American ally chain that spans Japan,
South Korea, and the Philippines. If a war were to break out, escalate, and
spread, the U.S. would be drawn in, if only to fulfill its commitment to
protect its allies.
US. economic illtt'l'ests ill Ttliwall. Taiwan is the U.S.'s seventh-largest
trade partner and, as mentioned before, a large supplier of the U.S.'s IT
consumption. A war would cause both an IT shortage in the U.S. and a
recession that would spread throughout the Asia-Pacific region, the destination for the bulk of U.S. exports, limiting the region's ability to absorb
them.

us.

us.

strategic interests in China. The U.S. has strategic interests in
China as well. With China's growing power the U.S. needs to accommodate China in the new world order. China has the potential to join the
U.S. in the global war on terror and in nonproliferation. Coming to Taiwan's defense may complicate China's willingness to help 011 those fronts.
Furthermore, the war will likely escalate into a regional security conflict
between the U.S. and China.

US. economic interests ill C'hina. The U.S. has a large stake in China's
economic development. Cheap imports from China have helped save
American consumers $100 billion since 1997. China is also an eager consumer of American goods. As America's fastest-growing export market,
China absorbs $20 billion worth of American exports each year. China
SIGMA
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also helps keep U.S. interest rates low by financing U.S debt (Tyson 2003,
30). It is in the U.S.'s interest to maintain its economic relationship with
China without disruption from war.

Model Specification
Within the above framework, I use game theory to predict the outcome of the China--Taiwan problem. Taiwan, China, and the U.S. will he
the players in the game. They will move in that order. Taiwan:s strategy set
(s7) contains four strategies: reunification (r), confederacy (ef), commonwealth (ew), and independence (idp). China's strategy set (SC) contains three strategies: invade (nu), not-invade but impose sanctions
(-lll'lse), not-invade and not impose sanctions (-lIu1-sc). The U.S.'s strategy set (SA) contains three strategies: intervene to help Taiwan (Il) and not
intervene (_h).4 I sllmmarize the strategy sets of all three players:
(I)

ST
SC
.<,A

=

(T, cj cw, idp)
(lIU, -mise, -nul-sc)

=

Ill,

=

-hi

Taiwan, as the first mover, chooses between r, ~l cw, and idp. I assume
that if it chooses r, it does so on Chinese terms, in accordance with Jiang
Zemin's eight-point proposal, which allows Taiwan to retain its armed
forces and independently administer its governmental affairs (Jiang 1995).
China will have attained its goal of peaceful unification and the game will
be over. If Taiwan chooses (j,' cw, or idp, then China chooses among IlU,
-llulsc, and -mi-sc. If China chooses lUi, then the U.S. enters the game
and chooses between hand - h.
The following is a list of all possible outcomes. The first letter of each
outcome denotes Taiwan's strategy: R for reunitlcation, F for confederacy,
W for commonwealth, and 1 for independence. for the number that follows the letter, -1 denotes a Chinese invasion and U.S. aid to Taiwan, -2 a
Chinese invasion without U.S. aid to Taiwan, -3 Chinese sanctions, and
-4 Chinese acceptance of Taiwan's offer. If Taiwan chooses reunification,
the game automatically ends without participation by the other players.
Therefore I set the digit for reunification to zero because 1-4 are irrelevant.
(2)
RO: (r)
FI: (cj lUi, h)
f2: (4' lUi, -h)

F3: (cj - tlulse)
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F4: (if,

~nv/~sc)

\'(/1: (cU!,

111J,

\'(/2: (cw,

lllJ,

W3: (cw,

~

h)
~/;)

IW!'C)

\'(/4: (au, ~llvl ~s()

11: (idp,
12: (idp,

lW, /;)

13: (idp,
14: (idp,

~ llvlse)

lllJ,

~ h)

~nll/~se)

I also assume that for every U.S. lIoll-IJe!p outcome, China will eventually
win the war, and Taiwan will be forced into reunification. For every h outcome, Taiwan will survive the war and strained relations after the
war will prevent any union between China and Taiwan, regardless of what
Taiwan originally offered, and Tliwan will be independent. The same applies if China imposes economic sanctions: strained relations will render
compromises impossible, and Taiwan will become independent. I summarize the ass lim ptions of the model below:
1. Taiwan has reached the point where it must choose
between reunification, confederacy, commonwealth, and
independence. Although Taiwan is currently able to keep
its policy options open rather than being forced to
choose one (Nathan and Ross 1997, 213-14), China has
warned that Taiwan cannot maintain the status quo indefinitely (Joffe 2001, 11 I).
2. If Taiwan reunites, China, though authoritarian, will
treat Taiwan in accordance with Jiang Zemin's eight
points for peaceful reunification.
3. If the U.S. does not intervene, China will win the war
and force Taiwan into reunification.
4. If the U.S. intervenes, Taiwan will survive the war and
become independent.
5. If China decides to impose economic sanctions on
Taiwan, compromise would be impossible and Taiwan
would move to independence regardless of what it initially offered.
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Analysis of Preferences
Ttliwan's Preftrences

I now examine every outcome and the utility each player derives from
those outcomes. To begin, I group similar outcomes and compare. Because for every non-help outcome Taiwan will be forced into reunification
and thereby lose all international standing in addition to suffering economic damage, all -2 outcomes will yield the lowest payoffs. From this
I conclude that
(3)
F2= W2=12.
And because with all help outcomes, Taiwan will become independent
and thereby maximize its international standing, its democratic way of
life, and suffer economic damages to a smaller degree than with non-help
outcomes, all help outcomes will yield payoffs all equal to each other and
higher than those in (3). This is represented by
(4)
F1=Wl=ll>F2=W2=12.
If Taiwan were to choose reunification then it would lose all international standing, puts its democratic way of life at risk, but could continue to enjoy economic prosperity. It would yield a payoff lower than
outcomes with help but higher than lion-help. With reunification, international standing approaches zero, while with all help economic prosperity does not close in on zero. Hence,
(5)
11> RO>F2.
For all non-invade/sanction, Taiwan would suffer economic isolation
from the mainland, although it could find alternative sources of economic
prosperity. Economic isolation does not compare to economic destruction
from war. So all payoff values for non-invadelstmction scenarios are higher
than those for all invade scenarios. And because the sixth assumption
holds that if sanctions are imposed, Taiwan move towards independence,
regardless of what it originally offered, all non-inV{ldeisanction outcomes
yield the same payoff values. Thus non-ill/!tlde/Stllictiolt payoffs are all equal
and greater than invade payoffs: Thus,
(6)
F3=W3=LhFl=Wl=11.
For all cases of non-illvtldeinoll-stillction, Taiwan could enjoy greater
international standing and continued economic prosperity than with JlOIlill/!tlde/stlllctioll cases. The level of international standing differs according
to regime type. Hence,
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(7)
(8)

14> V14>f4>F3= W~J=13.
Ifwe aggregate (4) through (7), we have
14> V14>F4>F3= W3=13>F1 = V1I =1i>RO>F2= V12=12.

China:, Preferences

Again, I begin by grouping similar outcomes. For all non-help outcomes, China would have Taiwan under its control after a long war, but
would suffer economic losses from war and suffer backlash from the international community for attacking a free-market democracy. The damage to
its military would offset any geostrategic enhancement from gaining the
island. The backlash would be [he only variable that differs depending on
what Taiwan chooses and would be inversely related to the level of autonomy Taiwan is seeking. If Taiwan were to choose independence, for example,
the backlash over attacking Taiwan would not be as great as if Taiwan offered com mOl/wealth, because offering commonwealth would make Taiwan
seem more conciliatory, since it is partially relinquishing some sovereignty,
so China would seem more at fault ifit declined the offer and attacked. Offering conJCderacy would make Taiwan seem ewn more conciliatory and
China even more at fault if China declined. So we have the following:
(9)
12> V12>F2.
For all help outcomes, China would not be able to regain Taiwan and
close the chapter of national humiliation. U.S. intervention would allow
Taiwan to become an independent country regardless of what Taiwan
chose in the first place. The payoffs are thus lower than in all those in (10)
and also depend on whether Taiwan were to choose conJCderacy, commOl/we,lItI}, or independence. So again, as with non-help outcomes, all variables
would be the same irrespective of Taiwan's original strategy, except the
international backlash, which would differ depending on in how conciliatorilya manner Taiwan negotiates:
(10)
12>V12>F2>Ii>V1i>FI.
If Taiwan were to choose conJCderacy, or commonwealth, and China
were to enact economic sanctions, then China would suffer the same economic damages from severing economic ties with Taiwan. Its closing of
the chapter of national humiliation would be the same under both outcomes because in both cases Taiwan would move towards independence,
regardless of whether it offered confederacy or commonwealth (Assumption 5). Still, the payoffs would be higher than from any war scenario:
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(11)

F3= W3>I2.
If Taiwan were to choose independence and China were to choose noninvilde/sallction, that is, do nothing, the CCP would lose its legitimacy,
creating the worst-case scenario. If Taiwan were to choose independence
and China non-invade/sI1l1ction, i.e., merely sanction, such action would
amount to virtual inaction. China would lose almost as much legitimacy,
creating the next-to-worst-case scenario, which would be worse than losing a war to the United States.
Some may question this preference. Assumption 4 holds that if the
u.S. were to choose help then China loses the war and not regain Taiwan
anyway. China would apparently suffer severe geopolitical and economic
damage in vain. The reason, as Chu Shulong of the China Institute of
Contemporary International Relations explains, owes to cultural perceptions of victory. Chu says that even if China were to lose to the United
States, standing up against an encroaching superpower like the U.S. would
be considered victorious to the Chinese (Chu1997). Thus the people prefcr China fight and lose the war than do nothing at all.
(12)
Fl>J3>I4.
If Taiwan were to choose commonwealth or cOllftdcrtlcy, and China
were to choose non-invfldeillon-sanction, then China would somewhat
close the chapter of national humiliation, without suffering losses in
economic development from severing economic ties with Taiwan. The
more autonomy Taiwan gains, the more embarrassment China suffers. All
non-in l!tlde/ll 0 II-sail ctioll scenarios yield greater payoff values than all lloninvade/sanction scenarios because the only difference is that lIon-invade/
sanction allows China to maintain trade and investment relations with
Taiwan.
(13)
F4> W4>Fh W3.
Finally, if Taiwan were to choose reunification, the chapter of national
humiliation would be completely closed, there would be no international
backlash, and China's national power would be strcngthened. This would
be the best-case scenario:
(14)
RO>r4.
Comhining (10) through (14) gives us the following preferences for

China:
(15)
RO>F4> W4>F3= W3>J2> il7.2>F2>Jl> Wi> Fi>l3>J4.
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United States' Preferences
We now examine preferences for the third mover, the United States. As
stated earlier, if the U.s. were to fail to come to Taiwan's aid it would lose
credibility on its defense commitments elsewhere. The U.S. has pledged its
support for all scenarios excepting a unilateral Taiwanese declaration of
independence. As mentioned earlier, the current Bush administration opposes any unilateral acts towards independence. It the U.S. intervenes when
Taiwan chooses independence it loses lives and treasure and suffers strained
relations with China; good relations are needed in the war on terror. So by
choosing 1Ion-help the U.s. would lose credibility only if Taiwan chooses
confedemq or commonwealth, not if Taiwan chooses independence. With FI
and WI the benefits of maintaining credibility and of maintaining China's
and Taiwan's separation from each other would exceed the cost of strained
relations with China. Between its non-help options, the U.s. prefers Taiwan
choosing conftderaq over cormnonloealth. The U.s. loses more credibility
from non-help if Taiwan offered c01lftderaq, because with cor~federacy Taiwan sacrifices more sovereignty. making it seem more conciliatory. Thus
the U.S. would be more obligated to defend Taiwan. Conversely. help when
Taiwan chooses cOllf:derrl~Y would be better than non-help if Taiwan
chooses commonwealth for the same reason. When Taiwan is more conciliatory. the obligation to defend is greater, and thus the higher the costs of
not defending.
To summarize, if Taiwan chooses conftdemqor commonwealth, then the
U.S. would be better off choosing JJelp. And the u.s. is better off helping
when Taiwan chooses conftdemcy than helping if it chooses commollwealtlr.
(16)
Fl>Wl>W2>F2.
But if Taiwan chooses independence, then the U.S. is better off choosing non-help. But 12 is preferred to W2 and F2 because again, the U.S. has
a greater obligation to intervene the more conciliatory Taiwan is. However, FI and- W'I are preferred to 12 because it is in the U.S.'s security interest to keep the two entities separate, and if Taiwan is seen as conciliatory the U.S. has justification. Finally, II is preferred to W2 and F2
because though the United States has no obligation to intervene if Taiwan
declares independence. intervening when not obligated and keeping Taiwan separate would be better than not intervening when obligated and
seeing a rise in Chinese power.
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Fl> Wl>I2>Il> W2>F2.
Beyond this point, payoff values are irrelevant for the United States
because for reunification and all nOll-invade scenarios the U.S. does not
play in the game. But I will complete the assignment of payoff values so
we can see the U.S. 's final utility. If Taiwan were to choose reunification,
then the U.S. would be better off than in any war scenario. Although the
U.S. would rather the two nations remain separate to contain the rise of
Chinese hegemony, the U.S. has demonstrated its preference tor a peaceful resolution in its longstanding policy of allowing the two sides to work
things out themselves. Thus,
(18)
RO>Fl.
The U.s. would also rather China and Taiwan bilaterally reunite than
China impose economic sanctions on Taiwan. Sanctions would cause a
regional economic disruption and cause U.S. exports to fall sharply. In
others words, though the U.S. would be better off geopolitically with n01/invade/sallction outcomes than with reunification, economically reunification would be more beneficial. Neither geopolitics nor economics are independent from each other, bur in this case I expect economic concerns to
dominate for two reasons.
(17)

First, a sharp export decline would cause the already-massive U.S.
trade deficit to swell to unacceptable proportions, considerably harming
the U.S.'s financial position. Second, the U.s. is currently devising other
solutions to containing China's hegemonic rise. The most notable one is
mai ntaining the balance of power in the region through strengthening
Japan by seeking a permanent seat in U.N. Security Council for the
island-nation. So though China would be strengthened by reunification,
its power can be offset by a more powerful Japan. For this reason the economic advantages of reunification would outweigh its political disadvantages. Thus reunification would yield higher payoff values for the United
States than non-invade/sanction scenarios.
Among the non-invadelstmction outcomes, all yield the same payoff
values because Assumption ') holds that in the case of sanctions Taiwan
will move towards independence regardless of what it originally offered.
The non-illvade/sa1lction scenarios would also be preferable to any war
scenarios, because the United States prt:fers any peaceful solution over
armed conflict. With war the regional economic disruption is even greater
than with sanctions. To summarize,
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(19)

RO>F3= W.3=LhFI.
Finally, non-illVlldelnoll-sanction scenarios are optimal for the United
States. They are peaceful solutions that keep the two entities separate
to certain degrees. Among those solutions, greater separation between
Taiwan and China results in a lower threat of Chinese hegemony and thus
greater payoffs for the U.s. So we have
(20)
[4> W4>F4>RO.
Combining (15) through (20) yields:
(21)

[4> W4>f4>[W>f3= W3=lhFl> Wl> [2> [l> W2>F2.

I n Table 1, I assign ordinal payoff values to outcomes for each player.

Outcome

Taiwan

China

U.S.

RO

2

12

8

FI

3

3

6

F2

1

6

1

F3

4

9

7

F4

5

11

9

WI

3

4

5

W2

1

7

2

W3

4

9

7

W4

6

10

10

lJ

3

5

3

12

1

8

4

13

4

2

7

14

7

1

11

Table 1: Payoff Values for Each Player
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Towards a Nash-Equilibrium Solution
With the ordinal values in place I now proceed to construct the extensive form game, shown in Figure 1. I will solve the Nash-equilibrium by
backwards induction.
Taiwan

r

cf

(2,12,8)

China

Ill!

~ Illifsc

~ n1l1 ~ sc

(4,9.1)

(5,11,9)

China

China

/lvlsc

~ nul~ sc

(4,9.1)

(6, 10,10)

/\ -h
(I ,6, I)

Legend
r - reunifIcation
Lf- confederacy
cw - commonwealth

h

/\

(3,4.5)

Ill'

~

fIlIlsc

(4,

l,~)

~ Iwl ~ sc

e, I, II)

us

us

h

(3,3,6)

idp

~

Nil

us

CIU

~j,

(I],2)

j,

A

(3,5.3)

~h

(1,8.4)

Ill' - invade
sc - sanction

h - help 1:1iwan

Figure 1: Extensive Form Game

Third-Mover: US.
If the U.S. is given (Lf !w), it chooses h. If given (ClV, llu), it chooses
h, If given (idp, IW), it chooses ~!J. So we eliminate F2, W2, and! I from
the game.

Second Mouer: China
If given (cf), China chooses ~Ill'/~SC. If given (ClU), China chooses
~nv/~sc. If given (idp), China chooses nv. This allows us to eliminate FI,
f3, WI, W3, 12, 13 and 14 from the game.
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First Mouer: 7iziwtl11
Taiwan, as the first mover, chooses from the entire ST and chooses cu',
which yields (cw, - nul, or W4, which has the highest remaining payoff
value of 6. China would receive a payoff of 10 and the U.S. 10. Hence W4
is the only Nash-equilibrium outcome.
Analysis of Results
The Nash-equilibrium, W4, is when Taiwan offers to unite with
China in a commonwealth and China decides not to invade or sanction.
The U.S. would not be drawn in. Invasion is an empty threat because the
U.S. will credibly defend Taiwan so long as Taiwan does not declare independence. This analysis reveals that economic blackmail will also be, in all
cases discllssed, an empty threat. While Han's model shows that the
prospect of American intervention will heighten the likelihood of conflict,
this model demonstrates that if compromise solutions are offered, war can
be averted. The compromises available to Taiwan and China are a commonwealth and a confederacy. With sovereignty being Taiwan's main
quest, and territorial integrity China's, these compromise regimes allow
both enrities to make gains from the status quo in their pursuits. Comparing the two regimes, a commonwealth gives Taiwan more sovereignty and
China less integrity. But a commonwealth is the more likely outcome because when China is offered either regime, the costs of invasion outweigh
the benefits. The absence of an invasion permits Taiwan to choose between the commonwealth and confederacy. It will choose a commonwealth because this regime type allows for greater sovereignty. The threat
of economic sanctions is also empty; China itself would lose economically
when it does not have to, and Taiwan would rather lose economically than
lose sovereignty. In this model, China would prefer to impose sanctions
rather than not if Taiwan declares independence. But in that case China
would be bener off attacking Taiwan anyway. From this I conclude that in
this crisis, economic blackmail would be an empty threat.
Conclusion
Previous game-theoretic works on the cross-strait crisis give Taiwan
and China two strategies in each game. Taiwan can either declare independence or maintain the status quo, and China can either attack or allow
the status quo. These dichotomies ignore concrete compromises between
independence and unification that scholars have proposed. This model
SICl'dA
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accounts for those compromises: it predicts that Taiwan will offer to form
a commonwealth with China, China will peacefully accept, and the
United States will not have to intervene. This model also reveals that Chinese threats of economic sanctions are not credible.
This finding has useful implications for further research. One possibility would be to merge this model with Benson and Niou's models to
form a more robust prediction, that is, construct a model that both includes uncertainty like that of Benson and Niou and accounts f<:)f the possihilities of the regime types examined in this model. Such a model would
show the impact of the crisis outcome for both American strategic commitments and regime-type possibilities.
Endnotes
1. Of course, reality is more complex. Eric Hyer has demonstrated that
the popular notion "China speaks with one voice on foreign policy" is false
(2005).
2. Daniel Damron has noted that rational choice is primarily concerned
with the aggregation of individual choices, not the individual choice itself
(200.~).

3. Some argue that having excessive commitments worldwide isrhe U.S.'s
problem; Buchanan notes that the U.S. has treaty guarantees to fifty countries and troops in one hundred countries (2004, 5-6).
4. The convention for extensive form games is to list a separate strategy
for every contingency (Cardon 2004; Mackay 2005). r;or example, China
would have !lV, - llvlsc, -llvl-sc for each strategy Taiwan chooses except r,
giving China a total of nine strategies. For simplicity and on the advice of
Jay Goodliffe I do not follow convention here (2005).
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